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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE ISOLATED AS THE REVOLUTIONARY:
HOW “LEFTOVER” MEN IN CHINA CHALLENGE HETERONORMATIVITY
In contemporary China, demographers estimate that 30 million men are single
because there are simply not enough women in the Chinese population, and the 2020
Chinese census shows that there are 34.9 million more men than women. These men are
called guanggun, which can be directly translated to “bare sticks/branches,” a slur that
indicates a lack of marriage and sex. In this project, I demonstrate that guanggun’s
singlehood marks them as the marginalized at the intersection of heteronormativity,
patriarchy, globalizing capitalism, and pronatalist governmentality. In a highly
heteronormative and patrilineal culture, guanggun are branded as abnormal/incomplete.
However, because most guanggun are poor men from rural China—the bottom of
hierarchical masculinities in contemporary China, they can hardly find a wife with the
severe female shortage and growing social inequalities. Meanwhile, the Chinese
government also reinforces the existing heteronormative culture with increasingly
pronatalist and pro-marriage policies. Under this pressure, many guanggun and their
parents resort to desperate, sometimes even illegal, measures to acquire a wife, such as
trafficking women domestically and internationally, which reproduces the vicious cycle of
gender-based violence. Building on the feminist and queer critiques of heteronormativity,
I argue that guanggun’s struggles in life are not from their singlehood but from
complicated, debilitating social structures that hinder guanggun from forming nonheteronormative, alternative relationality.
By listening to guanggun’s lived experiences, I believe we can learn crucial lessons
about heteronormativity and how to form alternative, meaningful connections. Far from
the stereotypical representation of guanggun in mainstream Culture, my fieldwork shows
the ambiguous—distressful yet resilient—lifeworld of guanggun. On the one hand, many
guanggun reinforce patriarchal heteronormativity by clinging onto binary, rigid gender
ideologies, which further push them into social isolation. On the other hand, some
guanggun manage to resist heteronormativity and social injustice by forming rich, atypical
relationships with humans, non-human beings, and objects outside of heteronormative
marriage. Their queer, abundant desires and connections generate revolutionary potential
to challenge existing gender norms, biopolitics, capitalist exploitation, and most
importantly, heteronormativity at both micro and macro levels.

KEYWORDS: Heteronormativity, the Hierarchy of Masculinities, Patriarchy, Social
Inequalities, Queer Lifeworlds
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CHAPTER 1. THE INTRODUCTION
“If you are still single at my age, everyone around you thinks there is something
wrong with you and tries to fix you,” Jade, a 39-year-old single man living in a small town
in Southeast China, said to me. His eyebrows twisted in pain while lips stretched into an
angle that resembled a smile. Jade is not alone. In contemporary China, demographers
estimate that 30 million men are single because there are simply not enough women in the
Chinese population (Guilmoto 2012; Poston Jr, Conde, and DeSalvo 2011), and the 2020
Chinese census shows that there are 34.9 million more men than women (The State Council
2021). This extreme female shortage comes from the strict population policies from the
1980s to 2015, to which many Chinese parents responded by aborting female fetuses or
abandoning daughters to make space for male offspring (Gerlach 2020). However, these
chosen sons face the ironic fate that the same patriarchal culture that dictated their survival
over their female counterparts now expects them to fulfill their patrilinear duties—enter a
heteronormative marriage and reproduce the familial line—against all odds. These men are
called guanggun1, which can be directly translated to “bare sticks/branches,” a slur that
indicates a lack of marriage and sex (Bolt 2004; Hudson and Boer 2004; Ebenstein and
Jennings 2009; Crow 2010; Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2011; Greenhalgh 2015).
In this project, I demonstrate how guanggun’s singlehood marks them as the
marginalized at the intersection of heteronormativity and multiple axes of social
inequalities. In a highly heteronormative and patrilineal culture, guanggun are branded as
abnormal/incomplete because “marriage and fatherhood are still essential to being ‘a real
Chinese man’” (Greenhalgh 2015, 360). Meanwhile, the Chinese government also

1

The term guanggun has identical singular and plural forms.
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reinforces the existing heteronormative culture with increasingly pronatalist and promarriage policies and propaganda (The Chinese Communist Party and The State Council
2021). However, because most guanggun are poor men from rural China—the bottom of
hierarchical masculinities in contemporary China, they can rarely find wives, given the
severe female shortage and growing social inequalities. Under this pressure, many
guanggun and their parents resort to desperate, sometimes even illegal, measures to acquire
a wife, such as trafficking women domestically and internationally, which reproduces the
vicious cycle of gender-based violence. Building on the feminist and queer critiques of
patriarchal heteronormativity and with archival data from the media representation of
guanggun, I argue that guanggun’s struggles in life are not from their singlehood but from
multi-level, intertwined forces that regard guanggun solely as instruments for various
patriarchal, heteronormative, biopolitical, and capitalist projects by not only continuing
pushing guanggun to pursuit the nearly-impossible heterosexual marriages but also
hindering guanggun from forming non-heteronormative, alternative relationality.
By listening to guanggun’s lived experiences from my interviews with them, I
learned crucial lessons about heteronormativity and how to form alternative, meaningful
connections, just like Ahmed’s (2010b) identifies in her happiness study that those outside
of happiness can offer valuable insights on happiness: “Perhaps the experiences of not
following, of being stressed, of not being extended by the spaces in which we reside, can
teach us more about happiness” (12). Far from the stereotypical representation of guanggun
in mainstream culture, my fieldwork shows the ambiguous—distressful yet resilient—
lifeworlds of guanggun. On the one hand, many guanggun reinforced patriarchal
heteronormativity by clinging to binary, rigid gender ideologies, which further pushed
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them into social isolation. On the other hand, some guanggun managed to reject the
instrumentalization of human lives and resist heteronormativity as well as social injustice
by forming rich, atypical attachments with humans, non-human beings, and objects outside
of heteronormative marriage. Their queer, abundant desires and connections generate
revolutionary potential to challenge existing gender norms, biopolitics, capitalist
exploitation, and most importantly, heteronormativity at both micro and macro levels.
In the following sections, I first introduce guanggun: their demographic and social
characteristics as well as the history that made guanggun, which particularly demonstrated
the vicious cycle of gender-based violence and hierarchical logic. Then, I introduce myself,
especially my positionality in relation to this project, how my perspective at the intersection
of gender and class as a lower class woman is uniquely useful in deconstructing the
violence of hierarchical logic, and how it shapes my theoretical and empirical approaches.
Afterward, I lay out my main arguments and their major intellectual lineages in feminism
and queer studies, to which I hope my work manages to contribute. I start by identifying
guanggun’s status as the bottom class in contemporary China and the exploitation against
them by globalizing capitalism and biopolitical projects from the Chinese government.
Then, I illustrate how guanggun’s social position at the bottom of hierarchical masculinities
demands an intersectional understanding of patriarchy and heteronormativity at the levels
of social structures and personal desires. Lastly, I showcase how guanggun’s lived
experiences manifest a feminist critique of the patriarchal kinship system and a queer
potential of alternative relationality. In the end, I conclude this introductory chapter with a
preview of the next three chapters that make up the rest of my dissertation.

3

1.1

Who are Guanggun?
Guanggun are a unique social group in both size and structure. Thirty million is the

most widespread estimated number of guanggun in contemporary China, although not
everyone agrees with this number (Guilmoto 2012). Despite that the 2020 Chinese census
showed 34.9 million more men than women in the Chinese population (Heng 2021), the
Chinese government still argues that the “real” number of guanggun is way smaller than
30 million by citing the 2020 census data that there are only 17.52 million more males than
females for the 20–40 age group (Mei and Jiang 2021). However, guanggun are not just
people aged from 20 to 40 years old, as studies reveal that many guanggun are more than
40 years old (Attané and Yang 2018; S. Wang, Yang, and Eklund 2021). Males who are
younger than 20 years old will also face the consequences of female shortage one day.
Structure-wise, these 30 million single men are not evenly distributed among the Chinese
population. Rather, most of them are from socially disadvantaged groups—the poor, the
rural, the less educated, and sometimes the mentally and/or physically disabled (Attané and
Yang 2018), who are left out of marriage by the cultural norm of female hypergamy and
deepening social inequalities.
Although guanggun is often framed as a men’s issue, it is inseparable from the
cultural practices around women and gender, as well as intersectional inequalities of
region, class, and ability. When men born after the 1980s reach the age of marriage, they
and their families notice how hard it is to find a wife, especially for men who are poor, less
educated, live in rural areas, and/or disabled. In the context of a severe female shortage,
guanggun are selectively left out because of the widespread and long-lasting tradition of
female hypergamy in China, which refers to the practice of women marrying men of higher
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socioeconomic status (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016; J. Yu and Xie 2015; Y. Xie 2013; Y. Qian
and Qian 2014a). In a patriarchal culture where women do not have the right to inherit
property from their parents 2 , marrying upward is a popular way for women to obtain
resources and achieve social mobilization. Moreover, the status differences also uphold the
male-dominant and female-subordinate patriarchal culture. With the female shortage, it is
now much easier for women to marry upward. One popular form of female hypergamy is
rural Chinese women marrying urban men for the housing, educational, and healthcare
welfare exclusively enjoyed by urban Chinese3. As a result, about 30 million disadvantaged
rural men are left out of the marriage market (Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2012b; J. Li
and Li 2021; Jiang, Zhang, and Sánchez-Barricarte 2015).
Due to its unique size and demographics, guanggun has attracted increasing
attention from scholars, politicians, and mass media, each using this heated topic to push
for their respective agendas. Some worry that a large group of adult males without family
responsibilities could threaten social stability (J. D. Tucker et al. 2005; Jiang and SánchezBarricarte 2011; Xiao-yi Jin et al. 2012; R. Yan and Da 2019; Tsang 2020). Some blame
women for guanggun’s singlehood (Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2012b; Jiang, Zhang,
and Sánchez-Barricarte 2015; Y. Wei and Zhang 2016; Nbd.Com 2019). However, these
popular views are limited because they obscure the history of violence behind guanggun—
the devaluation of women and the removal of girls. Without knowing where guanggun

2

Although the Chinese law states that men and women have equal rights to inherit property from their
parents, but the law asks parents to choose who to give their property. Given the patrilineal culture in China,
this parental choice often results in damaging women’s rights to inherit properties in real life (GenderinChina
2022).
3 Given the recent reforms in China’s household registration system (hukou), one might question the
prevalence of hypergamy between rural women and urban men. However, the reforms do not substantially
change the urban-rural inequality and regional inequality in China. Therefore, the status difference that
motivates this form of female hypergamy still exists.
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come from, we risk repeating the same mistakes from the violence of hierarchical logic—
when one group of people is deemed less and harm-able, the consequences of that harm
will extend to the rest social members. After all, feminist scholars have long told us that
gender is relational (Butler 1988; Connell 2001; Goldner 1991; West and Zimmerman
1987; Gardiner 2012, 2013, 2002; Beasley 2005). Although guanggun appear to be a men’s
problem, its root cause is violence against women.
Guanggun come from a collective mistake made by numerous individuals’
“rational” choices rooted in misogyny in traditional Chinese reproductive culture and
gendered policies by the Chinese government. Since the 1970s, the Chinese government
has implemented a series of policies, under the umbrella term “family planning policy,” to
slow down the population growth in China (Greenhalgh 2008; Ebenstein 2010; M. K. Chan
2011). The policy required all Chinese to drastically reduce the number of children per
couple from an average of six to one. However, one unintended consequence happened
when this number restriction clashed with the patrilineal reproductive culture, which only
views male decedents as legitimate heirs of the family wealth and cultural lineage—having
no son means the cultural death of a family line. This son-preference can be shown in this
Ancient Chinese song: “Sons shall be born to him: They will be put to sleep on couches;
They will be clothed in robes; They will have scepters to play with; . . . Daughters shall be
born to him: They will be put to sleep on the ground; They will be clothed with wrappers;
They will have tiles to play with” (L. H. Liu, Karl, and Ko 2013, 113). Although this is a
song from ancient China, it indicates the long-lasting tradition of son preferences and
daughter devaluation that is present in contemporary China (Hinton and Gordon 2008).

6

Essentially, the son preference in traditional Chinese reproductive culture was
ideologically supported by the Chinese government with both tacit consent and complicit
policies that devalue a girl as “half a person.” To pacify the resistance from son-craving
parents, the Chinese government also invented a gender-discriminative policy called 1.5Child Policy, which allows couples whose first child was a girl to have a second child (M.
K. Chan 2011; Greenhalgh and Li 1995). To ensure a boy within the policy restriction,
more and more Chinese parents resorted to the old practice of female infanticide and
abandonment. The “lucky” girls were left in front of orphanages shortly after being born,
with some of them surviving and getting adopted eventually by international adoptees (K.
A. Johnson 2016; Evans 2000). The “unlucky” ones were immediately killed or abandoned
in unlikely-survivable places, such as in the middle of a cornfield (Shang, Wu, and Li 2005;
King 2014; Gerlach 2020). With the availability of ultrasound technology to determine a
fetus’s sex as early as three months of pregnancy, sex-selective abortions have become the
common method for Chinese parents to remove unwanted female fetuses and make space
for sons (Gerlach 2020; Junhong 2001; B. D. Miller 2001; Nie 2011; C. Zhou et al. 2012).
The powerful combination of active femicide and a sexist policy resulted in a severely
unbalanced sex ratio at birth and in childhood—many more boys survived while a
corresponding number of girls disappeared.
In the 1990s, demographers noticed something was very wrong with China’s
population. In general, the male to female sex ratio at birth (SRB) of a population should
be between 103 and 107, but, according to sociologist Poston and demographer Zhang
(2009), “in 1980 China had an SRB only slightly above 107, it began to increase in the late
1980s, reaching a value of 115 by 1990, a value of 120 in 2000, and 118 in 2005” (58).
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Another abnormal index is the infant mortality rate—girls usually have a slightly higher
survival rate than boys. However, the Chinese girls’ death rate is much higher than boys:
Cao, Lei, and Wu (2013) discovered that the male to female sex ratio of infant death in
China was 105 in 1981, decreased to 87 by 1989, and further to 72 by 2000, and the high
female mortality rate could come from parental neglect, abuse, and sometimes even active
killing. Here, an abnormally large number of boys were born every year, and a similarly
abnormally high number of girls died every year. When the surviving boys and girls grow
up, the result is 30 million guanggun who simply could not find a woman with whom to
enter monogamous, heterosexual marriages.
When girls were killed to make space for boys, the vicious cycle of gender-based
violence gained its full force. The other side of guanggun is femicide, or more specifically,
female infanticide, but the violence does not stop with killing girls. With a severe shortage
of women, many men from disadvantaged social positions—poor, rural, uneducated,
and/or slightly disabled—are left single because high-status men are more likely to attract
the few available women as marriage partners (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016). As a result,
marginalized men are left single in the difficult space between hierarchical masculinities
and heteronormativity. Guanggun are viewed as socially incomplete, defective, and
lacking because marriage is still canonized as the gate to adulthood and a promising future
in contemporary China (Wong 2016; Y. B. Zhang et al. 2005; Jin et al. 2013; Attané and
Yang 2018).
Desperate to end singlehood, guanggun and their families entered another vicious
cycle of gender-based violence. Although human trafficking is a crime in China, it has
become a solution to the guanggun crisis in rural China (Hudson and Boer 2004, 2005;
8

Human Rights Watch 2019; Davis 2006; Duong, Belanger, and Hong 2007; Gunia 2019;
Stöckl et al. 2017; Yan and Da 2019). In addition, this illegal solution is generally
supported by the whole village and rural culture because an individual woman’s pain is
negligible compared to a family’s shame of discontinuing their family line per the
traditional reproductive culture in rural China. To make it even harder for women to escape,
some human traffickers target women who are from other countries as they cannot
speak/read Chinese. The term “Vietnamese bride” has become a coded term for
international human trafficking (Duong, Belanger, and Hong 2007; Guan C. and Feng
2017; M. Liu 2015; Stöckl et al. 2017). According to the estimation, there are 100,000
Vietnamese brides who were transported to China via different channels (Elitestalk 2019),
I will discuss this topic with more details in Chapter Two.
This is the domino effect of gendered violence: When one is harmed, it begins a
vicious cycle that harms everyone. When one group of people is deemed as harm-able, the
consequences of that harm will extend to the rest of society. However, power inequality
does matter; not everyone is equally hurt by the cycle of violence. The harm is unequally
distributed along the hierarchy of social inequalities, and the ones who are hurt the worst
are the most otherized, marginalized groups. Guanggun’s story started with the killing of
girls and proceeded to traffic women—one form of violence against women leads to the
other. In my writing, I strive to cut out this vicious cycle of hierarchal violence and to
imagine a way to connect without exclusion or otherization, one that opens up the
possibilities for egalitarian co-existence in differences.

9

1.2

Who am I to Write about Guanggun?
While writing about guanggun, I keep asking myself the following questions: Who

am I to write about guanggun? How is my perspective unique or useful for this issue? Why
are my words important? After all, there is already plentiful discussion about guanggun in
contemporary China, ranging from amusing jokes to serious government documents.
However, despite apparent abundance, there are only two narrow perspectives in existing
discussions of guanggun. The first type comes from the beneficiaries of the same
patriarchal culture that produced guanggun, and their main purpose is to minimize
guanggun’s threat to the status quo. The second voice comes from feminists who accurately
criticize the patriarchal culture that chose men’s lives over women, but their critiques
sometimes demonize guanggun while ignoring how guanggun are also marginalized by the
existing gender order and social inequalities. In my dissertation, I aim to tear apart the first
type of discussion and move one step further on the path established by the second type.
I strive to do so because I share the same marginalized socio-economic class status
as guanggun but the opposite gender position. Born a woman under the 1.5-Child Policy
in a remote Chinese village, I am on the other side of the guanggun coin. The logic behind
the 1.5-Child Policy is that a girl only counts as half a person while a boy is considered a
full person. I was the half-person, and my younger brother was the full person. It is via the
cultural devaluation of my personhood that my brother gained the chance to be born. I did
not die from female infanticide, but I was damaged growing up being told that I was less
than boys, that my demands for gender equality were unnecessarily combative, and that
my personal aspiration did not matter compared to my future roles as a wife and mother. I
come from a line of devalued female lives. My mother was abandoned immediately after
she was born because her birth parents did not see much value in raising another girl. My
paternal grandmother was sold to my grandfather’s family when she was five years old as
a “bride raised from childhood (tongyangxi).” Before her death at 90 years old, she still
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vividly remembered the feeling of almost starving to death because my grandfather’s
family refused to feed her enough food. Devalued yet still alive, we are survivors of
femicide in traditional Chinese reproductive culture, and I am here to tell my version of
this history with evidence-based research. As I mentioned above, many existing studies
and popular discussions on guanggun still follow the same patriarchal logic that produced
guanggun and the violence against women. These perspectives, if adopted, would only
further the vicious cycle of gender-based violence.
At the same time, some of my sufferings are from an experience that I share with
guanggun—the experience of living as the bottom class in Chinese society. This
experience, sadly, is not recognized by many contemporary Chinese feminists, most of
whom come from the middle-upper class in urban China and are privileged by urban-rural
inequality—the most prominent form of social inequalities in China (Luzhou Li 2015; A.
X. Wu and Dong 2019). Rural Chinese are stigmatized as backward peasants, deprived of
any welfare support from the state, and discriminated against as second-class citizens in
the political structure represented by the household registration system, hukou (a concept
that I discuss in detail in the next section and in Chapter Two). Meanwhile, urban Chinese
are viewed as more civilized, availing of healthcare and education well-funded by the state,
and holding the desired urban-hukou status (Chenchen Zhang 2018; K. W. Chan 2019; F.L. Wang 2022). My first cultural shock happened when I got enrolled in an urban school
at 11-years-old; the contempt my urban classmates directed at rural students like me still
makes me self-conscious in public spaces even after almost 20 years. Now, as a feminist
scholar, I cannot stop myself from noticing that some of my most admired feminists discuss
guanggun with the same contempt as if guanggun should be left rotten by themselves as
backward rural men. Their discussions rarely bother to examine guanggun’s lived
experiences—the experiences of living as the bottom class—the experiences that I share
with guanggun and that partially define me. As much as feminism empowers me the
strength to rebel against patriarchy, a part of me will always be muted by a feminism that
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demonizes rural, lower-class Chinese like me. Similarly, Dai Jinhua (2018), a
contemporary Chinese feminist, also notices the intersectionality of class and gender when
she studies gender and feminism in Chinese cinema: “I then realize that talking about
gender problems meant talking about class problems. …. I don’t want to be a kind of
feminist who left out these other problems, who did ‘only’ feminism” (163-164).
I mainly used two methods for this project: noticing and interviewing. Even outside
of my research life, I spent quite some time being a quiet browser: sometimes immediately
upon waking up in the morning, and sometimes before falling asleep at night, I would skim
through what everyone else was reading, commenting on, watching, reposting, and sharing
without saying a word or making a gesture myself. All I do is to notice what happened and
write down mental or digital notes. A lot of the archival materials in my dissertation are
accumulated through this habit of noticing. Honestly, I did not think much about this habit
until now that I have to write about my methods. Is it even counted as a method? I
questioned myself until I stumbled upon Anna Tsing’s expansive yet attentive work on
mushrooms, where she presents her method as arts of noticing: “I practice arts of noticing.
I comb through the mess of existing worlds-in-the making, looking for treasures—each
distinctive and unlikely to be found again, at least in that form” (Tsing 2015, 255). For me,
the action of noticing feels safe; I get to be in close contact with the worlds-in-the-making
but not consumed by it. If I just notice without leaving a trace, nobody will notice my
noticing. My habit of noticing is from a place of habitual muting: I have been policed for
what I say and how I say it for a long time, as a woman, as a lower-class woman, as a
woman of color, as a feminist, as an educated woman, as someone who uses English as
their second language. It felt risky and vulnerable to write this dissertation when I pulled
out materials from the archive accumulated via my habitual noticing. In this project, I
define archival data as publicly accessible information that is not collected or generated by
me (Elder, Pavalko, and Clipp 1993). The archival data on guanggun I cited in my project
includes news articles popped up on my screen, essays/images/videos shared by my
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research participants on their social media pages, viral popular cultural products circulated
in my friend circle (pengyou quan), a key feature of the most popular social media in
China—WeChat. Together, they form a rough representation of the world, or a discursive
universe, that guanggun live in, but they often erase the nuance and ambiguity in
guanggun’s lived experiences.
Coming out of habitual muting is not easy, but I want to put my writing out here
because guanggun are highly visible and invisible at the same time—they are highly visible
in stereotypical representations, but their lived experiences remain largely invisible. I try
to collect guanggun’s lived experiences by talking with them via WeChat. It is the best I
can do in the COVID-19 global pandemic, although it is by no means the best method. I
know that talking with guanggun is the start of something better than stereotypical
representations when my interviewees thanked me for listening to them at the end of our
conversations. For many of them, living as the bottom class in contemporary China means
that they are regarded as the abject against which the society should progress away from—
always referred to but rarely seen or heard. By talking to them, I hope to expose the power
structures that lock them at the bottom of the social hierarchies in contemporary China. In
her book about happiness, Sarah Ahmed invites readers to rewrite the history from the
viewpoint of the wretch: “If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their
wretchedness would no longer belong to them” (Ahmed 2010b, 17). I hope my
conversations with guanggun can add their viewpoints to my dissertation and the
discussions about guanggun in general. However, I do worry that conversations might not
be good enough by themselves.
Like many researchers caught in the COVID-19 global pandemic, I had to adapt
my data collection plans to the reality of international travel bans and lockdowns. I planned
to conduct ethnography because I had long admired its power: “An ethnographic sensibility
may have something to contribute to elucidating how emergent intersections of temporality
might make possible contingent, ironic, and above all imbricated stances toward structures
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of domination” (Boellstorff 2007, 240). In other words, ethnography can make visible what
the power structures work to conceal; it is good at making a mess in social engineering
projects that attempt to play god. I envisioned shadowing guanggun when they eat, work,
rest, and socialize so I could immerse myself in their narratives, lifeworld, and temporality.
However, I ended up interviewing guanggun online because I was stuck in the US, half a
globe and 13-hour time zones away.
Online data collection is increasingly common among researchers with the
popularity of the internet and social media. For example, Tingting Liu (2019) studies
Chinese masculinity via online ethnography because of the prevalence of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) in the everyday lives of Chinese rural migrant
laborers. Meanwhile, ethnographers try to remind newbie researchers like me that the key
element of ethnography remains unchanged, online or on-site: “The goal is to grasp
everyday perspectives by participating in daily life, rather than to subject people to
experimental stimuli or decontextualized interviews” (Boellstorff et al. 2012). I feel lucky
that I could still talk with my research participants across oceans and continents, but I do
not claim ethnography because I did not participate in guanggun’s daily life. I have not
eaten at the restaurants they frequented, visited the tiny, crowded dorm rooms they rested
in every night, or witnessed how they repeated the same motion thousands of times a day
at their workstations. In 2021, I interviewed 30 single men aged from 28 to 40 via WeChat,
the most popular Chinese social media. These men reached out to me after seeing my
recruitment ad shared around over WeChat. Each interview lasted at least two hours long.
Among the 30 research participants, I followed up with nine of them with monthly
interviews from February 2021 to October 2021. In addition to the interviews, I also
collected and analyzed the texts, images, songs, and videos posted on their social media or
shared directly with me from Feb. 2021 to Feb. 2022.
In this paragraph, I introduce the basic demographics of my 30 research
participants. Although existing studies disagree on the specific definition of guanggun,
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they all agree that guanggun are rural men who are still single well past the marriable age.
In my study, I recruited men who were over 25 years old—the average age of marriage for
Chinese men, and from rural China. Among the 30 interviewees, their ages ranged from 28
to 40 with an average of 32 years old. All of them were born in rural China with rural
household registration, and all of them had either studied or worked in urban China. Five
of them had post-secondary education, while the rest had high school or less education
levels. 15 of them did not have any siblings, 9 of them had at least one brothers, and 6 of
them had at least one sisters. In terms of occupation, 24 of them were migrant workers in
various industries such as construction, manufacturing, and service, while six of them
worked in or near their hometowns in local governments or organizations. 29 of them
reported overworking frequently, and 23 of them shared that they were not happy with their
income levels.
I recognize that online interviewing is quite different from in-person interviewing.
First, it was more difficult to establish trust at the beginning of each interview when the
rich materiality of lifeworld got filtered out by screens. I share many traits with my research
participants as rural Chinese: tanned skin, rural accent, never hesitating to sit on the ground,
and knowing food is not grown in grocery stores. However, these traits could not be easily
delivered to my interviewees, most of whom see me as an out-of-touch elite who graduated
from China’s best university and currently studies in the US because I revealed my
education information in the recruitment ad. For them, I did not appear as one of them, so
they assumed that I must have no knowledge of their life; my motive to study them
therefore appeared as questionable. For example, one interviewee directly told me that I
knew nothing about them, that I should watch a documentary on migrant workers before
interviewing him, and that I was one of the upper class. When I was questioned this way,
I did not argue with them or try to prove that I also came from a poor, rural family. Rather,
I admitted to them that I did have very limited experiences with guanggun and that I
sincerely hoped they could share their experiences with me. After all, I am privileged to
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have an uninterrupted education for 23 years as a woman from rural China. I have read
many books on migrant workers, but my real-life knowledge about Chinese working-class
people is quite limited.
Second, online interviews demanded more emotional labor from me. Aware of this
lack of trust, I second-guessed myself more often as I could not quite accurately perceive
the interviewees’ attitudes via exchanges on WeChat. At first, I was a bit nervous to ask
personal questions, and I always explained to my interviewees that they didn’t have to
answer a question if they were not comfortable. When they did not reply for whatever
reason, I would then apologize profusely because I thought my question somehow offended
them. However, as I talked more and more with them, I started to feel increasingly
comfortable, and they also grew used to me and my questions about marriage,
reproduction, and sexuality. Furthermore, they would even voluntarily share their recent
intimate troubles with me and ask for my opinions. Located behind the screens most of the
time, I am more often seen as an intellectual abstraction than a person with a body of the
opposite sex. As a result, it is easier for people to open up and share intimate information
about their sexuality because they could not see my female body right in front of their eyes.
However, it also means that people can be more disrespectful—several men I talked with
directly told me that Chinese women are worthless and shared many misogynist videos and
images with me. My first response was to ignore my anger so I could continue the
interview, but sometimes it became too difficult for me to continue without stepping away
from the screen and calming myself down. Luckily, online interviewing also offers more
space for emotional self-care because it is easier to walk away from a screen than a person.
Third, online interviews are more fragmented and repetitive compared to in-person
interviews. Most men I interviewed work full time, some even on weekends—they left our
WeChat screen when they were busy and returned to it when things slowed down. Rather
than finishing a whole interview in one setting, shorter interviews would be conducted
across the span of days and weeks. As a result, this longer process was better at generating
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trust between both parties. Moreover, I could also reflect on and adjust my interview
strategies per the interview process. Lastly, we used many coded languages as both my
interviewees and I were well-aware of the censorship on WeChat by the Chinese
government. As I discuss in later chapters, my research participants still managed to deliver
their criticism towards the Chinese government and society despite the intense censorship
on the Chinese internet.
In this project, I hope to provide critical attention to both gender inequality and
other dimensions of social inequalities in contemporary China. Theoretically, my project
is informed by feminism, especially intersectional feminism, and the sharp critique of
heteronormativity in queer studies. Empirically, my analysis is based on archival data on
guanggun and interview data from guanggun’s lived experiences. My perspective, as a
feminist and a scholar of social justice, can offer a way out of this vicious cycle of
patriarchal violence. Instead of pathologizing guanggun, I demonstrate how guanggun’s
lifeworld fosters queer, abundant relationality outside of heteronormativity. Based on
feminist methodology, I do not attempt to disguise my research as the “seeing everything
from nowhere” god trick (Haraway 1988, 581). Rather, I want to add my unique, partial
perspectives to “webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations”
(Haraway 1988, 584). For me, writing the story of guanggun is a journey of self-healing
as well as healing the culture that harmed me and the majority of people living in it. Here
I am providing a new cultural imagination, a queer, feminist speculation of inter-being
connections (Tsing 2015; Haraway 2018; Muñoz 2009).
1.3

Exploiting the Bottom Class
In my fieldwork, many research participants frequently expressed a feeling of being

disciplined by a nameless force. For example, Xie, a 29-year-old construction worker in
Hebei province, told me, “I think there is something wrong with this society, but there is
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nothing I can do to change it. All I can do is to try my best and live by the rules.” In this
section, I will reveal that this nameless force is the intersectional structure of patriarchal
heteronormativity with capitalism and neoliberal biopolitics. In the case of guanggun, these
various forms of social inequalities are manifested in the hierarchy of masculinities, in
which guanggun are marginalized as the bottom class. Guanggun’s bottom class status is
from three interlocking structural forces in contemporary China: the urban-rural divide that
marks rural Chinese as second-class citizens, the capitalist economic reform that drives
rural Chinese to leave their hometown and work in cities as migrant workers without much
legal support or protection, and the patriarchal heteronormativity that pushes single men to
the bottom of the hierarchy of masculinities. I argue that locking guanggun into the bottom
class facilitates the capitalist and biopolitical exploitation against them as instruments, and
the exploitation and instrumentalization further push guanggun into social isolation.
“This country does not offer any future for people like me in the bottom class,”
Snow was a 30-year-old migrant worker from Henan province, worked in an electronics
factory in Shenzhen, identified as the bottom class, an identity shared by many guanggun
I interviewed, especially by those who were rural migrant workers in urban China. Diceng
(the bottom class) is often loosely translated as subaltern in relevant studies on rural
migrant workers and class disparity in contemporary China (H. F. Xiao 2021; Zhong 2021;
T. Liu 2019; W. Sun 2014), and it refers to poorly-paid workers who migrant from rural
China to work in cities. As poorly educated rural young men, the majority of guanggun are
migrant workers doing manual labor in urban China with minimum wage. According to
the survey by Attané et al. (2019), nearly 75% of guanggun have been migrant workers,
and more than 50% of them have at least three years of experiences as migrant workers.
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Without a local urban hukou, migrant workers do not have access to the housing, education,
and healthcare resources in the cities they work. Hukou is a residential registration system
that marks a person’s legal status and access to social benefits in a specific location; those
Chinese with urban hukou in big cities can enjoy the state welfare while migrant workers
are expected to be self-sufficient laborers, providing labor without taking up any resources
for “housing the family, retirement, and educating and feeding future members of the labor
force” (K. W. Chan 2019, 11). Convenient and under-paid, rural migrants and their lowcost labor has made China the world factory (Pun 2005; Guang et al. 2010). Even with the
current hukou reforms that loosen up hukou restrictions in smaller cities, rural migrants are
still excluded from opportunity-rich big cities and branded as undesirable “low-end
population” (CMP 2017). The hukou reforms have limited effects on social equity and
further reinforce ableist social inequalities with its point system based on education and
income.
As a result, guanggun are cast to the bottom of hierarchical masculinities. The
hierarchy of masculinities refers to the observation that masculinity is not singular but
made of different types of masculinities, ranked hierarchically according to the power
structure of a given society (Kimmel, Hearn, and Connell 2005; Connell 2000). Hegemonic
masculinity is viewed as the ideal manifestation of manhood and ranked at the top of any
given hierarchy of masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). However, the
hierarchy of masculinities and the expressions of hegemonic masculinity change in
different historical and cultural contexts. In contemporary China, the hierarchy of
masculinities is ranked in two interlocking aspects—wealth and access to women (W. Luo
2017b). In a female hypergamous marriage culture, a man’s competitive value is decided
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by how much upward social mobility a man can offer to a woman and her family (Y. Wei
and Zhang 2016). Guanggun’s bottom class status as migrant workers extends to the
marriage market, where rural men are disproportionately left single because marrying a
man with urban hukou enables a rural woman to change her hukou status and have access
to the benefits enjoyed by urban citizens (Y. Hu 2017; Chenchen Zhang 2018; Guang et al.
2010). Meanwhile, guanggun’s bachelorhood further pushes them to the bottom of the
hierarchy of masculinities since marriage status is a crucial aspect of hegemonic
masculinity in contemporary China (Zurndorfer 2016; W. Luo 2017b). In other words,
guanggun are single because of their marginalized socioeconomic positions, but they are
further marginalized in the hierarchy of masculinities because of their singlehood.
Guanggun are also exploited by the intertwined power structure of patriarchy and
capitalism in the face of intensified economic inequality. As China transits from a socialist
society that centered on political power to a capitalist society that centers on consumption
and wealth accumulation, the patriarchy in contemporary China has adapted to moneyworshiping capitalism (Dai 2018), and guanggun are expected to enhance their masculine
status by achieving financial success. They are told that money is the key for them to find
a wife, be responsible for their family, and be a real man. Moreover, they are told that
financial success is achievable for them as long as they work hard enough, are smart
enough, or know how to hustle despite the burden of generational poverty. Many men I
talked with kept emphasizing that marriage and relationships should be on the side burner
until they have a successful career. For example, Dong, a 29-year-old apprentice
photographer in Guangzhou, shared with me that he would not worry about relationships
until he had a successful career. As a result, many guanggun voluntarily throw themselves
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into the culture of overworking and ignore the structural inequality underlying their
poverty, a topic that I explain in the following pages.
Such ideologies from patriarchal capitalism facilitate the exploitation of the mass
to profit a few. For example, K. W. Chan (2019) identifies that the cheap labor provided
by hard-working rural migrant workers is the reason behind the famous “China price” that
has fueled the expansion of globalized capitalism. In Dai Jinhua’s (2018) analysis,
“capitalism was always already tending toward a global expansion… it understood the
whole world as its resource, labor, and market domain” (155). Capitalists in developed
countries notice that moving their factories to developing countries would be more
profitable for them because of the lower labor cost and lack of laborer protection in places
like China. Hence, they closed up domestic factories even though it meant job loss for
millions of their fellow citizens and opened up oversea factories with inhumane working
conditions. Many rural migrants work in these factories with minimum wages and unsafely
long hours. For instance, as a factory worker, Snow only makes $350 per month, even with
extra shifts that average 12 hours a day and six days a week. In addition, “996” is common
in many IT workplaces, meaning from nine AM to nine PM and six days a week (Yip
2021). According to the survey data from EPS Data (2019), Chinese migrant workers in
the service industry work over 50 hours weekly.
Instead of implementing effective labor protection laws to help workers bargain
against demanding working hours and conditions, the Chinese government spends more
energy on crushing pro-worker labor movements (Crothall 2018; Howell 2021). Since the
open and reform in the 1970s, the Chinese government has adopted an economic
development strategy heavily depending on foreign investments and exporting “made-in21

China” products. Local governments would get praised by the Chinese Communist Party
if they successfully attracted foreign investment or created an investment-friendly
environment with tax cuts and exploitable labor (H. Sun 2018; Y. D. Wei 2013). Most of
these foreign investments take the form of manufacturing factories that produce various
“made-in-China” products. With the dollars earned from exporting Chinese commodities,
the Chinese government can buy advanced technologies and national debts from developed
countries to boost China’s status in global politics (Kaur, Bhalla, and Nazneen 2020; Qiu
and Wei 2019; Dai 2018). This development strategy has resulted in China’s rapid
economic development in the past decades, which in turn backed up the nationalist politics
in contemporary China, making it nearly impossible to criticize the Chinese government
(Y. Zheng, Pan, and D’Costa 2012; Y. Zheng and Xin 2017; G. Yang 2019; Helleiner and
Wang 2019). Moreover, any pro-laborer social organization or movement is labeled as an
ill-intentioned foreign force to disrupt the harmonious society in China (Howell 2021).
These anti-laborer measurements further crush “the illusion that the state could be anything
but a realm for securing the reproduction of the powerful and the wealthy in society” (Liu,
Karl, and Ko 2013, 23), an illusion that has been sharply criticized by Chinese feminist HeYin Zhen, a Marxist Anarchist feminist who was active from the 1900s to the 1920s who
firmly believed that the government would not promote social justice because the
government itself was an instrument to maintain the patriarchal status quo and reproduce
social hierarchies.
Increasing capitalism and lack of laborer protection have led to severe economic
disparity and little chance of social mobility. Poor men like guanggun are trapped in
poverty despite working multiple shifts in a harsh working environment—the basic salary
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for many factory jobs is so low that extra shifts only make a livable wage (Y. Gong 2018).
However, the paradigm of happiness stays the same: a heterosexual couple with at least
one biological child, a house in urban China, and at least one car (Kuan 2015). Yet, it is
no longer possible for the working-class to achieve this dream. Making $350 per month,
Snow was still trying to save money, but it was practically impossible with that income
while living in an expensive city like Shenzhen. According to China Admission (Chiu n.d.),
The average monthly cost of living in Shenzhen for a single person is $1,744. When I asked
him whether he wanted to get married, he answered in despair: “There is no hope for the
bottom class to make enough money to support a family and to live a life with dignity. No
future, only endless exploitation.”
In addition, many people found it hard to have a life outside of work or cultivate
interpersonal connections with such long working hours. For example, Dong told me that
he “really has no time to find a girlfriend” because he needs to work 11 hours a day, even
on weekends. The demanding work schedule leaves many guanggun too busy to connect
with other people. In this context, many Chinese are unwilling to have more than one child
if they manage to get married. As a result, China has entered an ultra-low birth rate for a
decade, with a fertility rate of 1.3 per the 2020 census data (S. Yang, Jiang, and SánchezBarricarte 2022). With the low birth rate comes a shortage of labor force and a slow
economy (Ke and Li 2021; Cui, Meng, and Lu 2018). Instead of addressing the economic
disparity and labor exploitation, the Chinese government responded by focusing on
extreme poverty in rural China with poverty alleviation programs 4 instead of addressing
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The current policy is called “Targeted Poverty Alleviation,” which sends government workers in villages
to offer material support, such as housing, food, and money, as well as occupational training.
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the labor exploitation that the vast majority of workers suffer from in contemporary China
(H. Zhang et al. 2018).
Moreover, the government aims to reinforce its biopolitical exploitation of the
Chinese bottom class with pronatalist policies and propaganda that educate its citizen to
reproduce for the society and the nation (Alpermann and Zhan 2019; The Chinese
Communist Party and The State Council 2021). These biopolitical arguments do not
consider the personal happiness of guanggun. Rather, they view guanggun’s biological
bodies as instruments to achieve specific cultural and governmental goals. For example,
Bing, a 30-year-old man who returned to work in his village after graduating college,
personally preferred the single life, but he still believed that he was responsible to others
and the society: “I should abide by social norms, get married, and have children.”
Guanggun also faces biopolitical exploitation from patriarchal culture in China, where a
male offspring is responsible for continuing the bloodline of his family. For instance, Nine,
a 35-year-old online merchant in Guangzhou, did not care for biological reproduction
himself, but he wanted to have a child so his parents could have enough motivation to live
another 20 years.
Guanggun are exploited as the bottom class. They are branded as the bottom class
in contemporary China because most of them are rural migrant workers suffering from
urban-rural inequality and severe social discrimination against rural Chinese. Their bottom
class status marks them as cheap, disposable labor that is indispensable for the expansion
of globalizing capitalism, which exploits them with inhumane working conditions,
extremely long hours, and barely livable wages. However, such exploitation is not
regulated but facilitated by the Chinese government, who not only embraces marketization
24

but also develops its unique state-sponsored capitalism that thrives on biopolitical
exploitation against its citizens. As I demonstrate in the next section, these structural forces,
along with patriarchal heteronormativity, form a debilitating power structure that stops
guanggun from fulfilling personal desires and pursuing meaningful connections.

1.4

Failing Patriarchal Heteronormativity
Per patriarchal heteronormativity, guanggun are marked as failures, branded as

abnormal because a single man is not viewed as a real man (Greenhalgh 2015), and
imagined as incomplete, deficient beings with a hopeless future. Snow painfully described
the treatment he received: “I don’t know how to face that failed-me in the eyes of relatives,
friends, and neighbors. For them, I don’t have anything, no goal, no dream, no tomorrow.”
In the following paragraphs, inspired by feminist critiques of patriarchy and queer analyses
of heteronormativity, I identify how patriarchal heteronormativity regards guanggun as
instruments for patriarchal dominance by locks guanggun into social isolation with binary,
segregating gender norms.
What is patriarchy? Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) acknowledges that “Of all the concepts
generated by contemporary feminist theory, Patriarchy is probably the most overused, and
in some respect, the most undertheorized” (274). I agree with Kandiyoti’s diagnosis, but I
believe there is power in escaping a rigid, universal definition—the power of open
pollination and cross contamination—being adaptive across cultures with varying
dominant matrix of power, be it political power, physical force, race, caste, or wealth.
According to Holter (2009), there are two perspectives of power structures in men and
masculinities studies: the first perspective focuses on male dominance and gender
inequalities, while the second perspective focuses on structural inequalities among men
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and their connections with gender hierarchy. Similarly, I argue that there are two ways to
conceptualize patriarchy. The first and most commonly used definition emphasizes male
dominance over women as the key feature of patriarchy, with the specific forms of
dominance varying across cultural and historical contexts (Kandiyoti 1988). The second
one identifies the domination of the symbolic father over the rest of the family, calls
patriarchy “the kingdom of the fathers,” and recognizes that “patriarchy is the power of the
father” (Rich 1995, 57). The dominant father status does not necessarily tie to biological
kinship; it usually indicates superiority along the most prominent hierarchy in a given
cultural group. For example, the popular Chinese saying “Daddy is whoever has money
(youqian jiushi die)” perfectly captures how economic capital equals patriarchal power in
an increasingly capitalist China. Per the second conceptualization, a small group of men
dominates women and the majority of men in a patriarchal society.
My conceptualization of patriarchy is inspired by He-Yin Zhen, who wrote
extensively on the intersectionality of class, gender, and ethnicity in China and advocated
that “what women strive for should not stop short of supreme justice for all” (L. H. Liu,
Karl, and Ko 2013, 183). Her work was translated into English by Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl,
and Dorothy Ko in the collection, The Birth of Chinese Feminism, published in 2013. HeYin defined patriarchy as a social hierarchy that puts men over women and illustrated how
patriarchy is manifested in familial relations, social institutions, and classical Chinese
philosophy, especially Confucianism (Liu, Karl, and Ko 2013, 122). Moreover, she
identified that patriarchy also referred to men oppressing men, especially along the line of
class: “My understanding of gender equality implies equality among all human beings,
which refers to the prospect of not only men no longer oppressing women but also men no
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longer oppressed by other men and women no longer oppressed by other women” (Liu,
Karl, and Ko 2013, 66).
During socialist China, the state feminism engineered by the Chinese government
strived to put an end to Chinese patriarchy because gender equality is a necessary
component of social equality mandated by Marxism and Socialism (Z. Wang 2016; 2005).
The representative slogan of Marxist feminism was from Mao Zedong’s (1957) public
speech: ‘Now we are in a different era, a woman can achieve whatever a man can.’ From
the Marxist perspective, a person’s essence is in the productive work they do in the public
area, but the reproductive labor in the private area receives far less attention. Despite
women’s increased participation in the collective labor, they were still burdened with the
same, sometimes even larger, amount of reproductive labor in the household (Hershatter
2014a; Meng and Huang 2017). GAO and Ma (2006) reveal that women suffered pelvic
organ prolapse from performing heavy physical labor in the field shortly after childbirth.
Although Marxist feminism did improve gender equality in the public area, such as the
marriage law granted women the freedom to marry and divorce, and women did exert
agency within the restrictions of state feminism, women’s unequal contribution within the
household and to reproduction was left unacknowledged (Z. Wang 2016).
Contemporary Chinese feminists in post-socialist China are left with unique
challenges. After the economic and social reform in 1978, gender differences re-entered
public discussions. Liberated from the state’s erasure of gender differences, many feminists
embraced femininity and gender differences in their writing, speech, and lifestyles (Meng
and Huang 2017). Neoliberal ideologies and policies in the name of gender equality prosper
under “the dangerous liaison between contemporary feminist practices, neoliberalism, and
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free market fundamentalism” (L. Wang 2019, 316). As a result, it is high time again to
recognize the intersectionality of patriarchy with other forms of power structures, or gender
inequality with other forms of social inequalities in contemporary China. Dai Jinhua
(2018), for example, reminds Chinese feminists that “the patriarchy also oppresses men”
(161), views the economic reform as “a new kind of violence, redistributing the wealth and
also sacrificing women in the process” (163), and examines the intersectional power of
class and gender in contemporary China. In other words, scholars should examine
patriarchy both as male dominance and as the intersection of gender inequality with other
dimensions of social inequalities.
One can approach the phenomenon of guanggun with these two conceptualizations
of patriarchy. Many feminist scholars have identified gender inequality in patriarchy as the
root cause of missing girls, i.e., the severe female shortage in the Chinese population (Bu
2008; M. K. Chan 2011; Johansson and Nygren 1991; Nie 2011; Mungello 2008).
However, some argue that patriarchy does not explain the marginalization of guanggun:
after all, guanggun are far from embodying male dominance as a group of disadvantaged
men. For example, Greenhalgh (2013) argues that solely framing patriarchy as male
dominance further marginalizes guanggun because men are viewed as “the unnamed
perpetrators of gender wrongs” (131). As a result, only women are worthy of governmental
protection or assistance, while men are regarded as “threats to the social-political order”
(143).
I agree with Greenhalgh’s above argument, but I had chills mixed with anger reading
her criticism of the Chinese government’s anti-human-trafficking efforts: “The most
visible central-level measure is to criminalize men’s efforts to purchase brides from
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intermediaries, making unavailable one of the only ways open to many to secure a family
and ensure themselves a life that accords with the conventions of Chinese culture” (143).
This sentence comes from the same patriarchal logic that regards women not as human
beings but as brides to be purchased or an instrument to fulfill cultural conventions.
Furthermore, Greenhalgh supports her argument with women in her imagination as well as
constructed in Chinese popular culture, “women who cheat men by manipulating the
marital inequalities in the countryside to their advantage, as well as those who are willing
and eager to be transported long distances to marry” (144). I do not know where to start
my criticism against her reasoning. First of all, how many women actually act this way?
Greenhalgh has conveniently used examples that have been amplified and circulated by the
Chinese news media, but the reason these news stories can attract such attention is exactly
that only very few women act this way. Secondly, even with the ones who do act so, it does
not deny the existence of patriarchy. For women to game patriarchy, they still must obey
the overall gender hierarchy of male-dominance and female-subordination. Just because
women can bargain with patriarchy, it does not make patriarchy less real.
Nevertheless, I concur that the male dominance conceptualization of patriarchy does
not tell the full story of guanggun: “left undefined and unattached to a robust theory of
gender that recognized gender’s already classed, raced, and sexed nature, the term
patriarchy has done some not so helpful work, work of analytic, political, and even
ideological sorts” (Greenhalgh 2013, 146). The guanggun phenomenon reflects not only
gender hierarchy but also the hierarchies among men along the lines of class, rural-urban
divide, and (dis)ability. We can understand guanggun better with the second
conceptualization that defines patriarchy as the power of the symbolic fathers—the

29

hegemonic masculinity in a given society. In contemporary China, wealthy men in urban
China can date or have de facto marriages with multiple women simultaneously despite the
severe female shortage (S. Xiao 2011; Zurndorfer 2016; X. Zhang 2008). Guanggun’s
struggles demand attention to the aspect of hierarchical masculinities in patriarchy, and
how patriarchy is a power structure that interlocks with various forms of social inequalities.
However, even without inequalities, heterosexual monogamous marriage is no
longer possible for many Chinese men with the female shortage in the Chinese population.
Yet, they are still burdened with the same heteronormative cultural expectations—finding
a “good” woman, entering a heterosexual marriage, and reproducing at least one male
offspring to continue the family line (Greenhalgh 2015; Murphy, Tao, and Lu 2011;
Deutsch 2006). All other forms of relationships are viewed as immature, less serious, and
undesirable.

In other words, Guanggun only become isolated bare sticks in a

heteronormative culture that limits kin-making opportunities to heterosexual marriages. It
is this narrow channel to happiness and connections that marginalizes guanggun.
When I use the term heteronormativity in this dissertation, I emphasize both the
“hetero” and the “normative:” an institution that not only defines the gender of one’s desire,
but also confines it to legal marriage, monogamy, a reproductive future, patriarchal gender
norms, and other dimensions of social norms. My approach to heteronormativity is inspired
by queer researchers who study how sexuality intersects with race (Knopp 1997; Hanhardt
2016; Bérubé 2001; Nero 2005), class (Trask 2018; C. R. Johnson 2013; Knopp 1997;
Hanhardt 2016), metro-normativity (Howard 2001; Herring 2010), and colonialism
(Morgensen 2010; Zaborskis 2016; TallBear 2018). Cathy Cohen’s (1997) call for
intersectional queer politics is particularly inspiring for me. For Cohen, heteronormativity
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means “both those localized practices and those centralized institutions which legitimize
and privilege heterosexuality and heterosexual relationships as fundamental and ‘natural’
within society” (440). However, she also identifies that the simple dichotomy between the
heterosexual and the queer is a “reductive notion of heteronormativity” (453) because
heteronormativity does not privilege all heterosexuals, especially not those who live
outside of “the dominant constructed norm of state-sanctioned white middle-and-upperclass heterosexuals” (441). In Muñoz’s (2009) words, heteronormativity is the “normal
love that keeps a repressive social order in place” (134).
In addition, heteronormativity also differs by cultural and historical contexts. In
contemporary China, heteronormativity takes the form of monogamous heterosexual
marriages with traditional gender roles and an appropriate number of biological children.
Under heteronormative pressures, some gay Chinese enter heterosexual marriages by
hiding their sexuality to their wives (Zhu 2018), successful women are labeled as
unfeminine and left out of marriage (Gaetano 2014; Fincher 2016), and lower-class men
are left single because they are viewed as lacking real manhood (Greenhalgh 2015). Such
heteronormative pressure is augmented by the pronatalist, pro-marriage policies by the
Chinese government, which utilizes the power of heteronormativity to push Chinese
citizens to supply future laborers for the state-sponsored neoliberal capitalism.
As China is a highly authoritarian society, heteronormativity in China is heavily
regulated by the Chinese government with heterosexist and pronatalist policies that treat
Chinese citizens as laborer-making instruments. In 2016, China’s State Administration of
Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television issued a new set of guidelines to disallow
TV shows with any abnormal sexuality, including but not limited to same-sex relationships
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(L. Song 2021). In addition to demanding the Chinese to be straight, the government also
frames childbearing and childrearing as a citizen’s responsibility to the state. Responding
to the ultra-low fertility in contemporary China (Y.-L. Huang and Wu 2018), on May 31st,
2021, the Chinese government implemented new family planning policies to allow a couple
to have up to three children as well as to reinforce traditional family values (The Chinese
Communist Party and The State Council 2021). The newest policies blatantly argue that
citizens are responsible for producing high-quality offspring for the state. Furthermore, the
government also seeks to restrict access to abortion in the name of women’s reproductive
health (M. Luo 2022). These pronatalist policies further push guanggun onto the nearly
impossible quest for heteronormativity and drive them away from alternative relationality
that could provide non-normative yet meaningful connections.
Essentially,

heteronormativity

dictates

the

hierarchy

of

kin-making

capacities/legitimacy by casting non-heteronormative relationships as undesirable or
illegitimate. Donna Haraway, in “Making Kin in the Chthulucene: Reproducing
Multispecies Justice,” criticizes how contemporary kin-making is still largely confined to
“heteronormative, biogenetic, compulsory family formation and reproduction” (2018, 73).
Similarly, Kim TallBear (2018) also identifies that heteronormativity as a colonial
institution functions to confine social connections to “the aspirational ideal of middle-class
nuclear family, including (hetero)normative coupledom and its compulsory biological
reproduction” (151). Although it is fueled by the promise of happiness, heteronormativity
does not foster love or connections as its end. Rather, it disciplines any queer desire that
hinders one’s chance of abiding by social norms of love and intimacy (Berlant and Warner
1998; Cohen 1997). As we can see from guanggun’s experiences below, heteronormativity

32

reinforces its hegemony by pathologizing and/or stigmatizing any non-normative desires
or connections.
Many of my research participants hated the objectifying, pro-marriage social norms
that do not care about their happiness. The men I interviewed were commanded by their
families to go on arranged blind dates, which is a common practice in China to ensure that
the potential match would meet the normative gender and socio-economic expectations
(Pettier 2016; 2022). Nice, a 31-year-old small businessman in Xiamen, criticized the
practice of arranged blind dates in this way: “Arranged dates are more like a market
transaction than a meaningful connection. Both parties enter with clear goals and specific
material conditions for the other party.” Other interviewees also shared Nice’s feeling of
alienation about arranged blind dates. For many guanggun, they felt the pressure to give
up the desire for meaningful connections in a heteronormative culture. Even without the
severe female shortage, guanggun are stuck in a dilemma with two bad options—one
choice is to cut off the desire for love, while the other is to stay single and isolated in a
heteronormative culture.
In addition to dictating the (il)legitimacy of a relationship, patriarchy and
heteronormativity also worsen guanggun’s struggles by locking them into rigid binary
gender norms that teach them what to desire and how to be desirable. The hegemonic
masculine standards value a man’s dominance over his female partner more than the
mutual, genuine connections generated from shared emotional vulnerabilities. Meanwhile,
the social norms of ideal femininity limit guanggun’s choices of potential mates to young
women who are less successful or experienced than their male partners and are ready to
perform the wifely and motherly duties. Together, the male-dominant and female-
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subordinate, i.e., the female hypergamous relational model, becomes the normative
relationship model, and it stops guanggun from forming non-normative yet meaningful
relationships. As a result, the gender norms reinforce both patriarchy and heteronormativity
at the ground level by directing interpersonal desires not only to heterosexual, reproductive
marriage but also to the patriarchal gender norms.
Despite longing for love and connections, many men expressed a conflicted message
that they should ensure their independence first, which means financial success for most of
them. Mao, a 31-year-old migrant worker in Beijing, told me that he should solve all his
problems first rather than asking another person to share the burden with him. This
sentiment has been long discussed in masculinity and family studies. In Men and
Masculinities, Stephen M. Whitehead (2002) articulates this observation with the following
sentence: “Often our very sense of male identity is sustained through our capacity for not
needing the help of others” (157). Independence is a crucial aspect of Chinese hegemonic
masculinity as well. Moreover, this demand for independence often extends to the notion
of responsibility: a good man is dependable for others instead of dependent on others; he
is supposed to be responsible for his family, work, and the nation (Wong 2016). A single
man is viewed as immature and lacking authentic manhood because marriage is viewed as
both a man’s responsibility to the patrilineal culture and an indicator of masculine success
(Greenhalgh 2015; Han 2008; Wong 2016; Deutsch 2006; Murphy, Tao, and Lu 2011). In
other words, the notion of responsibility for the patrilinear family and the masculine state
power is an extension of the masculine norm of independence, which comes from the
insatiate desire for male dominance. Because many guanggun come from poor families,
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this masculine norm of independence and responsibility forces them to postpone, or even
give up their chances of connections.
With the relational nature of gender, the masculine fantasy of male dominance is
inseparable from the social norms of femininity. Just like Rich (1995) revealed, women in
patriarchal societies are simultaneously devalued as inferior to men and gloried as selfless
mothers: “the central ambiguity at the heart of patriarchy: the ideas of the sacredness of
motherhood and the redemptive power of women as means, contrasted with the degradation
of women in the order created by men” (83). Immersed in the norms of ideal femininity in
contemporary China, many interviewees mentioned four characteristics of ideal femininity:
young (reproductive capacity), considered beautiful by the cultural standards, pure (lack of
sexual or marital experiences), and subordinate. Jade, for example, despite being 39-yearold, still prefers to marry a woman younger than 30 years old because he wants to make
sure the woman is still able to produce healthy biological offspring. At the same time, Jade
would not consider a woman with previous marriage because “it would be my loss to marry
a divorcee.” Lastly, almost all the men I talked with preferred subordinate women who
were younger and less experienced than them. For instance, Bing believes that “a good
woman follows her man.” This sentiment is shared by a popular saying in China that refers
to women and marriage: “If you marry a dog, follow a dog (jiagou suigou).” Although
supported by gender norms, these standards, in reality, often stop guanggun from
expanding their range of potential mates.
These male-dominant and female-subordinate gender norms also determine the
available relationship models in Chinese culture. As I have mentioned above, hypergamy
is the dominant model of relationship (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016). In this model, a man is
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expected to be superior to his female partners in every dimension of social evaluation,
especially wealth and education. If a man pursues a woman who is more educated or richer
than him, most people will question his motivations. For example, Snow was in love with
a co-worker in the factory he previously worked. However, she was college educated, while
Snow only went to a vocational school. She also had a higher salary than Snow. When the
two of them got closer and closer, they started to hear more gossip about how Snow was
wooing her and trying to take advantage of her. The social pressures eventually soured
their relationship, forcing Snow to quit the factory job. Sadly, Snow is not the only victim
of hypergamy, whose normative standards have severely narrowed guanggun’s chance for
meaningful connections.
Guanggun’s unique social position as men marginalized by heteronormativity
demands that I understand patriarchy and heteronormativity from an intersectional
perspective beyond a singular lens of gender or sexuality. I demonstrate how patriarchal
heteronormativity reinforces capitalist, biopolitical exploitation against guanggun.
Moreover, the rigid gender norms from patriarchal heteronormativity on masculinity,
desire and relationship further reduce guanggun’s chance of meaningful connections and
happiness. However, guanggun are not passive victims of the debilitating social structure
of heteronormativity, binary gender norms, and capitalist as well as biopolitical
exploitations. Rather, as I will demonstrate in the next section, their life experiences reveal
the fissures of the repressive power structure. Outside of heteronormativity, they find
meanings and satisfaction from atypical, queer yet abundant forms of connections with
human and beyond-human beings.
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1.5

Guanggun’s Revolutionary Potential of Alternative Relationality
Many men I talked with had complicated feelings about marriage: on the one hand,

they were constantly pushed by parents, relatives, and acquaintances to get married as soon
as possible, and they were discriminated against because of their singlehood; on the other
hand, they questioned whether they wanted marriage at all and whether there were other
ways of living in this world outside of marriages. For example, Wang was often ridiculed
as an “old” guanggun because he was a 30-year-old single man living in a small town in
central China, but he did not find marriage particularly attractive: “why do people need
marriage? I really don’t see anything special about marriage. If it’s for emotional needs, I
have friends. If it’s for someone to take care of me when I am sick or old, I can save up
money and pay someone to do so. Sex is probably the only special thing (about marriage),
but I am pretty okay with doing it myself.” Drawing from feminist and queer theories, I
argue that guanggun’s experiences of being at odds with heteronormativity enable them to
envision new ways of making alternative attachment, relationality, and lifeworlds.
Feminist scholars have long identified the need to transform patriarchal,
heteronormative kinship structures (Das 2015; Tsing 2015; Tapias 2015; Haraway 2016;
2018; Butler 2002a; Daniels 2012; Hill 2020). In her feminist speculation of relationality,
Haraway (2016) invites readers to reflect on existing kinship practices: “Who lives and who
dies, and how, in this kinship rather than that one? What shape is this kinship, where and
whom do its lines connect and disconnect, and so what?” (2). As I discussed earlier,
guanggun are made from the patrilineal kinship practice that favors a man’s life over a
woman, resulting in numerous parents killing daughters or aborting female fetuses to make
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space for sons under strict family planning policy 5 . Moreover, the patrilineal kinship
practice also facilitates patriarchal connections because a woman usually move into her
husband’s kinship circles and her child would take the father’s family name. As a result, it
connects a man’s family line while disconnects that of a woman (Deutsch 2006; Murphy,
Tao, and Lu 2011), resulting in women lacking social capital compared to men.
Furthermore, Haraway (2016) identifies that the narrow, excluding kinship practice from
the patriarchal, capitalist, white-supremacist, heteronormative, and human-centered power
structures has displaced countless beings—human and beyond: “Right now, the earth is full
of refugees, human and not, without refuge” (100). As a result, she calls for feminism to
revolutionize the existing kinship structures as “it is high time that feminists exercise
leadership in imagination, theory, and action to unravel the ties of both genealogy and kin,
and kin and species” (102). As we will see in the following paragraphs, guanggun have
opened up spaces for both alternative relationalities between human beings and multispecies
attachment.
Guanggun’s revolution starts with criticizing heteronormativity. Here, I define
guanggun’s resistance and revolution in three aspects. Firstly, some guanggun intentionally
and actively criticize heteronormativity once its default route is disrupted by the severe
female shortage in the Chinese population, forcing more and more men into singlehood and
social isolation. Although they are forced into singlehood, but some of them are consciously
resisting the heteronormative culture (more detailed examples can be found in Chapter
Four). Secondly, guanggun life struggles objectively expose the vulnerability of a

5

The practice of female infanticide can be found in both historical and contemporary China as well as other
parts of the world (Balikci 1967; Engels 1980; B. D. Miller 1987; George, Abel, and Miller 1992; Ingalls
2002; Shang, Wu, and Li 2005; Bhatnagar, Dube, and Dube 2012; King 2014; Gerlach 2020).
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heteronormative society that relies solely on heterosexual families and biological
reproduction to make kins and provide care. For many of them, a major stressor in life is
the pressure from parents, relatives, friends, mainstream culture, and the government for
them to get married eventually, if not as soon as possible, despite the gloomy prospect of
marriage due to gender imbalance and social inequalities. Moreover, according to this
heteronormative logic, marriage is the only possible happy ending that a person could have;
any lives outside of marriage are pathologized as immature, pitiful, and disruptive to the
social order. Ahmed (2010a) calls this kind of social pressure “wishful politics” and
recognizes how it tends to be disguised as happiness: “Happiness translates its wish into a
politics, a wishful politics, a politics that demands that others live according to a wish”
(Ahmed 2010a, 572). In addition to the social pressure, guanggun also reveal the need for a
public or communal social support system instead of putting all the caregiving burdens on
families and individuals. In other words, guanggun’s life struggles demand an end to the
neoliberal governmentality and economy that outsources its cost of care to heteronormative
families.
Thirdly, in addition to criticizing heteronormativity, guanggun’s lived experiences,
along with other sub-altern groups in contemporary China, also showcase the infinite
possibilities of meanings and satisfaction outside of heteronormative marriage. In
contemporary China, more and more people are exploring alternative ways of living outside
of heteronormative families (Cai 2022; Tan 2021; D. Chen 2017). Among the men I talked
with, many of them did have moments of joy with friends, pets, and hobbies, although they
were frequently represented as pathetic, meaningless, or dangerous in mainstream media.
However, these alternative ways of living are not acknowledged or respected in
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contemporary China despite generating happiness. Although the feelings of happiness are
from the same brain chemical, it is almost as if some kinds of happiness are viewed as
transitional, premature, informal, or trivial, while the supposed happiness from
heteronormative marriages is enduring, destined, legitimate, and fulfilling. In Ahmed’s
(2010b) discussion of happiness, she identifies that “[H]ierarchies of happiness may
correspond to social hierarchies that are already given” (12). In writing about guanggun’s
lived experiences outside of heteronormativity, their struggles as well as happiness, I hope
to “open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance” (Ahmed
2010b, 20).
In addition to feminist speculation of kinship and relationality, my writing is also
inspired by queer studies, especially the queer method of scrutinizing the norm from the
peripheral (Rupp 2006). Or, in Cathy Cohen’s (1997) words, I write for “an understanding
of the ways in which power informs and constitutes privileged and marginalized subjects”
(438). Moreover, it is also about bringing forward the queer experiences that are often
unconsciously, if not deliberately, obscured to construct an appearance of dominance for
the normative relationships. In other words, queer theories taught me the distinctions
between the normative and the descriptive by showing me how to retrain my attention to
notice the nonnormative lives that have always been there and will never be fully eliminated.
I understand that my conceptualization of queer theory might be unjust for its original focus
on sexuality, and I acknowledge that queer theory risks losing its unique edge if everything
non-normative can be conceptualized as queer. However, I do believe that my expansive
usage of queer theory in this project contributes instead of destructs more.
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When I talked with guanggun, I noticed one missing element in the current
narratives about guanggun, which I will introduce in detail in the next chapter. Yes,
guanggun do experience various struggles as single marginalized men, but they also have
managed to find joy with happiness outside of marriages and traditional kinship structures.
Inspired by Boellstorff’s (2007) envision of “a queer meantime that embraces contamination
and imbrication” (228), my writing about guanggun seeks to display such “meantime” with
multiple possibilities and multiple lifeworlds rather than one set destination for guanggun.
I learned from queer theories not only a rebellion against the heterosexual hegemony but
also the art of bringing the peripheral to the center: “Queer theory is a training in paying
attention to all that, the multiplicity of beats and points of convergence that correlate the
surprise and contingency of relationality and desire with threat, delight, and ongoingness,
world making and world building (incl. the sustaining rhythms of irregular encounters)”
(Berlant 2011, 686). By showing guanggun’s “irregular encounters” and atypical
relationality, I demonstrate their revolutionary potential to envision news way of being,
connecting, and world-making.
Guanggun’s singlehood and struggles do not indicate an individual failure but a
revolutionary force that destabilizes the status quo. My research participants formed queer,
abundant connections with human and beyond-human beings by failing heteronormativity.
Some interviewees enjoyed connections in friendship and non-romantic partnerships. For
example, Bing returned to his village after graduating from college and working in cities for
several years because he wanted to help the people in his village, and his favorite moments
were planning and implementing various programs with his NGO teammates who shared
the same love for rural China with him. Although he was constantly pressured to get married
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as soon as possible because he was his parents’ only son, Bing told me, “If I can choose
freely, I probably would not worry about marriage at all. I think working on the things I
love with people who share the same passions is all I ever wanted.”
In addition, many men I interviewed formed meaningful connections with nonhuman lives and objects. Some are satisfied with companion species (Haraway 2013),
enjoying the straightforward companionship. Panda was a 29-year-old man working in a
smalltown government per the wish of his parents, and he would rather spend time with his
cat, “Stary (Panda’s cat) would not judge my hairstyle or income. She only cares about the
cat food in my hand.” Others enjoy spending most of their time on their hobbies, such as
soccer, visual arts, reading, or watching movies. Curiosity, who was 31-year-old, single,
unemployed, yet away from his rural hometown, told me, “I enjoy being with myself. Give
me internet, and I will have an exciting enough world.” With more and more people
questioning the necessity of heteronormativity, scholars argue that the government should
create supportive policies for people with a non-reproductive future, such as “more
innovative community-oriented social relations beyond one’s family [, … n]ew policies and
living alternatives that extend support to non-biologically related people” (Huang and Wu
2018, 129). Such proposals demand the Chinese government bring back the state welfare
and stop the neoliberal agenda that puts all the burden of care labor on individuals and
families nested in the heteronormative kinship structures.
Finally, guanggun’s insistence on love and desires, pragmatic or not, is also a form
of resistance against heteronormativity and biopolitical exploitation (Schaefer 2015).
Although guanggun face multiple forms of social pressures against their singlehood—the
public perceives “there is something wrong with them,” their parents and friends push
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arranged blind dates on them, and the Chinese government pathologizes their singlehood
while reinforcing heteronormativity—many guanggun still insist on love and deep, sincere
connections instead of entering a loveless marriage. Bo, a 35-year-old single doctoral
student from Shandong, China, said, “I want the soulmate-type of relationship. I want to
marry someone with whom I can share good conversations and world views. Otherwise, I
would rather stay single.” This insistence on love and personal desires is often devalued as
unpragmatic or delusional by mainstream media and the Chinese government, but I view it
as a revolutionary force against the cultural and governmental logic that instrumentalizes
human bodies and connections.
In Ahmed’s (2010a) worlds, “Affect aliens, those who are alienated by happiness,
are creative: not only do we want the wrong things, not only do we embrace possibilities
that we are asked to give up, but we can create lifeworlds around these wants” (593).
Guanggun are creative “affect aliens” who expose the unsustainability of heteronormative
kinship structures, form queer yet meaningful connections, and insist on socially “devalued”
affects. Along with other affect aliens in contemporary China who live outside of the
dominant heteronormative culture (Cai 2022; Tan 2021; D. Chen 2017), guanggun’s lives
as “affect aliens” rebel against the patriarchal, heteronormative, capitalist, and biopolitical
exploitations that treats human lives merely as instruments.

1.6

Chapter Structures
Chapter Two, “The Cultural, Political, and Economical Production of Guanggun,”

examines the cultural representations of guanggun in mainstream Chinese media as well
as the underlying structural forces that lead to guanggun’s social isolation and daily
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struggles. They include biopolitical exploitation exemplified by the pronatalist policies by
the Chinese government, economic inequalities created by the expanding globalized
capitalism, and heteronormative culture that limits social connections to heterosexual
marriage and biological reproduction. All these forces shape the possible directions of
guanggun’s present and future lives from this very cultural-historical context. By
examining these news reports, I argue that guanggun are represented in three key themes—
victim,

failure,

and

danger—and

that

these

stereotypical

representation

of guanggun further marginalizes them into social isolation and hinders their chances of
meaningful connections. By reflecting on the current cultural representation of guanggun,
one can make informed decisions about whether to repeat the cycle of violence or cultivate
the potential of cultural transformation.
Chapter Three, “Segregating Gender,” demonstrates how guanggun’s pursuit of
love is complicated by their internalization of the segregating, hierarchical gender norms
in a patriarchal society. These norms include hegemonic masculinity—what a man should
be, normative femininity—what a man should desire, and the practice of female
hypergamy—what kind of relationship a man should pursue. With data from interviews
and field notes, I argue that these heteronormative gender norms not only segregate people
into binary gender spaces that hinder guanggun from forming meaningful connections, but
also uphold various social hierarchies that facilitate the patriarchal, capitalist, and
biopolitical exploitation against guanggun.
Chapter Four, “Queer Lifeworlds,” shows how guanggun resist exploitative social
structure and segregating gender norms with embodied protests and connections beyond
heteronormativity. With interviews and field notes, I demonstrated a critique of marriage
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and heteronormativity in contemporary China, a resistance in the form of insisting on
desires that are often labeled as unpragmatic and immature in traditional Chinese culture,
an embodied protest against biopolitical and capitalist exploitation rebellion against the
pronatalist biopolitics by refusing to marry or have children, and at last, guanggun’s
abundant ways of living and connecting beyond heteronormativity. I argue that these
connections have the revolutionary potential to challenge the status quo.
In conclusion, I argue that guanggun’s singlehood is not a disability or personal
failure but a revolutionary force that destabilizes the status quo and the instrumentalization
of human lives. Guanggun’s struggles expose the un-sustainability of heteronormativity,
which establishes heterosexual marriage as the only legitimate channel of social
connections. This narrow definition of happiness left many marginalized groups at risk of
social isolation and disability. A healthy, resilient society should facilitate diverse channels
of queer, abundant connections. Sadly, these connections are still ridiculed, if not
completely ignored, by the mainstream culture and the Chinese government, who still
operate via the lens of heteronormativity. With evidence-based research, my project
demands that the dominant culture and the government acknowledge and support these
atypical and meaningful lifeworlds beyond heteronormativity.
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CHAPTER 2. THE PRODUCTION OF GUANGGUN
Her face appeared almost numb to the camera or the video blogger behind it, but
her body was shivering and trying to squeeze into a corner as if she wanted to hide inside
the wall. It was hard to tell whether she had grey hair or just black hair matted with dust.
Under layers of stains, her sweater might have been pink, and her pants might have been
grey. There was not much place to hide in this tiny shack; a bare bed almost took up the
whole space. Outside of the door-less shed, it was freezing January weather in Feng
County, Xuzhou, China, and her clothes could not possibly keep her warm in this
temperature. However, she could not go anywhere warmer—there was a black metal chain
on her neck with the other end locked on the bed frame (Truth Time 2022). Outside the
shack, in the warm main house, with the woman out of sight, a man was eating lunch with
eight children. This man, Dong, was the reason for the video blogger’s visit: He was living
in poverty with eight children, and it was trendy to do charity for the poor as the Chinese
New Year approached. This father of eight was a popular candidate for charity in Feng
County. In contrast, people were rarely curious about the mother’s whereabouts.
Despite of the focus on the father, the visual image of the chained woman caught
the attention of people outside of Xuzhou: Why was she chained in a shack? Was she
trafficked here? How did she have eight children? Was she raped? Did the locals know
about her? If Dong was a popular candidate for governmental charity, was the local
government aware of the chained woman when they came to offer food assistance to Dong?
The oldest child among the eight children was over twenty years old; why would he allow
his mother to be chained? With so many questions and so few answers, people pressured
the Xuzhou government to investigate the matter (A. Cao and Feng 2022). The Feng
46

County government released different versions of answers, from claiming that the woman
was chained up because she was violent towards Dong and her children to that she was a
homeless woman with a mental disability and had been taken in by Dong’s father.
These answers were contradictory to what people saw from more videos of her
posted by other video bloggers. In these videos, people noticed that she did not speak the
local dialect in Feng County but had the accent associated with Sichuan province 1,500
KM away from Xuzhou, that she did not have any tooth in her mouth despite only
appearing to be middle-aged, and that she seemed to be missing the tip of her tongue. Some
bloggers speculated that Dong might have pulled all her teeth so she would not bite him
when he raped her and cut her tongue so she could not tell people who she was and what
happened to her. Although it was only speculation, they further fueled people’s, especially
Chinese feminists’, concerns and anger about violence against women. The intensified
attention forced the upper-level government—the Xuzhou government, to further
investigate the matter. The new investigation results proved the previous answers from the
Feng County government to be false, which angered people even more given the corruption
of the local government (Yuan 2022): How did Dong get a marriage certificate with this
woman? How did the local government make up a totally new identity with corresponding
documentation for this woman?
Nevertheless, independent investigations by journalists revealed that even the
investigations by the Xuzhou government proved to be unreliable. By this time, there was
still little information about this woman or her exact name. She was called “the chained
woman (tielian nv)” by Chinese netizens. Moreover, the Xuzhou government decided to
put this woman in the hospital to receive mental disability treatment. However, the same
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government also brutally beat and locked up two Chinese feminists who attempted to visit
her (A. Cao and Feng 2022). The government also prohibited journalists from visiting
Dong or getting near his village. Meanwhile, discussions about “the chained woman” on
the Chinese internet were censored, with relevant posts deleted within minutes after
publishing. These actions further angered people, which pressured the Jiangsu province
government, the upper-level government of Xuzhou, to form a special investigation team.
This team confirmed that “the chained woman” was trafficked to Xuzhou from Yunnan
province, that she was sold and raped by multiple people before being bought by Dong’s
father, that the local government in Feng County illegally fabricated the marriage license
and other documentation of her, that she lost all her teeth from Periodontitis, that Dong has
committed abuse against her, and that the government would punish everyone involved in
trafficking her, including the government officials (H. Wu 2022). After this investigation
report, people shifted their attention away from the chained woman.
The story of the chained woman is the other side of the guanggun story that I
mentioned in the introduction. Before chaining up this woman, Dong was a guanggun. His
now deceased father, the local villagers, and the local government officials worked together
to end Dong’s singlehood at the expense of the chained woman. In China, there are
numerous women like her—sold, bought, raped, abused, with new identities fabricated and
the violence against them sanctioned by the highly heteronormative culture. As Greenhalgh
(2013) has recognized, buying women is “one of the only ways open to many (rural
bachelors) to secure a family and ensure themselves a life that accords with the conventions
of Chinese culture” (143).
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Yet, there is another aspect of this story I want to show you—the power of
perspectives in media representation. Before the video of chained women went viral, many
local journalists reported Dong’s story, focusing on his fatherly love toward his eight
children despite living in extreme poverty. These reports established Dong as a worthy
candidate for governmental and communal assistance, and Dong received some donations
as a result of this media exposure. However, by turning the camera toward the chained
woman, the video blogger shifted the perspective from fatherly love to violence against
women. As a result, it triggered heated discussion from the public and pressured
governments at multiple levels to respond by investigating the truth and correcting the
wrong. This process shows that media representation is crucial in making reality because
it directs the agenda of public conversations, shaping the government’s policy responses
(Dom’nguez-Ruvalcaba and Corona 2010; Cuklanz 2013). Cultural representations are not
just images and stories. Instead, they shape social reality by influencing the popular
perception of and policy responses to certain social issues. Moreover, disadvantaged
groups are often portrayed with certain stereotypes in cultural representation, which
reinforce their marginalized social position (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008; Gammage
2015).
This power of cultural representation is also true in guanggun’s case. How
are guanggun represented in contemporary China’s cultural production? What cultural,
economic, and political forces shape guanggun’s cultural representation? What are the
consequences or implications of such cultural representation? In this chapter, I examine the
cultural representations of guanggun in mainstream Chinese media as well as the structural
forces underlying such representation. Some of the news stories were sent to me by my
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research participants during and after the interviews, and others were collected when I
searched for news stories related to guanggun. In examining these news reports, I argue
that guanggun are represented in three key themes: victim, failure, and danger. These
stereotypes are rooted in interlocking structural forces that instrumentalize guanggun,
including but not limited to biopolitics from the pronatalist policies of the Chinese
government, economic inequalities created by the expanding global capitalism, patriarchy
that pushed guanggun to the bottom of the hierarchy of masculinities, and
heteronormativity that limits social connections to heterosexual marriage and biological
reproduction. The stereotypical representation of guanggun further marginalizes them into
social isolation and hinders their chances of meaningful connections.
The victim theme portrays guanggun as pitiful men who suffer from a marriageless, therefore, hopeless life because they have no one to support or care for them when
they are sick or old. Hence, the question arises of whether guanggun should be saved by
the government with supporting policies. Meanwhile, the failure theme presents guanggun
from a Darwinist perspective and views guanggun as existential failures who fail on two
crucial aspects of contemporary Chinese masculinity: wealth and sexuality. Because
guanggun’s struggles are viewed as individual failures, no intervention is needed per the
failure theme. Finally, the danger theme views guanggun as a threat to social stability
because of their lack of social ties to heteronormative marriage. Therefore, guanggun
should be closely watched by the police and confined in factories or prisons.
These cultural themes of guanggun reflect the underlying structural forces that are
at the root of guanggun’s struggles. First of all, guanggun are only victims and danger in
the lens of patriarchal heteronormativity, which equals the lack of heterosexual marriage
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as misery and views men outside of heteronormativity as inherently violent. Secondly, the
logic that categorized guanggun as failure or danger is the biopolitical logic that views
human lives as instruments for to achieve governmental goals via the techniques of letting
die if not active killing. Lastly, the widening economic inequality in capitalism
computes guanggun—single men trapped in poverty—as failures. By presenting the
specific evidence and reasoning of each theme, I argue that the cultural representation is
rooted in structural injustice and that it further marginalizes guanggun. Because the cultural
representation of guanggun is biased and covers up structural inequalities, the solutions
proposed from these themes are also unfair and further perpetuate existing social
inequalities. By reflecting on the current cultural representation of guanggun, policy
makers can make informed decisions about whether to repeat the cycle of violence or
cultivate the potential of cultural transformation.
In the following sections, I discuss the victim, failure, and danger themes
respectively in detail. For the victim theme, I start with examples from news media reports
that view guanggun as the victim of poverty and gender crisis in contemporary China. I
argue that guanggun’s victimhood is constructed at the expense of erasing various forms
of violence against women in patriarchal heteronormativity, and that this biased
representation only leads to biased policy responses from the Chinese government.
Afterward, I illustrate the failure theme of guanggun with media representation of Sanhe
gurus (dashen), a group of single male migrant workers in Shenzhen. I demonstrate
that guanggun are forced to fail in a political economy that does not offer any chance of
class mobility for lower-class Chinese, and that guanggun are branded as failures by a
heteronormative culture that views heterosexual marriages and biopolitical reproduction as
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the only path to a meaningful life. For the danger theme, after showing examples from
media reports and existing studies on guanggun, I argue that the danger theme is rooted in
the heteronormative dichotomy between the good family men and the dangerous
undomesticated men. With the logic of danger theme, the corresponding solutions are to
pacify, confine, or eliminate guanggun with various governmental policies. In the end, I
argue that these three themes fail to recognize the structural forces behind guanggun’s
struggles, nor could they generate effective solutions to the guanggun crisis.

2.1

Victims
The victim theme portrays guanggun as pitiful men suffering from a miserable

wife-less life. Moreover, it seeks to blame feminism and women for guanggun’s suffering,
and it calls for the Chinese government to save guanggun from this “gender crisis.”
Through my analysis, I argue that the victim theme obscures how patriarchy and
heteronormativity are the root causes of the guanggun crisis and push guanggun into social
isolation. In this section, I first share a few detailed examples of the victim theme. Then, I
identify and analyze the patriarchal and heteronormative logic in victimhood-themed news
reports. Ultimately, I argue that this biased representation would only lead to unfair
solutions that not only reinforce social discrimination against women but also rarely
alleviate guanggun’s suffering.
To establish guanggun’s victimhood, media reports on this theme usually
selectively portray the most disadvantaged members of the guanggun group to represent
the whole group. For example, this report, “Investigating the Phenomena of Leftover Men
in Rural China: The Congregation of Old, Leftover Men Forced to be Marriage-less,” from
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China Youth Daily (2016) provided a sensational, detailed description of guanggun’s
miserable life and their unfulfilled desire for marriage and offspring. The report started
with a famous demographer, Shuzhuo Li’s analysis of the most recent statistics on
population and family. Li predicted that there would be around 30 million guanggun in
China by 2020 and that it was already a severe population and social crisis. In addition to
national statistics on the Chinese population and family, the journalists also interviewed
various types of informants, including demographic scholars, rural matchmakers,
guanggun, and their villagers, by specifying this scary big picture with lively stories from
individual guanggun and their family members.
For instance, the report shared the story of Xiaodeng, a 37-year-old single man.
Xiaodeng’s parents did not have much savings due to his mother’s chronic illness.
Meanwhile, he could only find low-paying jobs with a middle-school degree. No
matchmaker was willing to help him find a mate due to his poverty. As a single man in his
thirties, Xiaodeng faced tremendous social pressures from childhood friends, neighbors,
and his parents. His mother always cried a lot because she worried about his son’s marriage
and felt guilty for not being capable of saving money for the family. The pressure
eventually accumulated so much that Xiaodeng decides not to return home for the most
important annual family reunion during the New Year Festival. Besides Xiaodeng, all the
other guanggun cited in this report were over 40 years old and lived in extreme poverty in
rural China. This representation, however, does not represent guanggun as a whole group
because the term guanggun only means single men rather than poor single men over 40
years old. As one can see from existing studies and my research participants (Attané,
Eklund, and Zhang 2018), many guanggun are younger than 40 years old and do not
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necessarily live in extreme poverty. For example, the 2020 census shows that the majority
of guanggun, 17.52 million, are in the 20–40 age group. The selective representation
constructs guanggun as pitiful victims.
Moreover, these reports similarly concluded that guanggun’s suffering is rooted in
Chinese women, especially as the number of “materialistic” women increases along with
the deepening economic inequality. For example, Xin’s (2018) essay on Narada Insights
concludes that guanggun are victims of the changing gender culture and unbalanced sex
ratio in contemporary China. In his words, guanggun’s struggles reflect the “gender crisis”
that contemporary Chinese men face as more women pursue independence and gender
equality: “In the mating process, ‘leftover women’ either insist that they would rather be
single than compromise, or hold the value that ‘it is better to cry in a BMW than laughing
on a bike,’ or have developed stable ‘single’ philosophy. All these ideas have brought a
serious consequence—the ‘gender crisis’ for Chinese men.” According to Xin, these single
women and their high material standards are empowered by the female shortage that
victimizes guanggun. Hence, Xin calls this gender crisis the “new gender inequality” that
marks women with a higher status than men.
Once guanggun’s victimhood is established, the next “natural” step would be
calling the Chinese government to help alleviate their suffering. For example, in Oct. 2021,
the government website of Xiangyin County, Hunan Province, posted a call for rural
women to stay in rural areas to solve rural men’s “marriage problems” (Shen 2021). This
call was praised by rednet.cn, an online news portal owned by the Hunan province
government, who summarized the government’s call as the “bed warmer project” for
guanggun and argued that it was very necessary (rednet.cn 2021). Note that “Bed warmer
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(nuan beiwo)” is the Chinese slang for someone to sleep with) for guanggun. In other
words, the policy claimed that the government should help guanggun to find a wife. Once
published, the term “bed warmer” has been criticized by Chinese feminists because it
objectifies women. One netizen commented, “If the bed is too cold, a hot-water bottle
would work and not expensive at all” (Shen 2021).
2.1.1

Guanggun’s Victimhood is Constructed from Patriarchal Male Privilege
The victim theme is biased and fails to acknowledge that guanggun is not only a

victim but also a beneficiary of patriarchy. The other side of the guanggun coin is murdered
girls and aborted female fetuses. Guanggun’s victimhood is recognized and widely
circulated in the media because of male privilege. Such representation is rooted in the male
privilege in patriarchy because it ignored the gendered violence against women both
historically and in contemporary China. In its essence, the so-called guanggun crisis is a
surplus of men compared to women in the Chinese population, which is rooted in the active
killing of girls and aborting of female fetuses since the 1980s.
Yet, for a long time, the victim theme in mainstream media reports only recognizes
the victimhood of Chinese men while ignoring that of women. Wei Bu (2008), a gender
and media scholar in China, examined the media representation of guanggun in news
reports from 2004 and found that most reports unfairly presented guanggun as the sole
victim of the unbalanced sex ratio at birth and neglected girls who were aborted or killed
due to male preference. She identified that girls’ human rights were ignored when most
public conversations focused solely on the impacts on men. She criticized this cultural
representation with the following question: “Is it a crisis for single men or girls’ human
rights?” Sixteen years later, the same bias is still present in my analysis of media
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representation of guanggun. When I search for “sex ratio” or “guanggun” in Chinese news,
many stories still view men as the sole victim of a “gender crisis” (China Youth Daily 2016;
Peng 2017; Xin 2018; nbd.com 2019).
Moreover, the patrilineal culture bred by patriarchy and heteronormativity also
extends this victimhood to single men and their families. In a patrilineal culture, a family’s
name and honor can only be passed down by male offspring. Usually, patrilineal culture is
accompanied by a patrilocal living arrangement. The patrilocal arrangement means that
sons will leave nearby, if not with, their parents after marriage, while daughters will move
away to live with their husband’s family. Therefore, sons are responsible for caring for
their parents in old age. In places with strong patrilineal traditions, only sons can enter the
ancestral hall or participate in ancestor worship rituals, while women are banned from these
occasions. In other words, “the networks within which patrilineal families are embedded
affect the kind of social interactions that occur” (Murphy, Tao, and Lu 2011, 683). The
longer men like guanggun are stuck in singlehood, the more likely their family lines will
end in their generation, and so will the social world attached to the patrilineal family line.
A discontinued family line means social and cultural death for the family (Deutsch 2006;
Murphy, Tao, and Lu 2011; Wong 2016). It is from this logic that guanggun’s singlehood
signals victimhood for their family lines. However, this victim theme motivated by
patrilineal logic ignores the fact that it is exactly this patrilineal culture that brought
guanggun into existence because it motivated parents to kill girls to make space for boys.
In addition, this patrilineal argument ignored the reality that daughters actually provide
more care to their parents in old age than sons (L. Shi 2017).
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Patriarchal logic also drives media reports to find scapegoats for the guanggun
crisis. Again and again, women and feminism are used as the convenient scapegoats for
guanggun’s victimhood: “In the rural marriage market, women have achieved absolute
advantage, so it is a completely female-superior and male-inferior situation” (China Youth
Daily 2016); “With the rise of feminism, women are gaining higher and higher status.
Many single women would rather stay single than obey their parents’ arrangements”
(Shenqi 2019); “The so-called 30 million guanggun is a trick played by feminists to
suppress and swindle men for unreasonable privileges. It is their exaggeration online. From
the experiences of those around me, the root cause of men’s marriage problems is women
demanding higher and higher standards. These women are the bourgeoisie who loves
consumption but dislikes responsibility”(hl47604760 2018). The last quote is from the
most liked comment in the comment section of an article on guanggun—it was liked by
522 people. In summary, these arguments view materialistic women as the reason behind
guanggun’s bachelorhood, blame women who choose to stay out of marriage as selfish and
socially irresponsible, and argue that feminism is polluting Chinese women by turning
them away from their womanly responsibilities.
These arguments are supported by several observations: most guanggun are poor
men (Attané et al. 2019); some rich men have multiple female partners (S. Xiao 2011;
Zurndorfer 2016); compared to married women of the same age, single women are more
educated and have more successful career and more egalitarian relationship preference
(Fincher 2016; Gaetano 2014), and women tend to marry men of higher socioeconomic
status in China (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016). Although all these observations are solid, they
do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that women are to be blamed for the guanggun
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crisis. Rather, these observations are rooted in the strong cultural tradition of female
hypergamy.
Female hypergamy refers to the practice of women marrying up to men of higher
status along the lines of wealth, education, income, and/or other dimensions of social
hierarchies (Buckley 2016). China has a long tradition of female hypergamy, and it is still
the dominant practice in the contemporary Chinese marriage market (Y. Wei and Zhang
2016). Although female hypergamy is often cited to prove that Chinese women are
materialistic (Zavoretti 2016), here I emphasize that female hypergamy does not simply
describe the individual action or preference of a woman. Rather, it also reflects the mating
preference of men under the norms of female hypergamous marriage—men prefer to marry
women of lower status to maintain the male-dominant and female-subordinate relationship
model (Y. Qian and Qian 2014b; Eklund 2013). In addition, a woman’s marital choice is
often a matter for her whole family under the strong patriarchal familial culture in China,
especially in rural China (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016; Pettier 2022). When the ideal marriage
is one between a higher-status man and a lower-status woman, two groups of people are
left out of this female hypergamous marriage market—men in the lowest class and women
in the highest class (Gaetano 2014; Xiaoyi Jin et al. 2013).
Caili, or bride price, is an often-cited proof of materialistic women. Caili refers to
the money or goods a man or his family is demanded to pay a woman or her family in order
to marry her (WEI 2020). Once the caili is exchanged, the woman will be promised to the
man and move to live with the man and his family after marriage. Caili is viewed as the
obstacle to guanggun’s marriage prospect as Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte (2012b) name
their article “Bride Price in China: The Obstacle to ‘Bare Branches’ Seeking Marriage.”
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Only families who can afford the bride price can find a wife for their son, and men from
poor families are left single (Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2012b; J. Li and Li 2021; Jiang,
Zhang, and Sánchez-Barricarte 2015). Although caili is a highly controversial topic in
contemporary China with nearly all men against it while nearly all women for it, nearly
75% of marriages in contemporary China involve caili (Guyu 2020). Many news reports
and commentaries believe that caili causes guanggun’s singlehood and proves that women
are materialistic (Wei and Wang 2021; Nbd.Com 2019).
However, caili rarely benefits women, especially rural women, many of whom have
a brother. The caili from a rural woman’s marriage is usually completely used by her
parents to find a bride for her brother (G. Huang and Yuan 2022). The bride’s parents often
use the money to help their sons find a wife via building a better house or paying the bride
price for their sons’ potential mates. According to the survey by Guyu Data (2020), in
37.7% of the marriages involve caili, the brides’ parents take all of caili paid by the grooms
and their families. On most occasions, the amount of caili requested is decided by a
woman’s parents instead of the woman herself (Guyu 2020). For example, some women’s
parents argue that if they do not charge a high amount of caili, then the man and his family
might think of the woman as an “inferior product (cipin)” (Wei and Wang 2021).
Moreover, the amount of caili does not indicate women’s actual status. Rather, it
indicates the value of women as commodities in the marriage market (WEI 2020). The
amount of the bride price is usually based on how competitive the woman is in the marriage
market. For example, a woman who is young, healthy, good-looking, and has no sexual
experiences can often be marked with a high price. The increasing amount of caili in the
past several decades reflects the severe female shortage in the Chinese population. In her
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feminist analysis of media discourse on caili, WEI (2020) argues that caili reflects “a
patriarchal negotiation between two families” and “an exchange over the control of
women,” especially “women as reproductive instruments.” Wei further argues that the
current media discourse about caili does not question the patriarchal act of objectifying
women but focuses on how to “help men and their families continue their patrilineal family
lines at a lower cost.”
The victim theme further proves men’s privilege rather than victimhood. It is
exactly men’s gender privilege in patriarchy that creates this emphasis on men’s
victimhood and neglect of women’s suffering (Bu 2008; WEI 2020; G. Huang and Yuan
2022). Many scholars have discussed the relationship between social privilege and the
visibility of victimhood. For example, feminists of color have demonstrated that white
women are viewed as the perfect victim while women of color are deemed as unrapable
and their victimhood invisible (Ritchie 2017; Adeniji 2015; Andreasen 2021). Racial
justice scholars in the US have revealed that Black people’s victimhood is less likely to be
recognized in the US criminal justice system (L. L. Miller 2010). Although reports on the
victim theme combine data from various sources, they fail to include women’s voices in
their analyses of guanggun crisis. What’s worse, they blame both feminism—independent
women who no longer need marriage to survive, and traditional gender practices—female
hypergamy, for guanggun’s suffering. Instead of simply treating women as the beneficiary
and catalysts of guanggun crisis, they could have acknowledged the violence against
women as its root cause, and they should have included the voices of women concerning
the risks of entering an unequal, traditional marriage.
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Moreover, privileged social members can appropriate the mantle of victimhood to
reinforce their privilege and social inequalities (Banet-Weiser 2021). For example,
Johnson’s (2017) study of Donald Trump’s demagoguery demonstrates how the rhetoric
of white masculine victimhood encourages subjects to focus on their individual misery
rather than the relational nature of their condition. In the case of guanggun, the victim
theme encourages men (who were born instead of killed) to adopt the mantle of victimhood
at the expense of ignoring killed girls. It argues that feminism and women are the cause of
guanggun’s suffering while ignoring the fact that this victimhood itself proves privilege.
In addition, the victimhood extends to guanggun’s families—the endangered “patrilineal
family names and lines.” This biased perception of victimhood reflects exactly the male
privilege in patriarchy.
2.1.2

Guanggun are Victimized by Heteronormativity
The victimhood representation is also rooted in heteronormativity and its promise

of happiness. Sara Ahmed (2010) argues that happiness is not an innocent emotion but a
crucial mechanism of social norms. The politics of happiness discipline social actors by
establishing a linear, narrow path to happiness and ignoring other possibilities of happiness:
“The promise of happiness takes this form: if you do this or if you have that, then happiness
is what follows” (576). If you enter a heterosexual marriage, you will be happy. Because
guanggun are single, their lives are defined as lacking happiness, meaning, or a future. Any
means are justified to enable single men to get rid of this misery and enter heterosexual
marriages. However, this argument ignored the fact that this victimhood is nothing natural
but rather constructed by heteronormativity, which limits social connections within the
institution of heterosexual marriage and biological reproduction.
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Although human trafficking is a crime in China, it has become a solution to the
guanggun problem in rural China (Hudson and Boer 2004, 2005; Human Rights Watch
2019; Davis 2006; Duong, Belanger, and Hong 2007; Gunia 2019; Stöckl et al. 2017; Yan
and Da 2019). The horror of human trafficking has been well documented in movies like
Blind Mountain (Yang Li et al. 2008). Women are drugged, lied to, sold, chained up, raped,
and forcefully impregnated by desperate men and their families. Some are allowed to
regain freedom after giving birth to at least one child. Some are resold to a different family
and relive the cycle of misery again and again. In addition, this illegal solution is generally
supported by the whole village and rural culture. When a family buys a woman, the whole
village will ignore the woman’s cry for help. Instead, they would help the family cover up
this crime. When this woman attempts to escape, watchful villagers would tell the family
her whereabouts and even help the family catch the woman sometimes. When a woman
does manage to escape, the conversation between villagers would be mainly about how sad
it is for the family to suffer such a loss both financially and emotionally. According to the
traditional reproductive culture in rural China, an individual woman’s pain is negligible
compared to a family’s shame of discontinuing the family line.
To make it even harder for women to escape, some human traffickers target women
who are from other countries because they do not speak/read Chinese (Duong, Belanger,
and Hong 2007; Guan C. and Feng 2017; M. Liu 2015; Stöckl et al. 2017). Vietnamese
brides refer to the increasingly common phenomenon of Chinese men purchasing women
trafficked from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian Countries (L. Gong 2015; Stöckl et al.
2017, 33; Y. Wang 2018; Elitestalk 2019). A rough estimate in 2015 from China News
Weekly revealed at least 100,000 Vietnamese women were sold to Chinese men (L. Gong
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2015), some through legally ambiguous, so-called marriage agencies—subtle forms of
human trafficking, and others via blatant human trafficking (Y. Wang 2018). The structural
forces behind the popularity of Vietnamese brides are the economic disparity between
Vietnam and China, China’s female shortage, the patriarchal cultures in both Vietnam and
China, and heteronormativity.
The worst example I stumbled upon in the victim theme is the media representation
of Vietnamese brides. Rather than sympathizing with the Vietnamese women who are
human trafficked to China, many news reports take the side of Chinese men and families
who buy, rape, and lock up these Vietnamese women (Guan C. and Feng 2017; J. Gong
2018; Chenglong Zhang 2020; Sanjiao Li 2022; Dao 2022). Many stories focused on the
economic and family cost when women escaped from these families. In this case, these
Vietnamese women were sold to a place with completely a different language, food, and
culture. Many of them were chained up, raped, and forced to give birth to at least one child
before they were allowed to have a minimum amount of freedom. Yet, some news reports
choose to solely focus on Chinese men’s risks of finding Vietnamese brides.
For example, one news article from Hua Shang Daily titled “The Vietnamese
Brides of Multiple Shaanxi Men Ran Away: More than 200,000 RMB expense, and Some
Already Have Children” (Chenglong Zhang 2020), focused solely on the suffering of the
few men whose Vietnamese brides ran away. It explained these men’s economic loss,
emotional pain, and marriage dilemmas in detail and referred to these men as victims: “Hua
Shang Daily journalists learned from several victims that, other than losing both the bride
and money from these scams, the ran away Vietnamese brides also brought a huge problem
for the victims—they could not get a divorce in order to marry again.” With a content
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analysis of media reports of Vietnamese brides, Guan and Feng (2017) confirm that the
media reports focus on the grooms’ gains and costs but rarely mention the lives of the
brides.
Yes, it is true that these men who purchased Vietnamese brides do suffer, but they
are not victimized by escaped brides. Instead, they are victimized by a heteronormative
culture that forces them to get married at all costs. The messages guanggun received from
the patrilineal culture is that their lives are meaningless if they stay single, that they also
deprive their parents of happiness, and that their singlehood endangers the family blood
and cultural lines. Meanwhile, they are told that marriages give their lives purpose and
happiness, no matter how the marriages were obtained. However, after buying a bride,
many of them found that they were still not happy because they were either worried about
the bride running away or having zero meaningful connections with the bride due to
language and cultural barriers. If anything, their sufferings prove how heteronormativity
victimizes guanggun by pushing them toward one narrow, nearly impossible channel of
happiness and social connections.
2.1.3

Biased Representation Leads to Unfair Solutions
This biased representation shapes the public conversation about this social

phenomenon and related policy responses from the Chinese government. For example,
many academic publications view guanggun as victims in need of policy support (Huijun
Liu and Feng 2019; S. Wang, Yang, and Attané 2018; Xudong Zhou and Hesketh 2017).
When guanggun are named as the object of protection and women are viewed as the
creators of a gender crisis in mainstream media representation, corresponding policy
responses also reflect similar biases. As a result, the responses from the Chinese
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government mainly aimed to increase bachelors’ marriage opportunities rather than
addressing gender inequality in patriarchy (Shen 2021; D. Peng 2017). For example, the
most recent policy response to the guanggun crisis targets the bride price and implies
materialistic women and their families as the cause of the guanggun crisis: “Destruct the
ugly old habits of hefty caili and construct new marital and reproductive culture” (The
Chinese Communist Party and The State Council 2021). Treating guanggun as the sole
victim would only further deepen existing gender inequalities and fuel gender-based
violence against women.
To save guanggun from miserable victimhood, the victim theme blames women
and their families for guanggun’s singlehood and prompts the government to implement
corresponding policies. Specifically, this theme concluded that guanggun are forced to be
single because Chinese women are too materialistic and only choose rich men. For
example, poor men and their families usually cannot offer a competitive bride price to
women and their families. Hence, they are more likely to be rejected. As a result, the
Chinese government updated its policy on marriage and population in Spring 2021 to
restrict the bride price and to educate women on the correct views of marriage, family, and
relationships (The Chinese Communist Party and The State Council 2021). This policy
ignores the fact that the bride price is not created by materialistic women but by a
patriarchal culture that limits the right of inheritance to men only. By blaming women for
the guanggun crisis, this policy only deepens the gender inequality that created guanggun’s
struggles.
By critically analyzing the victim theme media reports, I argue that these reports
actually reflect guanggun’s male privileges as men in a patriarchal society whose survival
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were achieved at the expense of missing girls. In most cases, the female shortage does not
improve women’s social status but enhances their exchange value between two patrilineal
families. Guanggun is not victimized by women or feminism; Instead, they are victimized
by a heteronormative culture that pushes them to get married against all odds. What’s
worse, the biased representation of the victim theme has prompted the Chinese government
to implement policies targeting women and their families, which are not effective at
alleviating guanggun’s suffering.

2.2

Failure
The failure theme presents guanggun’s living conditions as existential failures that

fail on two crucial aspects of contemporary Chinese hegemonic masculinity: wealth and
sexuality (L. Hu 2018; W. Luo 2017a). In this section, I argue that guanggun are only
failures by the standard of heteronormativity and capitalism with the example of Sanhe
gurus. I analyze the cultural representation of “Sanhe guru” in contemporary China and
reveal how it depicts guanggun as failures. Sanhe gurus are a group of single male migrant
workers gathered in Sanhe, Shenzhen. On the one hand, the capitalist measurement of
success in terms of wealth marks guanggun as failures at the bottom of hierarchical
masculinities. On the other hand, their low economic status makes them undesirable in the
marriage market, and their singlehood defines them as double failures. According to the
biopolitical logic of state power, guanggun are also branded as failures because they are
shamed both for being low-quality laborers and for not reproducing future laborers to
contribute to the Chinese society. In the end, I demonstrate that representing guanggun as
failures functions to blame individuals for their sufferings while shifting responsibilities
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from social structures—the deepening economic inequality and the lack of institutional
support for non-heteronormative relationships.
Sanhe dashen (gurus) came to my attention via my research participants: one
participant asked me, “Have you heard of Sanhe dashen?”; another said, “If you want to
understand people like me, you need to check out this documentary about them.” Sanhe
dashen is slang for a group of single male migrant workers gathered in Sanhe labor market,
Shenzhen. Existing English reports have translated dashen as “big shots (LU and XU
2020),” “Gods,” or “legends (Tian 2020).” In my writing, I translate dashen as “gurus” to
emphasize their most unique feature—a transcendental, unworldly attitude towards money,
housing, food, marriage, and other aspects of a successful life that a typical Chinese would
pursue diligently. Their mantra is “work for a day, party for three” (Tian 2020). They spend
most of their income and time in internet cafes and the virtual world of video games and
online chatting (Z. Yang 2017; Tian and Lin 2020). Therefore, they are sarcastically called
gurus in Chinese popular culture as spiritual beings without worldly desires. Like most
guanggun, Sanhe gurus are from poor families in rural China, without a college education,
doing low-paying manual labor in cities, and left out of the marriage market in
contemporary China (Y. Wu and Chen 2017).
Sanhe gurus further entered the public conversation via the Japanese documentary
made by Japanese broadcaster NHK—The Cruel Tale of Sanhe Youth (Endo 2018).
Different interviewees repeatedly recommended this documentary to me, believing that it
tells the real stories of their lives. The documentary interviewed and followed several
people in the Sanhe job market to understand the lives of Sanhe gurus. The most
representative Sanhe guru from the NHK documentary is Song. He ate the cheapest food,
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drank the most affordable water, slept in a shabby hotel, or sometimes simply slept on the
street. To survive, he even sold his ID card, the documentation needed to take any public
transportation in China—buses, subway, trains, planes. He was 27 years old, but he had
been wandering in Sanhe for nearly a decade now. When asked about his future, he
answered, “I used to think about the future when I was young. Now you see where that got
me.” When further asked about old age, he replied, “I’ll die, like everyone else, rich or
poor.” As a recognized guru among migrant workers in Sanhe, Song shared that he had
been much more at ease since becoming a guru, although his belly was still empty. After
introducing Sanhe gurus, the documentary concluded that their obsession with the internet
cafe is to compensate for their frustration in real life: “In real life, they have no chance to
get married, no car or their own house. However, they can marry and raise children with
an invisible partner in the virtual world on the internet.”
Soon after the documentary, Sanhe gurus attracted the attention of various Chinese
media, who either interviewed more Sanhe gurus or commented on their lifestyle. The term
Sanhe guru quickly went viral on the Chinese internet. In addition to becoming a
laughingstock, they were also quickly labeled as lazy, meaningless beings with problematic
views of work and life. Duoluo (degeneracy) is the most often used term to describe Sanhe
gurus (J. Shi 2021). A commentary from 163.com (2021) published these words: “Sanhe
gurus used to be a group of hardworking, aspirational young men. No one knows what
happened to them, but now they have no confidence or willpower. They live the cheapest
life and think about nothing. Their only income is daily jobs in Sanhe, which will pay them
around 100 yuan (14 US dollars) at the end of the day. They spend a dollar or two on food
and water and rest in an internet café, where they play games or sleep throughout the night.
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They wear broken clothes and never change their clothes. They do not shower or brush
teeth neither. Wherever they go, an awful smell follows. They live a mindless, meaningless
life.”
In addition to media judgment, the increased visibility of Sanhe gurus also invited
more strict regulations from the Chinese government. The Shenzhen government tore down
the shabby buildings that gurus frequent and deployed more police in Sanhe to stop
guanggun from sleeping on the street (J. Shi 2021). If gurus were caught sleeping on the
street, they would be “sent back to their hometowns by local rescue centers, something
most of them dread, ashamed to go back to their families. Others believe that they have no
family” (LU and XU 2020). The government also strives to transform the Sanhe job market
and its surrounding areas. Before, there were many shabby hotels and internet cafes in
Sanhe, trash scattered everywhere, and full of homeless people. Now, according to a report
by CCP media Xinhua, “Sanhe has a completely new face. The ground is clean and neat,
walls are filled with elegant murals, bookstores have replaced internet cafes, and shabby
hotels are transformed into stable apartments. Most importantly, Sanhe gurus have
disappeared” (K. Zhou and Sun 2022). Over the torn-down site of Sanhe job market, a
public square is under construction. The square is named “The Hard Worker (fendou zhe)
Square.” By tearing down the places where Sanhe gurus gathered and constructing a public
square named as the opposite of the Sanhe guru spirits, the Chinese government
simultaneously erases and evokes the social problems signified by Sanhe gurus.
2.2.1

Poverty as Failure in Capitalist China
Guanggun like Sanhe gurus are labeled as failures not only because they are poor

but also because they refuse to work with capitalist exploitation. Instead of believing in the
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neoliberal promise that one can succeed if one works hard enough, Sanhe gurus realize that
this promise is empty in the face of widening economic inequality and scarce opportunities
for social mobility. Their refusal of capitalist exploitation marked them as lazy and lacking
good personal qualities. Against this cultural discourse that blames individuals for their
suffering, I argue that guanggun are failed by a capitalist society that measures a person’s
worth by their economic wealth.
In The Queer Art of Failure, Jack Halberstam (2011) argues that failures might be
redemptive when succuss is defined problematically: “success in a heteronormative,
capitalist society equates too easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined
with wealth accumulation” (2). In contemporary China, the hierarchy of masculinities is
ranked according to this heteronormative, capitalist definition of success—wealth and
(sexual) access to women (W. Luo 2017b; Uretsky 2008; Wong 2016). Guanggun are
nested in this hierarchy of masculinities. In a female hypergamous marriage culture, a
man’s location in the hierarchy of masculinities is decided by how much upward social
mobility a man can offer to a woman and her family (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016; Eklund
2013). As a result, guanggun are left single, but rich men can have multiple female partners
simultaneously (Zurndorfer 2016; S. Xiao 2011; X. Zhang 2008). Guanggun’s
bachelorhood further pushes them to the bottom of the hierarchy of masculinities since
marriage status is a crucial aspect of hegemonic masculinity in contemporary China
(Zurndorfer 2016; W. Luo 2017b). In other words, guanggun are single because of their
lower-class status, but their singlehood further marginalizes them in the hierarchy of
masculinities. Yet, they are promised that their failures will not last forever if they work
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hard enough to obtain financial success, and that they can climb up the ladder of
hierarchical masculinities by being a hardworking man (T. Liu 2019).
Some guanggun, however, recognize that this neoliberal capitalist promise is
simply an empty promise. Yong, another protagonist in the NHK documentary, revealed
the impossibility of class mobility for lower-class Chinese. Yong appeared in the
documentary showcasing his vigorous martial arts moves and optimistic personality. He
had just graduated high school, but his family could not afford the college that admitted
him. Instead of giving up, Yong decided to come to Shenzhen and find another way to live.
After witnessing the lives of other migrant workers in Sanhe, Yong commented, “I believe
I have two choices. I can just let it go and live like the gurus, or I can work harder, enjoy
life more, and love life more. I hope I will always choose the second.” However, at the end
of the documentary, Yong looked like a completely different person, as if all the vigor
inside him had evaporated. He sat on the side of the street with long, oily hair covering
most of his face, staring numbly into the camera. No one knows what happened, but he lost
his ID along with hope.
China Labour Bulletin (2022) find via their survey data that, in addition to low
wages, migrant workers suffer from long work hours, little job security, few benefits, and
no labor protection. In the case of Sanhe gurus, many migrant workers in Sanhe faced harsh
exploitation in sweatshops without proper compensation or respect from their employers
(Tian 2020). In his ethnographic work on Sanhe gurus, Tian (2020) noted their “aversion
to exploitation, to being nickel-and-dimed by their bosses, and to facing discrimination.”
Moreover, more and more migrant workers recognize that they cannot change their fate as
the bottom class in contemporary society no matter how hard they work. Instead, they
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would rather enjoy gratification from the virtual world of internet cafes and video games.
For example, Xie, a Sanhe guru, refused to work overtime, which caused him to be fired
from several factories. Xie could not understand why these factories liked overtime so
much: “I just want to get off work as soon as possible so I return to my dorm and play
video games” (J. Shi 2021). Forcing workers to work overtime is a strategy of these profitdriven factories to maximize their exploitation against workers.
However, working-class men were not always portrayed as failures in China. The
association between wealth and hegemonic masculinity is a capitalist phenomenon. Hu
(2017) studies the trend of masculinity representation from 1951 to 2016 and discovers that
physical strength used to be a crucial indicator of masculinity and that working-class men
were the representation of hegemonic masculinity in socialist China. However, the
situation changed after privatization and marketization in China in the 1970s. Economic
success and sexual prowess become signs of masculine accomplishment, and rich men with
young, attractive female partners become the face of hegemonic masculinity in
contemporary China. Luo’s (2017) article on masculinity on the Chinese TV screen
confirmed the same trend. Luo argues that hegemonic masculinity in contemporary China
reflects “the rule of a market economic hierarchy and uphold[s] the hegemonic ideal of
versatile, successful, and upper-middle-class manhood, which hinges on the patriarchal,
heteronormative model of love and marriage” (190). As a result, guanggun, most of whom
are migrant workers, are represented as double failures in both wealth and sexuality
according to the capitalist standards of hegemonic masculinity.
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2.2.2

Singlehood as Failure in Heteronormative Patrilineal Culture
Under heteronormativity, only a life moving towards heterosexual marriage is a

purposeful life: “Heterosexual love becomes ... what life is aimed toward, as being what
gives life direction or purpose, or as what drives a story” (Ahmed 2010, 90). It is from this
heteronormative logic that guanggun are regarded as failures. Heteronormativity also
shapes the norms of manhood as masculinities scholars in China have identified—the ‘real
man’ aspires to enter a heterosexual marriage, raise children and carry on the family line
(Choi and Peng 2016; Lin2017; Tingting Liu 2019). Although they appeared to be
transcendental, Sanhe gurus were also immersed in this heteronormative culture. Even
though they have a very slim chance of marriage in the real world, they still try to marry
and reproduce children virtually in their favorite video games, as shown in the NHK
documentary. Guanggun are deemed as failures because they could not meet the
heteronormative expectations or continue the patrilineal family lines. However, I argue that
guanggun’s singlehood makes it possible for them to resist capitalist and biopolitical
exploitation.
Another layer of failure in the cultural representation of guanggun is unique to
China’s patrilineal familial culture and the heteronormative obsession with biological
reproduction. Even with increasing gender equality and modernization, the majority of
Chinese still believe in the traditional view that only a man’s biological offspring can
continue his family line. Therefore, if a man cannot find a wife or have biological children,
it is not only his personal failure but also the failure of his parents and whole family line
(Wong 2016; Y. B. Zhang et al. 2005). In rural China, if you are a single man over 25 years
old, almost everyone you encounter at every social gathering would question, and
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sometimes even intervene in, your status of marriage, your parents would be viewed as
failing their mission, and you would become a joke in the community, especially if you are
the only son in your family (Xiaoyi Jin et al. 2013; Attané and Yang 2018).
I argue that the failure theme not only erases the possibilities of happiness and
fulfillment outside of this hierarchy, but also facilitates capitalist, neoliberal exploitation
against lower-class Chinese. Many guanggun do suffer from social isolation in a
heteronormative society that only sanctions social connections around heterosexual
marriages and biological reproduction (Tian 2020; Endo 2018), but they have also firsthand witnessed how heteronormativity facilitates exploitation. Many young migrant
workers grew up as “left-behind children” in rural China with their parents working in far
way cities (Tian 2020). These parents had to separate from their children in order to fulfill
family responsibilities and provide financial support as well as a chance of a better future
for them (Y.-J. Wen et al. 2021). In other words, they could not be present for their children
because they are exploited in sweatshops in exchange for minimum wages. Guanggun,
most of whom are second-generation migrant workers, learned from a young age that
responsibility is not love, that work could not generate happiness, or, more blatantly, that
the so-called family responsibilities make one exploitable. Sanhe gurus’ rejection of
overtime work is possible because they are single men. Their failure in heteronormativity
gives them the freedom to fail the capitalist exploitation of lower-class Chinese in
contemporary China.
2.2.3

Failing the Biopolitical State
Guanggun are also failures in the eyes of the biopolitical state that seeks to harness

its citizens’ bodies to maximize its economic and political power. In recent decades, the
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Chinese government has focused on two types of biopolitical projects. The first one seeks
to train Chinese citizens into selfless, dedicated, and high-quality workers that would fuel
the Chinese economy and reinforce the legitimacy of the Chinese Community Party’s
ruling. The second and more recent one aims to encourage the Chinese to have more
children in the face of the ultra-low fertility crisis so that China would have a sustainable
supply of future laborers. As a result, guanggun, especially those who are like Sanhe gurus,
are harshly criticized and regulated by the Chinese government. However, guanggun are
failing these biopolitical projects because there is no justice for lower-class Chinese in
contemporary China. Branding guanggun as failures only functions to obscure the
structural responsibility for guanggun’s struggles and the structural support needed to
provide better lives for lower-class Chinese.
Let me start by introducing the biopolitical projects by the Chinese government.
Here, I use the term biopolitics to indicate the political projects that seek to govern human
lives and extract use of them, following Foucault’s tradition (Foucault 2012; Foucault,
Davidson, and Burchell 2008a). There are many forms of biopolitics, and I introduce two
examples here. The first example is the Chinese government’s governance over the fertility
of the Chinese people. Gradually over the past decade, the Chinese government has shifted
its family planning policy from fertility restrictions to urging the Chinese to produce more
and better quality children (Alpermann and Zhan 2019; Greenhalgh 2010; Jacka 2009a).
The latest policy released on May 31st, 2021, allowed each Chinese couple to have three
children and highlighted the responsibilities of Chinese parents to raise high-quality labor
force for the Chinese society (The Chinese Communist Party and The State Council 2021).
The second example is the government’s emphasis on individuals’ responsibility to
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contribute to society and the state as laborers and consumers. The same policy document
that allowed the Chinese to have three children also stated that Chinese citizens are
responsible for “providing effective human capital support and domestic consumption
support for China’s high-quality development.”
With their “Work for a day, party for three” mantra, Sanhe gurus are viewed as
threats to these biopolitical projects by the Chinese government. As a result, many stateowned media portray Sanhe gurus as failures. For example, this report from Xinhua, the
official state press agency of the Chinese government, celebrates a “positive” case of a
“converted” Sanhe guru: “When asked about his past (in Sanhe), 35-year-old Zhong Hang
frankly says that he is ‘too ashamed to remember.’ On the morning of January 2nd, 2021,
Zhong encountered government workers in Helian community, ‘After understanding my
situation, they offered psychological counseling and employment instructions to me, which
woke me up from the decadent status.’ Zhong tells the journalist that he is raising crawfish
in his hometown in Meizhou, Guangdong, that he is married and has children, and that he
has been living a positive, upward life” (K. Zhou and Sun 2022). Here, with Zhong’s story,
the state media delivered its definitions of failure and success to readers—living like Sanhe
gurus is shameful, while having a productive job and a reproductive future is a life with
purposes and directions, an “upward” life.
Moreover, this criticism also extends to Chinese workers who want to rest more
instead of work more. Tangping (lying flat) has become a viral word in China since April
2021. It expresses the desire of Chinese workers to take a break from their stressful,
competitive, and busy work (BBC News 2021; W. Zhang and Liu 2021). However, it was
criticized by Guangming Daily, a newspaper run by the Chinese Communist party under
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The Central Propaganda Department. One commentary identified how tangping would
hinder China’s biopolitical governance goals: “The ‘lie flat’ group is obviously harmful to
the socio-economic development. Currently, our country faces multiple challenges such as
an aging population, and a high-quality development is inseparable from the creative
contribution of Chinese youth” (Xingyu Wang 2021). Another commentary directly
attacked people who choose to lie flat as lazy, “compromising in the face of difficulties,
and giving up the future” (M. Guan 2021). These messages from state media exposes how
Chinese citizens are treated as laborers and consumers—instruments of the Chinese
government, as a critic from China Labour Bulletin identifies, “If more and more people
choose to drop out and not consume, the economy could stall and the integrity of the Party
may be undermined” (2021b).
However, guanggun are failing these projects because there is no justice for lowerclass Chinese. For example, the NHK documentary also portrays Chen Yongfa, a hardworking migrant worker, one that would be celebrated by official media owned by the
Chinese government (Endo 2018). He had been working in Shenzhen for 18 years and lost
his right arm in a factory accident. Using his savings and the compensation from the
factory, Yongfa opened a restaurant named “Left-handed” in Sanhe. Although he worked
for long hours every day, he was still an outsider in Shenzhen because he did not have
Shenzhen hukou as a migrant worker. As a result, his daughter could not attend schools in
Shenzhen like many children of migrant workers (China Labour Bulletin 2022; Goodburn
2020). At the end of the documentary, he had to send his daughter back to rural China so
she could attend school there as a “left-behind” child (Y.-J. Wen et al. 2021). Chen
Yongfa’s story reflects the reality of lower-class Chinese—their hard work rarely improves
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their living conditions. Instead, with the class solidification in contemporary China, lower
class Chinese tend to stay in the lower-class no matter how hard they work (Lulu Li and
Zhu 2017).
In the case of Sanhe gurus, the key issue in their life is the lack of realistic wage
regulation and supportive housing projects for migrant workers. The Chinese government
stated that the minimum wage for factory jobs should be no less than 2000 yuan (280 US
dollars) a month (Office of Labor Relations 2020). This threshold has not changed for 15
years despite the skyrocketing housing and living expenses in urban China. For migrant
workers, this minimum wage is all they will earn if they work 8 hours a day and five days
a week. However, it is not even enough to cover the basic living expenses. The only way
for a worker to support himself or have a little bit of savings is to work overtime. In the
end, it is common for a worker to work 11 to 12 hours a day and six days a week. The long
working hours are not only taxing but also unsafe for workers. Accidents happen when
workers cannot stay awake in their work stations (A. Chan 2016).
When long hours and unsafe working conditions push guanggun out of factories,
they face no support but more discipline from the Chinese government. For example, Sanhe
gurus cannot stand the demanding work conditions that barely keep them alive, so they quit
the factory jobs and seek an alternative way to survive in cities. Rather than getting help
from the government, they are frequently harassed or arrested by the police when sleeping
on the street (C. Wang 2017; 163.Com 2021). In fact, they have no place to seek effective
assistance. Labor activists and organizations have noticed the suffering of migrant workers,
including Sanhe gurus. However, activist efforts would be labeled as ill-intentioned and
shut down by the government (Crothall 2018; Howell 2021). The union still exists in
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contemporary China, but only as a branch of the Chinese government. Therefore, it does
not have an independent voice to represent workers’ interests. For example, instead of
advocating for an increase in the minimum wage, the union blames Sanhe gurus for lacking
a good work ethic (Wang Xingkun 2018; K. Zhou and Sun 2022).
Biopolitical capitalism can continue to exploit guanggun by labeling them as
failures while neglecting their worker’s rights and using them for cheap labor. In other
words, globalizing capitalism and the Chinese government conspire to exploit guanggun
for economic and political gains. After demonstrating the conspiracy of capitalism and
biopolitical governmentality, I argue that guanggun are not failures but forced to fail for
the profits of capitalism and the Chinese government. The biggest problem of the failure
theme representation is that it often presents guanggun’s situation to be the result of
personal character flaws. This theme refuses to view guanggun’s situation as an inevitable
consequence of structural inequality and violence, or to acknowledge the complicit role of
the Chinese government in the making of guanggun. Rather, it identifies guanggun as
“incapable” men’s failures. Ignoring the structural forces does not help to generate helpful
policy responses but fuels the government’s indifference to guanggun’s living conditions.
The failure theme and its individualist perspective obscure the problem that the existing
social safety network by the government is largely designed to facilitate heteronormative
families. A more effective response to the guanggun crisis is to create an expansive social
support system that accommodates lives in and out of heterosexual marriage.
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2.3

Danger
The danger theme attracts the most media, policy, and scholarly attention. In this

narrative, guanggun are depicted as dangerous, reckless men who threaten social stability
because they lack social ties to heteronormative marriage. According to this representation,
guanggun is the force behind rising numbers of sexual violence against women,
international as well as domestic human trafficking, and the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases. More importantly, guanggun as a group is also viewed as a potentially
revolutionary force that could threaten the ruling of the Chinese Communist Party. I argue
that the danger theme serves the biopolitical governmentality that seeks to maintain the
status quo and political control over the society. It works with heteronormative patriarchy
to demonize single men’s violence while treating male violence within marriage as
acceptable. This representation can generate deadly consequences for the guanggun and
other social groups, including mass incarceration and/or war.
When searching for the cultural representation of guanggun, I found the danger
theme everywhere. Chinese media also widely circulate the assumption that guanggun will
lead to an increase of violent crimes (Junzirong 2018; Peng D. 2019; R. Yan and Da 2019;
Xiaohong Li 2012). Examples of the danger theme are abundant. As early as 2012,
People’s Daily, the newspaper owned by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party, published a commentary, arguing that the surplus men in China were a severe issue,
especially in forms of an increase in the crime rate and a threat to social stability: “With
the accumulation of men who should be married but could not, the risk of social instability
and unsafety has significantly raised. Reports have shown that some single men in villages
have participated in destructive behaviors in the past three years, from gambling in groups,
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making troubles in groups, stealing as a group, and group fights” (Xiaohong Li 2012) In
2019, Phoenix Weekly reported a sensational story to imply that guanggun can lead to
sexual violence against women with the title “What is behind missing girls is China’s
guanggun crisis” (R. Yan and Da 2019). The article started with a news story of a 55-yearold single man kidnapping a 16-year-old girl, who was chained in his basement for 24 days
and raped multiple times. The article links this story to China’s guanggun crisis, concluding
that guanggun are as dangerous as ticking bombs: “For rural single men, if they could not
find wives and realize that they are not competitive in the marriage market as the bottom
class of the Chinese society, they would very luckily be frustrated and choose the criminal
path of social destruction” (R. Yan and Da 2019).
In addition, scholars project that guanggun, as disadvantaged single men, might be
more inclined towards violence and risky behaviors (Ebenstein and Jennings 2009; Xiaoyi Jin et al. 2012; J. D. Tucker et al. 2005; Tsang 2020). For example, scholars argue that
guanggun will increase HIV transmission by participating in commercial sex (Ebenstein
and Jennings 2009; Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2012a; J. D. Tucker et al. 2005). Some
historians predict that the surplus men in the Chinese population will endanger social orders
and lead to rebellion or war (Hudson and Boer 2004; Crow 2010; Jiang and SánchezBarricarte 2011). With examples from Chinese history, Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte
(2011) argue that a large number of single men will lead to social instability such as
collective conflicts and revolution with the “secret societies, brotherhood associations,
bandit groups, and other organizations alike” that they have formed (18). However, Jiang
and Sánchez-Barricarte (2011) conclude that the collective actions by guanggun will not
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generate any meaningful progress, just destruction, because they are merely “peasant
revolts” as the majority of guanggun are rural men (18).
2.3.1

The Dangerous, Undomesticated Men outside of Heteronormativity
The danger theme reflects the intricate tensions between men and family.

Masculinity scholars Michele Adams and Scott Coltrane (2005) acknowledge that modern
Western men are expected to transcend the domestic sphere and focus on the public sphere,
but the association with family is crucial in constructing the ideal/hegemonic masculinity
in the binary of “the familial” versus “the dangerous” (239), more specifically, the
“respectable family man” versus the “extra-familial, dangerous, and undomesticated man”
(239). This is exactly this binary that captures guanggun—as single men, they are often
labeled as irresponsible troublemakers, who would commit various crimes to meet their
material, sexual, and emotional needs (Greenhalgh 2015). For example, a reporter wrote,
“If men’s sexual needs are not met when they reach the age of marriage, it will promote
the commercial sex industry and other forms of illegal activities” (R. Yan and Da 2019). I
argue that this binary between familial men and dangerous men is responsible for
guanggun’s suffering. Caught in this black or white dichotomy, guanggun do not have
much room to explore their alternative lives. Often, they only have two choices available:
to try every means, no matter how illegal or cruel, to enter heterosexual marriage, or to
fulfill the biased representations of them in contemporary Chinese culture—victim, failure,
and/or danger.
In addition, the danger theme also reflects the widespread perception that men are
essentially violent, dangerous beings. Masculinity scholars acknowledge the fact that men
do commit more violent crimes than women (Edwards 2004; Kaufman 2007). However,
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they argue that the more meaningful task is to examine how a society harnesses this
violence (Connell 2000; Whitehead 2002). For example, Michael Kaufman (2007) believes
that “[E]ven if we could ascertain that humans in general, or men in particular, are
predisposed to building neutron bombs, this does not help us answer the much more
important question of how each society shapes, limits, or accentuates this tendency” (35).
The dichotomy between the “respectable family man” versus the “dangerous, and
undomesticated man” is one crucial social mechanism that divides men’s violence into
acceptable or dangerous. For instance, most patriarchal societies tolerate, sometimes even
normalize, men’s violence within marriage (Alcalde 2010; Basu 2015; Xiangmei Li and
Wang 2021). However, in the case of guanggun, it is the violent tendency of single men
outside of heterosexual marriage that is deemed extremely destructive and dangerous.
The danger theme reinforces the heteronormative assumption that single men are
inherently a threat to the social order. However, the research article by Attané at al. s (2019)
tells a different story after comparing the sexual behaviors of married men and unmarried
men in rural China. Their study found that compared to married men, guanggun do not
have a higher rate of purchasing commercial sex. Moreover, it also shows that “in China,
homosexual men frequently enter into heterosexual unions in order to escape social
pressure and stigmatization” (2019, 1010). As a large group of men living outside of
heterosexual marriage, guanggun’s existence questions the “natural order” of
heteronormativity and opens up the potential of lives outside of heterosexual marriage. As
a result, it is branded as a danger to heteronormativity and the status quo.
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2.3.2

Pacify, Confine, or Eliminate the Danger
However, the danger theme is not a harmless cultural phenomenon. Rather, it can

be abused by the government for biopolitics when a large group of people is pathologized
(Foucault, Davidson, and Burchell 2008b; Mbembe 2019). Existing academic and popular
have framed guanggun as a problem of surplus (Hudson and Boer 2004; C. Tucker and
Van Hook 2013; Booth and Kim 2016; Cowen and Siciliano 2011), excess (Poston Jr,
Conde, and DeSalvo 2011; Lo 2010), and leftover (W. Luo 2017b; China Youth Daily
2016)—a problem in need of bio/necropolitical governance (Tyner 2013; T. M. Li 2010).
Moreover, this surplus is also viewed as dangerous: guanggun’s consumption of
commercial sex might endanger the physical health of the Chinese population by spreading
sexually transmitted diseases (J. D. Tucker et al. 2005); the congregation of guanggun
might threaten social stability (Jiang and Sánchez-Barricarte 2011; Xiao-yi Jin et al. 2012);
guanggun’s lives outside of heterosexual marriages might disrupt the order of hegemonic
masculinity and patriarchy heteronormativity (Tsang 2020; Attané and Yang 2018). When
people are made into the dangerous surplus, the question that follows is what to do with
this surplus—expanding the space to make lives, or letting die to eliminate the danger?
To solve the “guanggun crisis,” scholars have proposed various solutions, including
the emigration of surplus men, immigration of women from other countries, colonial
expansion/war, improving the social support system, and eliminating gender equality
(Hudson and Boer 2004; Li, Shang, and Feldman 2013; Attané et al. 2019). However, if
influenced by the danger theme, the Chinese government will be more motivated to
discipline guanggun and less motivated to implement positive policies like enhancing the
social safety network. In addition, it may be more inclined to cultivate this so-call “violence
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tendency” in single Chinese men to fuel nationalism and pacify domestic and international
crises. It may also strengthen the social surveillance and incarceration system to confine
guanggun. To an extreme, scholars predict that the Chinese government may also use war
to eliminate a large amount of the male population like numerous wars have successfully
done before (Hudson and Boer 2004).
However, scholars like Wendy Brown (1992) caution against framing the state
power or the government as an it: “Despite the almost unavoidable tendency to speak of
the state as an ‘it,’ the domain we call the state is not a thing, system, or subject but a
significantly unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules,
and practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one
another” (12). The same is true with the Chinese government, which is made of multiple
departments and layers of local governments with competing interests and agenda. Let
alone the complicated agency of the countless government workers inside the government.
Therefore, I admit that my discussion of the Chinese government is convenient but too
simplistic, and that a more complicated discussion of the government is needed in my
future writings.
Firstly, the Chinese government can further perpetuate patriarchal violence by
transferring guanggun’s problems to women. Some media reports and commentaries
specifically recommend the Chinese government import women from other countries to
alleviate the guanggun crisis in China (Yalong Li, Ni, and Liu 2015; qixiaohan 2013). One
article goes through the sex ratios of different countries in the world and comes up with a
list of countries that has more females than males (Business Sohu 2013). In the end, it
suggests the Chinese government develop good relationships with these countries and carry
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out policies to import women from these countries to China. Here is another enraging
example. After Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the term “Ukraine beauty”
went viral on the Chinese internet as many Chinese men posted that they would be more
than happy to “shelter a Ukraine beauty,” and that “priority will be given to those who are
young, beautiful, unmarried, and fit” (V. Zhou and Ewe 2022; Descalsota 2022). The
problem with this proposal is that it objectifies women as if they are just one form of
transnational commodities. It attempts to solve the guanggun crisis with governmental
actions without considering the agency of women.
Secondly, the danger theme prompts the government to surveil, police, and
incarcerate the surplus male population with the state violence machine. When guanggun
are framed as dangerous, it offers a convenient cause for the government to step in as the
protector of the social order. Many narratives in the danger theme highlight the violence of
single men against women to illustrate the danger of guanggun. Feminist scholars have
identified this rhetorical trope as the “masculinist protector state” logic (Young 2003). It
offers a “legitimate” excuse for the state to strengthen and activate its violence machine
via policing, incarceration, and/or war. For example, the Chinese government closed Sanhe
job market after “Sanhe gurus” went viral and are represented as disrupting the social order
(C. Wang 2017). Currently, the Chinese government is expanding its prison labor system
in areas that it deems as in need of stronger control (Aslam, Fabrizio, and Thomalla 2021;
Roberts 2018).The danger theme is especially harmful because it calls for violence from
the government to deal with the guanggun crisis. Moreover, it uses a few extreme examples
of violent crimes to represent the whole guanggun group.
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Last but not least, historians have studied the connections between war and a
surplus male population and found out that a surplus male population tends to result in
violence, conflicts, and war as measures to reduce the male population (Cowen and
Siciliano 2011; Hudson and Boer 2004; Crow 2010). The Chinese government has not
openly expressed its intention to use war to solve the guanggun problem. However, it has
fostered nationalist attitudes among Chinese men and made regular pro-war gestures and
pro-military propaganda. Xi Jinping repeatedly threatens to impose violence on Taiwan
and any countries who dare to challenge China (Ni 2021). People’s Daily publishes promilitary videos and articles regularly. For example, in response to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker
of the United States House of Representatives, and her plan to visit Taiwan, Zhao Lijian,
the speaker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
responded, “the Chinese army will not stand by and will absolutely take strong, effective
measures to defeat any foreign forces” (X. Wen 2022). Although the Chinese government
might have other intentions in making these pro-military gestures, but on the military and
propaganda levels, China is getting ready to start a war and enjoy one of its side effects—
eliminating the surplus male population and bringing “balance” to the population structure.

2.4

Conclusion
The victim, failure, and danger themes in the cultural representation of guanggun

can generate harmful consequences instead of inspiring helpful policies. Focusing solely
on individual characters and sensational stories, these themes cannot generate an in-depth
analysis of the structural problems underlying guanggun’s struggles, especially how global
capitalism, biopolitical governmentality, and patriarchal heteronormativity exploit and
marginalize guanggun. In addition, guanggun is often simplified as a homogeneous group
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without layers of complexities. Simply because they are single men above the average age
of marriage, they are assumed to be desperate and miserable. Moreover, stereotypical
masculinity labels men outside of the family as dangerous and violent. Together, they
define a hegemonic/normative masculinity—the familial men, and guanggun is
problematic/pathologized based on this narrow definition of what it means to be a good
man.
By pathologizing guanggun, no effort is needed to challenge the macro forces that
instrumentalize human lives, such as patriarchy, heteronormativity, biopolitics, and
capitalism. Stigmatizing and blaming guanggun serve to disguise the structural injustice as
individual failures: Guanggun only become a problem when both state policies and cultural
traditions

perpetuate

gender

discrimination,

when

neoliberalism

shifts

social

responsibilities on individuals and families, and when heterosexual marriages monopoly
both affective and material supplies. In addition, stereotypical representation leads to
biased policy proposals that often target scapegoats instead of the root causes of
guanggun’s struggles. As a result, policies prompted by stereotypical representation rarely
improve guanggun’s living conditions.
More importantly, such cultural representation also ignores the agency of
guanggun, especially their potential to live a meaningful life outside of heterosexual
marriage. The stereotypes reduce guanggun into negative symbols while ignoring the
revolutionary potential generated by guanggun’s “failure” at heteronormativity. Without
considering the agency of living beings, structural forces may appear as an inescapable iron
cage that locks away any potential of living outside of social norms. The main source of
information in these reports are scholars, government officials, and married villagers.
88

Guanggun’s voices are missing, so is their perception of reality (K. Zhang and Bélanger
2017). Do they agree to be represented as victims, failures, and/or danger? How do they
negotiate social norms around masculinity, gender, and marriage? How do they perceive
pronatalist biopolitics from the Chinese government? Are they aware of the impact of
capitalism on their work, life, and love? We can only answer these questions by entering
guanggun’s lives and listening to their tales of love/despair and connections/isolation. In
my fieldwork, I explore guanggun’s existence beyond heteronormativity and biased
cultural representations. Rather than reading and watching guanggun like an object, I invite
them to create first-person narratives of who they are and how they live. In the next two
chapters, we will learn through guanggun’s own eyes and words about how they both enact
and challenge social norms.
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CHAPTER 3. SEGREGATING GENDER
A commonly accepted assumption in a patriarchal culture is that love can be
present in a situation where one group or individual dominates another.
— bell hooks, 2018, All About Love: New Visions, page 40.

“I still want to live a life with someone I am really in love with,” Snow told me
despite the repeated frustration he endured in the marriage market as a 30-year-old migrant
worker from rural Henan who worked at an electronics factory in Shenzhen. Love was
repeatedly mentioned in my conversation with guanggun; they did not necessarily want
marriage, but most of them longed for love and meaningful connections. However,
guanggun’s pursuit of love is complicated by their internalization of the segregating,
hierarchical gender norms in a patriarchal society, in addition to the hindering structural
factors discussed in the last chapter. Just like bell hooks’ (2018) quote suggests, patriarchal
inequality and dominance are barriers to the loving connections that guanggun desire.
Guanggun’s struggles with love and gender norms demonstrate the complicated
relationship between structural forces and individual agency. On the structural level,
gender norms and the institution of heteronormative marriages reinforce each other and coconstitute the patriarchal gender hierarchy. In contemporary China, the gender norms of
hegemonic masculinity and normative femininity are situated in the male-dominant and
female-subordinate gender order manifested in the prevalence of female hypergamy as the
normative mode of marriage. However, for structural forces to become internalized
discipline devices, social norms need to enter individual subjectivities by activating their
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affective tendencies or desires (C. Y. Zhang 2022). Once internalized, an individual can be
caught in a dilemma when their desires and structural norms tangle up, especially when
environmental changes make it nearly impossible to live up to the social norms. For
example, compared to married men, guanggun tend to have more conservative gender
attitudes and confine women to traditional gender roles (Attané, Eklund, and Zhang 2018),
which might be because guanggun feel the need to hold on to traditional masculinity to
compensate for their frustration in the marriage market. Yet, traditional gender attitudes
actually reduce their odds of entering heterosexual marriages in the context of severe
female shortage and deepening economic inequality in contemporary China.
In this chapter, drawing on data from my field notes and online interviews with
guanggun, I demonstrate how rigid and traditional gender norms segregate people into
binary gender slots that hinder guanggun, both internally and externally, from finding love
or forming meaningful connections. Before I proceed, I need to point out that by no means
am I suggesting that marriage equals love or meaningful connections, although these terms
are often conflated together in discussions about guanggun. In a highly heteronormative
culture like contemporary China, marriage is often said to provide meaning to one’s life.
For example, Chinese national survey data shows that nearly all Chinese believe that
marriage is an indispensable part of adulthood and that they should enter legal marriage
before 30 years old (Yeung and Hu 2016), and those who are single after that age usually
face tremendous pressure from families and social networks (Pettier 2016; Gaetano 2014;
Tao et al. 2021). Yet, the men I interviewed insisted that meaningful connections could
only appear with love. Although they were under pressure to get married as soon as
possible, they still distinguished between love and marriage. Even though some of them
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found it hard to define love or meaningful connections, they were certain that it is not an
exchange of resources between two persons or two families, or a matter of “bank notes,
cars, and houses”—a popular practice in the marriage market in both rural and urban China
(Pettier 2022). Like bell hooks (2018), my research participants emphasized the spiritual
connections between two persons when they talked about love. Many of them refused to
believe that the kind of marriages based on material exchanges could provide the
meaningful connections they desired. In this chapter, I identify the three obstacles—set up
by the gender norms in patriarchal heteronormativity—in their quest for love.
The three interlocked obstacles are hegemonic masculinity, normative femininity,
and the practice of female hypergamy in a patriarchal society. First, the norms of
hegemonic masculinity prioritize independence and dominance over mutual, emotional
connections. In contemporary China, a man’s financial success becomes a measurement of
his manhood and a pre-condition for love and marriage (W. Luo 2017a), which locks poor
men like guanggun into singlehood. Moreover, this emphasis on a man’s financial capital
also contradicts guanggun’s desire for spiritual connections. Second, guanggun’s
expectations for ideal femininity also limit their choices of potential mates. Under the norm
of masculine dominance in China, an ideal woman is expected to be powerless compared
to her male partner, i.e., she should be family-oriented, younger, less educated, less
experienced (pure), and with a lower income (Xiaomeng Li 2020). As a result, many older
women with previous marriage experiences and/or successful careers are excluded from
guanggun’s search for love, which further reduces guanggun’s chance of finding a partner.
Lastly, combining hegemonic masculinity and normative femininity, the typical maledominant and female-subordinate relational model makes it harder for guanggun to form
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non-normative yet meaningful relationships. Per this model, female hypergamy becomes
the only acceptable form of relationship (Y. Wei and Zhang 2016), which severely inhibits
lower socio-economic class men from finding love. In the following paragraphs, I examine
each obstacle in detail with the data I collected, situate it within the social-cultural context
of contemporary China, and explain how it foils guanggun’s quest for love.

3.1

Hegemonic Masculinity
In this section, I demonstrate how masculinity, especially the hegemonic norms of

masculinity, are limiting guanggun’s chances of meaningful connections. Recognizing
both the relational nature of masculinity and the limitations of binary gender norms,
masculinity studies scholar and activist Michael Kaufman argues that “Masculinity is one
half of the narrow, surplus-repressive shape of the adult human psyche” (2007, 43). A
binary gender system is limiting because it forces each person to only choose half of their
possibilities as a human being. Masculinity is relational because it is constructed as the
opposition or the lack of femininity. With guanggun’s own words and the masculinity
studies in contemporary China, I illustrate how the norms of hegemonic masculinity further
shrink guanggun’s chance of forming meaningful connections in the face of severe female
shortage. Specifically, I offer a critique of the contemporary Chinese masculinity norms
that prioritize independence over connections, worship career success and wealth, and seek
dominance over women.
Let me start with the concept of hegemonic masculinity. Although often used as
singular, masculinity is more plural than singular. Masculinity scholar Stephen Whitehead
(2002) argues that “masculinities are plural and multiple; they differ over space, time and

93

context, are rooted only in the cultural and social moment, and are thus, inevitably entwined
with other powerful and influential variables such as sexuality, class, age, and ethnicity”
(34). Moreover, different masculinities are often hierarchically ranked per the structural
inequalities in each society, with hegemonic masculinity at the top of any given hierarchy
of masculinities. Exploring different forms of masculinity, Connell and Messerschmidt
(2005) define hegemonic masculinity in terms of its normative power, which “embodied
the currently most honored way of being a man, it required all other men to position
themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimated the global subordination of
women to men” (832). The concept of hegemonic masculinity and its related term, the
hierarchy of masculinities, disrupts the universal assumption of male sex roles and adds
nuance to critiques of patriarchy. Rather than assuming all men are at the same powerful
location of social dominance, the hierarchy of masculinities highlights the power
differences among men and the intersectionality of the multiple axes of power structures.
In addition, scholars emphasize the normative rather than descriptive nature of
hegemonic masculinity: although hegemonic masculinity is sometimes associated with a
specific group of men in a given society, it is frequently an ideal that no man in that society
really lives up to. As bell hooks (2018) accurately identified, “the masculine identity
offered men as the ideal in patriarchal culture is one that requires all males to invent and
invest in a false self” (38). This collective investment in a false self is a crucial mechanism
for acquiring the “consent and participation by the subaltern groups” (Connell and
Messerschmidt 2005, 841) as they internalize the norms of hegemonic masculinity. For
example, the hegemonic masculinity in a capitalist society focuses on economic success,
but this hegemony is maintained via a shared frantic desire for wealth among all men, rich
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or poor. Many economically disadvantaged US men voted for Trump religiously because
“he’s a successful businessman” (T. K. Brown 2016).
Compared to Western references above, hegemonic masculinity in China has
similar but also distinctive features, and it also has been changing with different historical
periods (Hird 2019; Louie 2002). For example, soft, feminine, and educated men were
regarded as characteristics of higher-class men in traditional Chinese philosophy and
premodern China (Hird 2019). However, Charlie Yi Zhang (2014) identifies that the
Chinese government has been actively adopting western macho hegemonic masculinity to
facilitate neoliberalism and nationalism in contemporary China. Hence, hegemonic
masculinity in China is increasingly characterized as the opposite of femininity. In
addition, the hierarchy of masculinities also changes over time in China. For instance,
businessmen (shang) were considered the lowest social status in ancient China from Qin
dynasty (221 to 206 BC) to late Qing dynasty in the 1900s (Feng 2003), but rich
businessmen are viewed as representing the hegemonic manhood in contemporary China
(Louie 2002). Meanwhile, working-class men were viewed as embodying hegemonic
masculinity in socialist China, but they, especially male migrant workers, are largely
marginalized in contemporary China (Tsang 2020; Hu 2018; Lu 2016; Kim 2015; Lin
2013). As a result, even the poorest men dream of becoming rich one day, which reinforces
wealth as the yardstick of Chinese hegemonic masculinity.
Although there are nuanced differences, scholars on Chinese masculinity largely
agree on three indicators of hegemonic masculinity in contemporary China—
independence, wealth, and dominance over women (L. Hu 2018; W. Luo 2017a; Wong
2016; Uretsky 2008; T. Liu 2019). First, independence is a crucial aspect of Chinese
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hegemonic masculinity. This independence often extends into responsibility: a good man
is dependable for others instead of dependent on others; he is supposed to be responsible
for his family, work, and the nation (Wong 2016). Second, a man’s wealth indicates his
ability and manhood, and successful businessmen are celebrated as responsible citizens
who provide job opportunities to common folks and increase the national GDP. The last
indicator, dominance over women, is manifested in two aspects: the hostility against
“feminine men” and the objectification of women. According to this view, real men are
supposed to be yanggang—yang as the opposite of yin or feminine, and gang as strong and
tough (Wong 2016; Hird 2016; Jankowiak and Li 2014). In addition, a real man’s
performance of hegemonic masculinity also depends on his sexual access to women.
Women are viewed as the triumphs on men’s path to achieve masculine dominance (Tsang
2020; Zurndorfer 2016; Xiao 2011).
However, hegemonic masculinity is also contested in the rapidly changing society
of contemporary China. On the one hand, alternative masculinities emerge in Chinese
popular culture and feminist critiques. The rise in feminism has initiated a critique of
Chinese masculinity. For example, puxin (common yet confident) is a popular feminist
critique of male privilege in China. It is a term invented by Li Yang, a female standup
comedian, to describe the phenomenon that many men with common qualifications are
uncommonly confident compared to their female counterparts (xinxingji 2021). Jade
quoted this term to mock himself during our interview after he listed his many requirements
for his ideal wife, while he himself was a 39-year-old local government worker in a small
town. Although he knew that he had common qualifications, he was quite confident and
insisted that he would not settle for a woman any less than his long list of requirements.
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In addition, there has been an increase of male idols with traditionally feminine
attributes in Chinese popular cultural products that target women: these men wear eyeliners
and lipsticks, have flawless skin, showcase attractive dance moves, and do not hesitate to
express their affections toward female fans. This increasing popularity of male idols with
traditionally feminine characteristics prompts a cultural myth of the “masculinity crisis” in
contemporary China (L. Hu 2018; X. Zhang 2011). Meanwhile, traditional hegemonic
masculinity is defended by the mainstream media controlled by the Chinese government.
There has been harsh criticism in mainstream culture against the feminine, “soft” men and
governmental policies to reinforce hegemonic masculinity (Hird 2016; W. Zhang 2021; Du
and Chen 2021; Y. Yu and Sui 2022). For example, the Department of Education in China
designed a plan to prevent “the femininization of Chinese men” (Allen 2021). Similarly,
President Xi Jinping even publicly emphasized his role as the patriarch of the nation and
demanded that Chinese men remember their responsibilities to their families and the
Chinese nation-state (Hird 2017; C. Y. Zhang 2022).
Yet, drawing on my fieldwork data, I argue that the masculine emphasis on
independence and responsibility harms guanggun’s chance of social connections. Despite
longing for love and connections, many men expressed a conflicted message that they
should face their life struggles by themselves. For example, Curiosity, a 32-year-old
migrant worker in Beijing, despite struggling with unemployment, social isolation, and
disconnection from his family, still insisted that he would not look for any emotional or
material support from others: “I need to fix my own problem rather than dragging another
person into my mess.” Similarly, Dong, a 30-year-old photographer apprentice in
Guangdong told me that he would not consider relationships until he achieves financial
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success: “I should have a good career first before worrying about relationship and
marriage.”
This sentiment has been long discussed in masculinity and family studies. For
instance, Adams and Coltrane (2005) identify that hegemonic masculinity prioritizes
independence over connections, i.e., a man is expected to be absolutely independent before
entering any relationship. In Men and Masculinities, Whitehead (2002) articulates this
emphasis on independence in masculinity with the following quote: “Often our very sense
of male identity is sustained through our capacity for not needing the help of others” (157).
The performance of masculinity will be threatened by any sign of vulnerability or need for
help. This expectation of masculine independence harms guanggun’s chances for
meaningful connections because being vulnerable and accepting help is key to forming
emotional connections, especially the sincere spiritual connections that many guanggun
desire.
Moreover, not only did guanggun not want to need the help of others, but they also
wanted to make sure that they were dependable and responsible for others. For the men I
interviewed, hegemonic manhood is also boosted through a man’s capacity to fix other
people’s problems, in other words, to be responsible to other people. In his study of
hegemonic masculinity in China, Wong (2016) observes that “an exemplary man is
expected to excel financially but also to shoulder his responsibilities, first and foremost
within the kin group, and then to society and the country” (3). This expectation can be
traced back to the ancient Chinese philosophy that a man should cultivate the body/self
(xiushen), harmonize the family (qijia), govern the state (zhiguo), and create peace in the
whole world/universe (ping tianxia). Unlike the separation of the domestic sphere and the
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public sphere in Western masculinity (Adams and Coltrane 2005), family here is seen not
as the opposite of the public sphere but a natural extension and necessary step to achieve
hegemonic masculinity in the public sphere. In the case of guanggun, men’s marital status
determines their social positions in the hierarchy of masculinities. A single man is viewed
as immature and lacking authentic manhood because marriage is viewed as both a man’s
responsibility to the patrilineal culture and an indicator of masculine success (Greenhalgh
2015; Han 2008; Wong 2016; Deutsch 2006; Murphy, Tao, and Lu 2011).
Furthermore, the notion of responsibility for the patrilinear family and the
masculine state power is an extension of the masculine norm of independence, which
comes from the insatiate desire for male dominance. For example, Bing, a 29-year-old
college graduate who worked in his home village in Henan province, emphasized the key
role of responsibility in all aspects of his life: “I need to bear social responsibilities. For
example, if I don’t get my job done, I would create a mess for my colleagues. I also have
a responsibility to fulfill my parents’ expectations. In addition, I am also responsible for
social progress. If I can contribute to the society but choose not to do so, it feels weird.”
However, this idea of responsibility as a requirement of masculinity is unrealistic for
guanggun, many of whom come from poor families without effective family support or
social capital. Meanwhile, men born in rich families are more like to have an easier career
path because they would inhere both materials and social capital from their parents. The
pressure to be a dependable man forces guanggun to postpone or even give up their chances
of connections. This double bond of masculinity further marginalizes guanggun into social
isolation.
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I need to clarify the differences between responsibilities and connections because
this norm of independence/responsibility comes from a place of masculine control and/or
dominance that disciplines men’s desire for mutual, emotional connections. To begin with,
responsibility is not the kind of love or spiritual connections that guanggun desire. For
example, Nice, a 36-year-old online merchant based in Fujian, was frequently ridiculed for
his desire for love: “My friends laughed at me for craving true love at my age.” In Nice’s
friends’ eyes, Nice’s desire for love is an immature adolescent phase that a real man grows
out of because a real man marries for responsibility instead of love. This responsibilitycentered, family-focused “love” is celebrated as the “big love,” while personal desires like
the love craved by Nice are dismissed as “small love,” per Charlie Yi Zhang’s (2022) keen
observation of love, affect, and desire in contemporary China.
Moreover, the desire for love is also viewed as a sign of weakness and vulnerability
because one can never fully control if the other person would reciprocate their affection.
Harmony, a 27-year-old construction worker in Henan, declared that he decided not to take
romantic relationships too seriously: “You lose if you care too much. A strong man would
not be hurt by relationship failures.” Here, love and relationship become a battleground for
power where there are losers and winners, and a strong, hegemonic man would, by no
means, become a loser, even at the price of giving up the desire for connections. According
to the masculine standards of responsibility, men should provide for women, making
women rely on them so women cannot leave men at their will. Meanwhile, the masculine
norm of independence prohibits men from depending on women materially or emotionally.
The notion of responsibility and independence is an extension of the masculine obsession
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with control and power—an obsession that contradicts their desire for love and meaningful
connections.
Another alienating factor for guanggun is the worship of wealth in hegemonic
masculinity. Scholars of contemporary Chinese masculinity have demonstrated that wealth
is at the center of hegemonic masculinity (Zurndorfer 2016; Wong 2016; S. Xiao 2011;
Uretsky 2008). A man’s wealth is viewed as the most important indicator of his manhood
and his competitiveness in the marriage market. Based on what he saw in life as a poorly
paid migrant worker in China’s fastest-growing city, Shenzhen, Snow concluded that “a
man would not be short of women as long as he has money.” As a result, many men I talked
with prioritized making money over anything else and believed that love would naturally
come once they became rich. Many of them work more than ten hours a day and six to
seven days a week. However, despite their strong motivation and efforts, they cannot
overcome the deepening class inequality in contemporary China. Studies have shown that
class mobility is increasingly more difficult for Chinese who were born in poor, rural
families (Xiang Zhou and Xie 2019; Lulu Li and Zhu 2017), and poor children are more
likely to grow into poor adults.
In addition, guanggun’s class disadvantage is highlighted by their gender. Because
men are expected to be financially responsible for their families, guanggun’s lower
economic status is detrimental to their marriage prospects. As a result, they are viewed as
failures because of poverty and singlehood. As long as wealth is still a dimension of
hegemonic masculinity, guanggun are disadvantaged in the marriage market as poor rural
men. To compensate for their frustration in class competition, the men I interviewed held
onto their masculinities and male privilege as the few sources of pride for them (as I
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demonstrate in detail in the next two sections). Therefore, guanggun tend to have more
rigid views and expectations of masculinities and gender roles (Attané, Eklund, and Zhang
2018), which further hinders their quest for meaningful connections.
Wealth is also closely linked to the third aspect of hegemonic masculinity—
dominance over women, which is manifested in two ways. First, manhood is produced not
just as the opposite of but also, more importantly, as superior to femininity in all
dimensions (Gardiner 2013, 2012, 2002). Almost all my research participants prefer
women that are less than them in age, education, income, life experience, and family
background. For example, Snow’s manhood was challenged when he was in love with a
colleague from his previous factory, who was more educated and earned a higher salary
than him. Lacking dominance over his female partner, Snow was viewed as soft, “not a
real man,” and “taking advantage of her.” Eventually, Snow gave up this relationship
because “the pressure was too much.” The dominance over femininity is also crucial for
the hierarchy of masculinities because emasculation or femininization is an effective
mechanism of hegemonic masculinity to establish dominance over marginalized
masculinity (Pascoe 2011; Connell 2005; Hird 2016; W. Zhang 2021). Hence, Snow was
ridiculed as “not a real man” when he challenged the norm of masculine dominance by
dating a more educated woman. This mandate of male dominance further limits
guanggun’s choice of potential mates, given the severe gender unbalance and female
shortage.
Second, the dominance over women also enables the objectifying of women as the
triumph of manhood (Beasley 2005; Whitehead 2002a). Zurndorfer (2016) identifies that
a man’s status in the hierarchy of masculinity is marked by the amount and quality of
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women he can access. Zheng (2009) also notices that consuming sex services is a crucial
mechanism for contemporary Chinese men to construct their manhood. However, one’s
access to women is unequally distributed along the hierarchy of masculinity. For instance,
Snow observed that “rich men could enjoy sex with women every day and every night”
when poor men struggled with their sexual and emotional needs in the face of severe female
shortage. Tsang (2020) shows how single male migrant workers purchase risky, low-end
commercial sex to “cope with their emasculated reality.” Snow also revealed that he could
only save up enough money to afford inexpensive sex services twice a month. Although
Snow regularly purchased low-end sex services to meet his sexual needs, he did not see
them as emotionally fulfilling. Instead, he looked down on female sex workers and used
derogatory terms like jinv (prostitute) and chang (whore) for them in our conversation.
Because access to women is viewed as an indicator of masculinity, rejection from
women is deemed as a failure of manhood. Jade says, “I once pursued a woman I liked, but
I failed. I feel like a failure.” To preserve one’s manhood, many men learn to deepen the
objectification of women by treating a relationship as a game that requires specific
techniques, such as the coaching lessons from pick-up artists (Yuan 2019; Haiping Liu
2021). For example, Harmony, in addition to the above statement that he would not take
relationships seriously, also stated that he would follow tricks from pick-up artists rather
than his heart because “playboys are more likely to attract women than good men.” In the
end, objectifying women makes it nearly impossible for guanggun to form emotional,
mutual connections with women and creates rigid, vulnerable manhood that depresses a
man’s longing for love.
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When the desire for connections is viewed as a threat to one’s independence, when
wealth becomes a pre-condition for love, and when relationships with women are treated
as a game of dominance, guanggun’s odds of finding meaningful connections do not look
hopeful. However, as I demonstrate in the next section, it is not just the masculine norms
working against their quest for love; the norms of ideal femininity in contemporary China
also make this matter more complicated.

3.2

Normative Femininity
Just because guanggun are single, it is often assumed that they have nothing to do

with women. My fieldwork, however, revealed just the opposite. In this section, I
demonstrate that normative femininity in contemporary China and its imprint on
guanggun’s desire limit guanggun’s choices of potential mates and chances of forming
meaningful connections. Masculinity is always constructed in relation to femininity, just
as Connell (2000) argues: “The principal axis around which the varieties of masculinity are
organized is the overall social relation between men and women, that is, the structure of
gender relations as a whole” (31). Rigid gender norms, represented by hegemonic
masculinity and normative femininity, are situated by the ideal heterosexual relationship,
i.e., heteronormativity, and nested in various forms of intersectional social inequalities
(Schippers 2007; Hamilton et al. 2019). The social norm of femininity shapes guanggun’s
perception of an ideal female partner. However, normative femininity is increasingly under
debate due to multiple competing strands of feminism and the severe shortage of women
in contemporary China. In this section, I first introduce the concept of normative femininity
and its manifestation in the existing scholarship, governmental policies, and mainstream
media in contemporary China. Then, with interview data and field notes, I present
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guanggun’s typology of Chinese women, especially the contrast between the ideal woman
and the materialistic woman. Lastly, I situate normative femininity in China and
guanggun’s perception of ideal womanhood in the dynamic of Chinese feminism(s) and
female shortage.
I define normative femininity as the type of womanhood that best supports the
binary gender roles defined by patriarchal heteronormativity. In other words, normative
femininity is not about a woman’s empowerment but about how much she aligns with the
existing gender order, although a woman might benefit from her proximity to normative
femininity. This concept is inspired by Connell’s (2013) analysis of emphasized femininity
as compliance with hegemonic masculinity. The conceptualization of emphasized
femininity is further refined by the concept of hegemonic femininity. Schipper (2007)
defines hegemonic femininity as “the characteristics defined as womanly that establish and
legitimate” (94) the gender hierarchy. Informed by intersectionality, Hamilton et al. (2019)
define “hegemonic femininities as cultural ideals of womanhood that are simultaneously
raced, classed, and (hetero)sexualized” (316), highlighting the observation that hegemonic
femininity also upholds other dimensions of social inequality. For example, having a
slender body is viewed as an important dimension of hegemonic femininity in
contemporary China (W. Luo 2012). However, this body standard upholds the hegemony
of middle-and-upper-class women because it is less achievable for a busy working-class
woman who not only does not have the time or energy to manage a slender body but also
pragmatically needs a strong body to carry out manual labor at her job. The
conceptualizations of emphasized femininity and hegemonic femininity are insightful at
revealing the relational nature of femininity, but they both are limited to some degree.
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Emphasized femininity does not capture the hierarchy of femininities, and hegemonic
femininity does not reveal the crucial fact that ideal womanhood does not empower women
or change their subordination in the patriarchal gender order. Therefore, I choose the term
normative femininity to indicate both the gender inequality within patriarchal
heteronormativity and the hierarchy between multiple femininities (Deliovsky 2008;
Budgeon 2014).
Normative femininity in contemporary China is not only rooted in Confucianism
but also has its unique “post-socialist” features. On the one hand, an ideal woman is nested
in patriarchal heteronormativity—a dutiful mother and a submissive wife to her husband
(Hird 2017; Xiaomeng Li 2020; Tan and Shi 2021). According to the classic teaching of
Confucianism, a virtuous woman is always submissive to the male authority in her life
(Zhen 1907; Kristeva 1977; L. H. Liu, Karl, and Ko 2013). When she is single, she should
obey her father (congfù); after she is married, she should obey her husband (congfū); Once
widowed, she should obey her son (congzi). In addition, a knowledge-less woman is
virtuous (nvzi wucai bianshi de). The ideal Chinese woman abides by traditional gender
roles—the domestic wife and the provider husband (Tan and Shi 2021). Such women are
deemed as possessing the caregiving, self-sacrificial, and family-oriented “natural
femininity” (E. Chen 2016). On the other hand, the socialist legacy also demands a woman
to have at least a job with income, if not a career (Pei and Ho 2006). Since the socialist
reforms in the 1950s, Chinese women have been expected to participate in the collective
labor outside of their house while still expected to carry out all the domestic duties as usual
(Hershatter 2014b). The double requirements are still active in post-socialist, contemporary
China. In C. Y. Zhang’s (2022) words, “Women’s qualifications for love have been
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redefined in contradictory terms that require both self-made success in the market and selfsacrifice for the family” (2). Women are still expected to have it all: career, beauty, and
family (Pei and Ho 2006). However, her career should never be intimidating or more
successful than her male counterparts. Otherwise, she will be deemed masculine and
undesirable (Gaetano 2014). For example, one widespread joke against highly educated
women in contemporary China is that “the world has three types of humans: Men,
Women, and Female PhDs” (Fincher 2016).
The Chinese government openly supports this normative femininity. Xi (2021)
calls for Chinese women to remember their womanly virtue, perform their unique role
in the domestic sphere, and educate the next generation of China to be a positive force
in socialist construction. The state media also reinforces normative femininity via
various representations. After analyzing the image of Peng Liyuan, China’s first lady,
in state media, X. Li (2020) observes that the representation focuses on Peng’s beautiful
appearance or fashion, her domestic role as a wife and a mother, and her soft power as a
feminine and submissive role to assist her husband. Although Peng has a career, the media
reports choose to focus on her traditional gender roles as a wife and a mother. In conclusion,
Chinese women are still “constrained by a regime that has a long tradition of patriarchy
and gender inequalities” (iv). In addition, it is through the stereotypical representation of
his wife that Xi Jingping constructs his identity as the masculine leader of contemporary
China (Hird 2017). When Peng Liyuan is labeled as the “national mother” (guomu), Xi
Jinping successfully positions himself as the patriarch of the Chinese nation-state.
Furthermore, normative femininity is also reproduced via mass media in
contemporary China. As aforementioned, highly educated women, such as female PhDs,
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are stigmatized as the third gender, undesirable, and unfeminine in popular media (Fincher
2016; Gaetano 2014). Similarly, normative femininity is also constructed in Chinese chick
flicks via the dichotomy between the ideal woman versus the masculine woman (F. Yang
2020). The ideal woman represented by the feminine heroine is beautiful, pure, and
gullible, while the masculine women represented by supporting female characters are
worldly, ambitious, and dominating. In these chick flicks, the former type of woman is
pursued by nearly every man, but the latter is rejected by the male protagonist and marked
as undesirable. It is through this historical, political, and cultural construction of normative
femininity that Chinese women learn how to be desired and Chinese men learn what to
desire.
My research participants filled our conversation with their perceptions of women,
and specifically their rankings of women. According to them, women can be categorized
into four groups ranked from the most desirable to the most despicable: women that
embody the ideal femininity, the “not-good-enough-for-me” women, the independent
women, and their opposite—the materialistic women. These four categories are
constructed in relationship to each other and defined by their desirability in men’s eyes.
Normative womanhood is formulated by criticizing the other three and validating
hegemonic masculinity as well as the gender hierarchy in contemporary China. I will
explain each of them in detail in the following paragraphs, but first, let me introduce ideal
womanhood in the eyes of guanggun.
Many guanggun mentioned four characteristics of ideal womanhood: young
(reproductive capacity), beautiful, pure (lack of sexual or marital experiences), and
subordinate (loyal to her husband), all of which uphold the patrilineality and male
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dominance in patriarchy. First, all men I interviewed insisted that an ideal female partner
should be younger than them. No matter how old a guanggun is, his ideal mate should
preferably be less than 35 years old, at which age threshold a woman’s fertility is believed
to drastically drop. In other words, an ideal woman must be able to reproduce biologically.
Jade, for example, despite being 39-year-old, still preferred to marry a woman younger
than 30 years old because he wanted to make sure the woman was still able to produce
healthy biological offspring. Second, beauty is a crucial component of normative
femininity. When describing the woman with whom he was in love, Snow’s first word was
“beautiful.” This emphasis on a woman’s appearance was present throughout my fieldwork
with different participants. In contemporary China, feminine beauty is defined by three
characteristics: pale skin (bai), thin body (shou), and girly (you or nen) (J. Yang 2011; W.
Luo 2012; McLoughlin 2013; Q. (Vivi) Xie and Zhang 2013; Jung 2018). Third, an ideal
woman should be pure, i.e., with no previous sexual or relationship experiences. Almost
all men I interviewed still used the term “girls” instead of “women” when depicting their
relationship expectations. The word “girl” implies a woman’s lack of experience and
guanggun’s desire for purity. Lastly, most men I talked with prefer subordinate women
who are loyal to them. Harmony required his ideal partner to be forgiving, supportive, and
humble in front of him. Bing believes that “a good woman follows her man.” This
sentiment is shared by a popular saying about the expectation for women in marriage: “If
you marry a dog, follow a dog (jiagou suigou).” In other words, once a woman marries a
man, she is expected to follow her husband’s every decision, even when he lives like a
dog—a Chinese slang for miserable living standards.
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Moreover, an ideal woman would augment a man’s masculinity, just like a “notgood-enough-for-me” woman would damage a man’s manhood. In other words, a woman’s
proximity to normative femininity marks a man’s status in the hierarchy of masculinities
(Morgan 2005). Despite facing intense pressure from singlehood, these men still firmly
rejected women that they believed were not good enough for them. For instance, Nice
exclaimed, “My mom is even worse! She arranged a blind date for me with a WIDOW!”
Similarly, Jade would not consider a woman with previous marriage because “it would be
my loss to marry a divorcee.” In this case, a man’s masculinity is threatened by a woman’s
distance from normative femininity because women are viewed as a marker of men’s social
status. In my fieldwork, a woman’s education level is another frequently mentioned status
signifier. For example, Bing argued, “Since I have a college degree, I of course should
match with a woman with a similar or slightly lower education level. If I am still single in
a few years, I might tolerate a much less educated woman.” Harmony even directly
declared that education levels are women’s price tags: “If a woman only graduated midschool, you could probably lure her with a gift of several bucks. If she has a high school
diploma, you probably need to entertain her with something worthy of at least dozens of
dollars. If she has a college degree, you need to spend hundreds of dollars to get her, and
she still might not choose you even after hundreds of dollars.” When Harmony learned that
I was getting a Ph.D. degree at a US university, he immediately assumed that I must have
married a rich man.
Although guanggun rank women according to their appearance, marriage history,
and education, a frequent complaint from these single men is that contemporary Chinese
women are too materialistic, and that there is no true love in relationships. Since gender is
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relational, the ideal masculinity cannot exist without a cooperative femininity (Adams and
Coltrane 2005). My interviewees praised the traditional female figures who prioritize
romantic relationships over personal gains while believing that materialistic women are
ruining intimacy and love for Chinese men. Normative femininity is constructed against
the materialistic women, who are represented by the slogan “I would rather cry in a BMW
than laugh on a bicycle” (Zavoretti 2016). For my research participants, a materialistic
woman is someone who would exchange her body and emotions for material goods. For
example, several men directly told me that some women rejected them because they were
not rich, and that contemporary Chinese women expected men to buy everything for them.
Despite some guanggun acknowledging that it is harder for women to accumulate
wealth because women face more discrimination in the workplace and family inheritance,
they still blamed women who choose to achieve class mobility via marrying rich men. For
instance, Snow witnessed how his female co-workers were frequently harassed by
managers in the factory, and the harassment forced some women to eventually quit their
jobs. However, he still blamed women who marry rich men because he perceived them as
materialistic women who “sell their love and body for money.” In his logic, these women’s
mating choice proves women’s advantages over men: “Women have more options than
men. If they want a better life, they can achieve it via their hard work or finding a rich
partner.” Here, the cultural norm of female hypergamy is perceived as advantageous for
women. However, as I demonstrate in the next section, female hypergamy does not
empower women but reinforces patriarchy.
The men I interviewed often discuss the last category of women—independent
women—with ambiguous attitudes. On the one hand, independent women are often
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referred to in our conversation, to prove that materialistic women are disreputable because
the existence of independent women shows that women do not need to rely on men for
material needs. For example, after criticizing materialistic women and disparaging sex
workers, Snow praised independent women: “Most independent women will not sell their
love and body for money. When women are economically independent, they do not need
to rely on anyone, no matter how rich the other person is.” In other words, independent
women are often used by guanggun to prove that gender inequality does not exist. On the
other hand, despite many men expressing their respect for independent women, they rarely
showed romantic interest in independent women. In their relationship with women, they
were often worried if the woman was more experienced, more educated, or made more
money than them. As a result, independent women are viewed as respectable but
undesirable.
Moreover, examples of independent women are often used to ridicule
contemporary Chinese feminists. Several interviewees mentioned feminism to me without
being asked, and some of them specifically believed that feminism was a reason for their
bachelorhood. Moreover, the gesture was more like throwing their diagnosis of Chinese
feminism at me to provoke a reaction from me. My first response was to ignore such
provocations to continue the interview, but sometimes it became too difficult for me to
continue the interview without stepping away from the screen and calming myself down.
For example, Harmony pronounced that Chinese women were shameless and selfish
because they were emboldened by feminism: “they don’t even do housework anymore!” If
they would say such misogynist things to me, a female researcher, I could not imagine how
they would think, talk, or act in private with a female partner. In the end, I asked them,
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“what do you think feminism is?” Surprisingly, they offered almost identical answers: they
all argued that there were two types of feminism—fake feminism and real feminism.
According to them, fake feminism is advocated by women who only want to benefit
from existing gender relations by asking the male to bear all the burdens. Fake feminism
believes that men should buy women whatever they want. Meanwhile, real feminism is
made of independent, strong, and powerful women. They do not need to take anything from
men. For instance, Nice politely told me that he respected feminism, but “it has to be real
feminism, not fake feminism, which is just a bunch of scam bags trying to profit in the
name of feminism. Fake feminism provokes gender conflicts and consumes them. Real
feminism is represented by female politicians, and they are delivering actually meaningful
values.” However, almost all the “so-called” feminists in China now belong to fake
feminism because they want to make Chinese women more materialistic and make Chinese
women hate Chinese men. For example, Harmony believed that “feminism is making
Chinese women feel entitled and look down on Chinese men.” Despite repeatedly voiced
misogynist comments in our conversation, he was angry at the disabled female poet, Yu
Xiuhua, for her attack on Chinese men: “I always feel that Chinese men are not worthy of
Chinese women” (HKT 2022a). When women are materialistic, they would naturally reject
poor men like guanggun. Hence, my research participants blamed their bachelorhood on
feminism.
My interviewees’ critiques of fake, consumerist feminism are also observed in
existing scholarship on contemporary Chinese feminism. Luzhou Li (2015) argues that
Chinese feminism is lost in consumerism and state censorship. Using the term “consumerist
pseudo-feminism,” Yang (2020) identifies that the feminism adopted by middle-class
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Chinese women is rooted in consumerism in the neo-liberal economy. For example,
Harmony observed that “now there are all kinds of weird holidays and occasions that
require a man to please a woman with gifts. So many toxic messages tell women that a man
does not really love you unless he buys everything for you.” Although consumerist
feminism seems to empower women via consumption and commodity, it essentially
replicates the patriarchal gender binary and hierarchy represented by the slogan: “You are
responsible for being a beautiful flower, and I am responsible for making money to support
the family” (Jiangzainan 2020). According to consumerist pseudo-feminism, a woman’s
femininity is achieved via the commodity she consumes, especially the ones provided by
her male partner. In Yang’s (2020) words, “femininity is commodified in the form of the
capital to be accrued from body/beauty, thus enhancing the asymmetrical power relation
between sexes” (5).
The complicated landscape of femininities and feminism(s) in contemporary China
reflects both its socialist legacy and marketizing present. Guanggun faces a dilemma in
this changing dynamic of femininities. On the one hand, they are more likely to encounter
women who do not fit their ideal of normative femininity—women who are older, more
educated, make more money, or have more life experiences—with the emergence of
alternative femininities and the rise of feminism (Gaetano 2014; Tan and Shi 2021). On
the other hand, if they want to continue pursuing a relationship with rigid gender roles of
male dominance and female subordination, they lack the economic capital to sustain a
female hypergamous compared to their wealthy counterparts, as I explain in the coming
section (Yang 2020). In both scenarios, guanggun are demanded to change, either what
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they desire or their socioeconomic class, if they want to have a better chance of love and
connection.

3.3

Female Hypergamy
Poor, rural men are squeezed out of the marriage market because female hypergamy

is still the dominant form of relationship and marriage in contemporary China (Attané et
al. 2019; Y. Wei and Zhang 2016; Mu and Xie 2014; Y. Qian and Qian 2014a; Eklund
2013). Female hypergamy refers to the heterosexual relationship model where the woman’s
status is lower than the man in various aspects such as age, height, education, family
wealth, income, region, race, caste, and/or citizenship. Female hypergamy “naturally”
becomes the only acceptable form of love in patriarchal heteronormativity when male
dominance and female subordination are at the respective center of hegemonic masculinity
and normative femininity. In this section, I first explain the connections between female
hypergamy and patriarchal heteronormativity, highlighting the relational nature of
masculinities and femininities as a gender system that upholds patriarchal
heteronormativity. Then, I introduce the characteristics of female hypergamy in
contemporary China, especially how it pushes lower-class men into singlehood. Afterward,
I present my research participants’ complicated attitudes—support as well as critique—
toward female hypergamy. In the end, I argue that guanggun’s life struggles demand
reforming the “male dominance and female subordination,” gendered norms of social
connections.
Hypergamy describes the relationship mode where a person mates with someone
from a higher status in the social hierarchy of a given society (Buckley 2016). In some
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cases, the person’s family rather than the person makes the mating choice. Moreover,
because hypergamy is measured against certain social hierarchies, it is always structural
rather than an individual preference. In patriarchal societies, female hypergamy—women
marrying up—is more often observed than male hypergamy (Floyd 2014). Scholars have
documented as many dimensions of female hypergamy as the axis of social hierarchies.
Meszaros (2017) shows how Filipino women marry American men as an example of
female hypergamy in the dimension of citizenship. Indian scholars demonstrate how caste
is a common dimension of female hypergamy in India (Mohanadoss 1995; Khare 1972).
Education is another well-studied aspect of female hypergamy. Many studies have
documented that female education is decreasingly hypergamous, with more women
entering higher education worldwide (Frye and Urbina 2020; Erát 2021; Esteve, GarcíaRomán, and Permanyer 2012; Esteve et al. 2016). However, female hypergamy is still the
norm in terms of earning capacity even in some of the countries with the highest scores on
gender equality, such as Norway and Sweden (Almås et al. 2020; Chudnovskaya and
Kashyap 2020). In addition, female hypergamy can also be observed in the dimensions of
regions—from poor areas to affluent areas (Weiss, Yi, and Zhang 2013), height—shorter
women with taller men (Belot and Fidrmuc 2010), and age—younger women and older
men (Bereczkei and Csanaky 1996).
However, despite the common occurrence and abundant documentation of female
hypergamy across different cultures, there are two opposing theories on the nature of
female hypergamy—the exchange theory versus the hierarchy theory. The exchange theory
views marriage, or mating, as a fair exchange of desired resources between two parties
(Rosenfeld 2005), exemplified by Goode’s (1963) quote: “all courtship systems are market
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or exchange systems” (8). The exchange theory is widespread in marriage studies. For
example, when I study guanggun and marriage, the term “the marriage market” is used
without much hesitation in existing scholarship as well as in my own writing. According
to the exchange theory, female hypergamy can achieve the maximum functionality because
each gender contributes its best to the relationship, and it is also beneficial for the
reproductive outcome and relationship durability: “females who marry higher status mates
and males who choose younger mates have significantly more surviving children than those
following alternative mating strategies… Couples whose wives are younger and/or less
educated and whose husbands are older and/or more educated stay together for a longer
period of time than other couples” (Bereczkei and Csanaky 1996, 17). However, how does
female subordination benefit women? Are children and duration good enough indicators
for a happy relationship? Who do those functions benefit?
The hierarchy theory views female hypergamy as a manifestation and mechanism
of social hierarchies, especially the interactions between gender hierarchy and other axes
of social inequality. Studying the hypergamy along caste in North India, Mohanadoss
(1995) argues that female hypergamy “is closely associated with the assumption that man
is superior than woman” (558). Furthermore, Khare (1972) argues that female hypergamy
further reinforces the hierarchical structure in a given society. For example, female
hypergamy contributes to female infanticide (Mohanadoss 1995). The hierarchy theory
also articulates the function of female hypergamy, but it specifically identifies the
beneficiary of this function rather than ambiguously calling it “the maximum
functionality.” Saint-Paul (2015) identifies that female hypergamy can reduce uncertainty
in paternity because the power imbalance facilitates the man’s control over the woman. In
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other words, female hypergamy makes it easier for a man to claim a woman as his property,
confine her to the private sphere, and exclusively possess her reproductive capacity.
Mohanadoss (1995) observes that the female “hypergamous milieu has a pronounced
patrilineal line” (559).
Because the patrilineal bloodline is crucial for a family’s honor in a patriarchal
society, any threat to it would be actively eliminated at any cost by the agent of the
patriarchy. When the norm of female hypergamy is violated, both the women and the men
involved would be punished. As men with wives from a higher status are emasculated in
peer interaction and cultural representation, they are more likely to use domestic violence
as an instrument to regain their manhood. Indian scholars have found that violating female
hypergamy leads to a significant increase in domestic violence (Roychowdhury and
Dhamija 2020). However, couples outside of female hypergamy would not be punished if
female hypergamy is not the relationship norm in that society (Esteve et al. 2016).
Female hypergamy is the normative model of relationship in contemporary China
(Attané et al. 2019; Y. Wei and Zhang 2016; Mu and Xie 2014; Y. Qian and Qian 2014a;
Eklund 2013). In this model, a man is expected to be superior to his female partners in
many aspects of social evaluation, especially wealth and education. Wei and Zhang (2016)
argue that female hypergamy reflects gender inequality in contemporary China, where
women still largely acquire social mobility via marriage. Although Chinese women are
gaining more education in recent decades, they are still pushed to choose hypergamous
marriage as the channel for social mobility in the face of surging consumerism and the
continuation of gender discrimination (Mu and Xie 2014).
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There are many dimensions of female hypergamy in contemporary China, and the
most common four dimensions are age, education, wealth, and region. Eklund (2013)
identifies the prominence of female age hypergamy throughout Chinese history, culture,
and law: “The notion that women practice age hypergamy is also reflected in the legal
framework of the marriage law, where Article 6 states, ‘No marriage may be contracted
before the man has reached 22 years of age and the woman 20 years of age’” (66). As
discussed in the above section on normative femininity, almost all the men in my study
prefer women who are younger than them. Age also compounds education and wealth. The
common example of female hypergamy is more-educated, older men with less-educated,
younger women (Y. Qian and Qian 2014a). Because wealth accumulation is partially
dependent on age, one also often observes the partnership between older, rich men and
younger, poorer women (Eklund 2013; Mu and Xie 2014; Y. Wei and Zhang 2016). Wealth
here includes not only a person’s income but also their property and family background. In
addition, one’s region is another prominent dimension of female hypergamy with the
significant economic disparity between different regions of China, especially between
urban and rural areas (Eklund 2013). Wei and Zhang (2016) have documented the
widespread phenomenon of rural Chinese women marrying men with urban hukou (the
household registration system that I extensively discussed in Chapter Two) because an
urban hukou leads to better education, housing, and healthcare. Weiss, Yi, and Zhang
(2013) also observed the hypergamous marriage between mainland Chinese women and
Hong Kong men because Hong Kong has been considered more developed than mainland
China for decades.
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Guanggun have complicated attitudes toward the norm of female hypergamy. On
the one hand, they are harmed by it, being at the bottom class of China’s social hierarchy—
rural, poor, and less educated—when women marry up to urban, rich, and more educated
men. For example, Snow was in love with a co-worker in the factory he previously worked.
However, she was more educated (college degree) and had a higher income (manager
position) than Snow—a vocational school education and assembly-line worker position.
When the two of them started a relationship, gossip was circulated among factory workers
about how Snow was trying to take advantage of her. The social pressures eventually
soured their relationship, forcing Snow to quit the factory job. Sadly, many of my
interviewees are victims of the cultural norms of female hypergamy in contemporary
China. Panda was a 30-year-old government worker in a small town in Anhui, and in his
most recent relationship, the woman broke up with him after meeting his parents because
her family was wealthier than Panda’s and “her parents did not allow her to be with a poorer
man.” Another man, Curiosity, had to lie about his education level when he was dating a
woman introduced by his parents in his hometown; Otherwise, “her conditions would be
better than mine.” However, the woman eventually blocked him after finding out that he
was not as educated as he claimed to be. The norm of female hypergamy is harmful to
guanggun when they try to form romantic relationships.
On the other hand, they still view female hypergamy as the ideal mode of
relationship because it compensates for their already precarious manhood. Because
guanggun are already emasculated in the aspect of socio-economic class, many of them
feel the need to hold on to the rigid gender norm of male dominance in a female
hypergamous relationship (Attané, Eklund, and Zhang 2018). For example, although
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rejected by his ex-girlfriend because of his poverty, Panda still viewed female hypergamy
as the ideal relationship model because it enables the man to protect the woman and offer
her everything she might need in the relationship. When dating his ex, Panda was proud to
protect her from being harassed by another man, which he believed to be what bound him
and his ex together. Similarly, Harmony insisted that female hypergamy is crucial for a
harmonious relationship because “each person knows their roles—the man will take care
of money, and the woman will take care of the household.” Therefore, there would be less
room for the woman to argue or bargain with the man.
However, their aspiration for masculine dominance in a relationship is often
challenged by their class status and the increased popularity of feminism in contemporary
China. For many young, educated women in contemporary China, they look for more
egalitarian relationships; when men are unable to offer class mobility to women, they are
expected to bear more domestic responsibilities. Yet, my interviewees are not ready to
adjust to this new gender dynamic. For example, Harmony argued that feminism makes
Chinese women feel more entitled in marriage: “Men are responsible for buying a house
and a car and paying for wedding bills as well as bride price, but most women nowadays
do not cook or do housework. When a man gets married, all he does every day is to bear
the responsibility of a family and raising children.” This unwillingness to give up the
traditional gender division of labor further reduces guanggun’s chance of success in the
marriage market.
The norm of female hypergamy impacts different groups in strikingly different
ways. Because of the One-Child policy in urban China from the 1980s to 2015, urban
parents with a female only-child invested all their resources in their daughters, which
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produced a generation of highly educated, wealthy urban daughters (Fong 2002). However,
they are more likely to be single under the norm of female hypergamy (Gaetano 2014).
Some of them seek empowerment and companionship via consumption, such as purchasing
virtual lovers (Tan and Shi 2021). Rich men enjoy a revival of polygyny where one man
has multiple female partners (S. Xiao 2011; Zurndorfer 2016; X. Zhang 2008). Meanwhile,
poor men are forced to stay single and find temporary satisfaction by consuming low-end
sex services (Tsang 2020). As long as the ideal relationship model is female hypergamy, a
group of lower-class men will be squeezed out of luck in their pursuit of romantic love,
whether there is a female shortage or not. However, the female shortage and gender
imbalance in the Chinese population have tremendously magnified the consequence of
female hypergamy for lower-class men, who are expected to continue pursuing love within
the boundaries of unrealistic gender norms and relationship mode.

3.4

Conclusion
We now have learned how the rigid gender norms of masculinity and femininity

have failed guanggun. First, the norm of hegemonic masculinity firmly locks guanggun at
the bottom of the hierarchy of masculinities. Second, normative femininity narrowly
defines what is desirable for guanggun and drastically reduces their choices of potential
mates. Lastly, female hypergamy sets up a relationship model that is unrealistic for
guanggun to follow in the face of severe female shortage and deepening social inequalities
in contemporary China. As a result, they are stuck between a fantasy that teaches them how
and what to desire as real men and a reality that no longer sustains that fantasy due to an
unbalanced population and economic inequality.
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Yet, the Chinese government still wants Chinese men and women to return to the
good old ways of relationships and marriage to fix the low fertility crisis and aging crisis
in contemporary China. The latest population policy by the Chinese government demands
Chinese men and women to “return to traditional Chinese virtues, to marry and reproduce
at the appropriate age” (The Chinese Communist Party and The State Council 2021), as if
these population crises do not reflect the failure of the patriarchy heteronormativity but the
failure of Chinese people to abide by it. In his book about Dreadful Desires in
contemporary China, Charlie Yi Zhang (2022) asks, “Why do we keep returning to our
aspirational dreams even after they repeatedly fail us?” (ix). I argue that guanggun’s
struggles with marriage and love reveal the need to reform the social norms around love.
Love is not the problem; the problem is with the discipline of love—heteronormativity. We
need to make visible the queer, atypical connections that some guanggun already formed
in their lives, and to see them not as failures but as possibilities of happier, more rewarding
ways of living. As Halberstam (2011) discussed in The Queer Art of Failure, “In fact if
success requires so much effort, then maybe failure is easier in the long run and offers
different rewards” (3). In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how guanggun’s lived
experiences offer a powerful critique against heteronormativity and revolutionary potential
to transform the norms around love with abundant yet atypical connections.
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CHAPTER 4. QUEER LIFEWORLDS
Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing,
unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more
surprising ways of being in the world.
—Jack Halberstam, 2011, The Queer Art of Failure, page 2.

Many guanggun are viewed as failures because of their poverty and singlehood.
Borrowing Jack Halberstam’s (2011) tribute to failure, I argue that guanggun’s are showing
us alternative ways of being in this world outside of heteronormativity. In this chapter, I
showcase how guanggun’s failures in entering heteronormative marriage propound a
powerful critique against heteronormativity and reproductive futurism, and how their
marriage-free lives create revolutionary lifeworlds with queer connections and embodied
resistance against capitalist and biopolitical exploitation. Feminist demographer Attané
(2019) defines heteronormativity in China’s context as “the strong normativity that
surrounds love, sex and family formation, opportunities for which are usually only
available within the formal framework of heterosexual marriage” (999). However, with the
severe shortage of women, marriage is no longer available to around 30 million men in
contemporary China. In addition, the study by Attané et al. (2019) finds out that one-third
of guanggun accept bachelorhood and do not wish for marriage. Yet, in existing studies
and popular discourse on guanggun, the proposed solutions are still primarily situated
within heteronormativity and the institution of marriage, i.e., how to help guanggun get
married or minimize their disruption of the status quo. Based on guanggun’s lived
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experiences, I argue that most of these solutions are flawed because they lack an in-depth
reflection of heteronormativity in contemporary China. If anything, the discrimination
guanggun struggle with daily exposes the harm of heteronormativity, especially how
vulnerable individuals can be when love, happiness, and connections are narrowly confined
within the institution of heterosexual marriage.
It is time to nonjudgmentally examine guanggun’s lived experiences beyond
heteronormativity, especially to see the revolutionary space of alternative lifeworlds
created by guanggun. When we look beyond heteronormativity, guanggun’s existence does
not manifest a failure or crisis but rather a creative space to hatch richer, more diverse, and
more resilient ways of living with one another. It is on this mission that I write about
guanggun: to display their lifeworlds and the infinite possibilities opened by guanggun’s
ways of living. In conversation with existing scholarship and based on my interview data,
I demonstrate not only how guanggun resist heteronormativity in Chinese culture and
pronatalist biopolitics by the Chinese government but also how they transform enervating
social structure and gender norms by building lifeworlds beyond heteronormativity, the
lifeworlds that have the revolutionary potential to challenge the status quo. Moreover, I
situate guanggun’s lifeworlds in the stream of resistance formed by many other subaltern
groups in contemporary China, such as single women, migrant workers, and LGBTQ+
communities. Together, they explore and construct alternative lifeworlds outside of
heteronormativity.
In addition to this short introductory section, this chapter is made of five more
sections. In the first section, “Marriage ± Happiness,” I provide a critique of marriage and
heteronormativity in contemporary China with Curiosity’ story, which powerfully shows
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how marriages do not equal happiness. Moreover, his story also reflects the decreasing
faith in marriage in the broader context of contemporary China. Then, in the section “Insist
on Love,” I proceed to introduce a form of resistance by insisting on affects and desires,
such as longing for romantic love, spiritual connections, and soul mates, despite these
desires often being labeled as unpragmatic and immature compared to heteronormative
marriages in traditional Chinese culture. Next, in the section “No Future, No
Reproduction,” I move to a rebellion against the capitalist and biopolitical exploitation by
the Chinese government and its state-sponsored capitalism with Snow’s story, who refused
to marry or have children because “this society does not offer any future for the bottom
class.” I argue that this refusal of reproductive futurism demonstrates an embodied protest
by lower-class Chinese against biopolitical and capitalist exploitation. Afterward, in the
section “Attachment beyond Heteronormativity,” I present guanggun’s abundant ways of
living and connecting beyond heteronormativity, and how they resonate with many
Chinese people’s desire for alternative relationality with human and beyond human beings.
In the conclusion section, “Making Queer Lifeworlds,” I revisit my arguments in this
chapter and identify the structural barriers to guanggun’s queer lifeworlds beyond
heteronormativity and how supportive policies could foster such lifeworlds.

4.1

Marriage  Happiness
“Whenever I think about marriage, I think of my parents’ marriage. Why would I

want to get married?” Curiosity (Beijing, 33) and I stayed silent for several minutes across
the screen. It was 10 pm for him in Beijing and 9 am for me in Kentucky. The silence was
not awkward but rather felt like a camaraderie between us—two people who grew up in
domestic violence. Although I was in the US, thousands of miles away from my hometown,
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my body tensed up, and memories flashed back when Curiosity talked about his family:
“My parents used to fight all the time. My father hit my mother a lot. It shadowed my heart.
I don’t want to get married at all if that’s what marriage is like.” The violence was not just
against his mother; Curiosity said, “My father also hit my brother and me a lot. It makes
me believe that there is no way I can communicate with them. He is too violent.” I know
all too well what he meant: Growing up with a violent father, my brother and I learned
from a young age to lie and escape our home whenever possible. Just like my mother,
Curiosity’s mother stayed in this marriage: “She only cares about other people’s
perceptions.”
His parents’ marriage shadowed Curiosity’s heart, his father’s violence and his
mother’s obsession with external perceptions gave Curiosity little confidence in his chance
of happiness. Moreover, his parents also constantly tried to impose their value on
Curiosity’s life and relationship. He expressed himself this way: “I want to run away from
responsibilities. I do not have any control over my life. My parents just want me to do the
things they want.” They bought a house for Curiosity in his hometown even though he
repeatedly said no because he could not afford the mortgage nor wished to live in his
hometown. His mother pressured him to get married as soon as possible because it would
look bad in other people’s eyes if Curiosity turned out to be a guanggun. His father ordered
him to have a boy to continue the family line once he got married, although he wanted a
daughter himself.
Curiosity grew up in a poor village in Henan province, and both of his parents were
farmers. Like most rural kids, he was told that the only way out of poverty and to avoid
becoming someone like his parents was to get a college education. In 2008, he entered
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college in Beijing with a fabulous score in gaokao, the college entrance exam in
contemporary China. However, four years later, he did not graduate from college because
he failed too many courses, so he had no bachelor’s degree. He never told his parents about
it, but he confessed to the woman his parents arranged for him to marry: “I really liked her,
so I need to be honest with her. I want a trusting marriage.” Afterward, the woman cut off
connections with him, and her family informed Curiosity’s parents of his degree problem.
His father was mad, but eventually, his parents asked Curiosity to purchase a fake degree
from the black market. Curiosity left home and had not returned since then, the winter of
2019. When I interviewed him, he was unemployed and living alone in a cheap rental room
in the margin of Beijing: “I like being by myself. I do not have to worry about other
people’s feelings. I can just take care of myself. I don’t feel lonely.”
Curiosity’s story decoupled happiness and marriage, a pair of terms that are often
conflated together. In the following paragraphs in this section, I further take apart this
heteronormative link between happiness and marriage. As I will show in detail, marriage
is not only unequal to happiness but also sustains various forms of violence and inequalities
in patriarchal heteronormativity. Facing tremendous pressure and difficulties to enter
marriages, more and more guanggun start to question the meaning of marriage. Just like
Butler (2002) argues, “[O]ne gets there (the questioning of taken-for-granted conditions),
as it were, through suffering the dehiscence, the breakup, of the ground itself” (19),
guanggun’s struggles with heterosexual marriage generate the radical yet complicated
ground to question heteronormative marriage (Basu 2020).
Worldwide, numerous academic studies and popular discourses are circulating this
simple idea— that marriage makes you happy, that there is a strong link between happiness
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and marriage (such as this longitudinal study from Germany by Qari in 2014), and that
married people are happier and more satisfied with their lives (such as shown in this British
study by Grover and Helliwell in 2019). As Ahmed (2010) identifies in her study of
happiness, “[O]ne of the primary happiness indicators is marriage. Marriage would be
defined as ‘the best of all possible worlds’ as it maximizes happiness. The argument is
simple: if you are married, then we can predict that you are more likely to be happier than
if you are not married” (6).
Yet, this idea is more of an assumption than a fact. Some empirical studies have
found that marriage has nothing to do with your happiness: People in happy marriages are
happy, and those in unhappy marriages are unhappy. “A strong link from happiness to
marriage does not exist” (Chapman and Guven 2016, 533). Instead, the compulsive,
normative link between marriage and happiness is what forces people to choose and stay
in unhappy marriages. As we can see from Curiosity’s story, Curiosity’s mother would
rather endure violent abuse in marriage than become a divorced failure defined by the
cultural norm in China. Moreover, Curiosity’s parents would rather Curiosity get married
by lying than being a guanggun. It is not a lack of marriage that makes Curiosity unhappy.
Instead, it is the mandate to enter and stay in a marriage no matter how unhappy it is. In
this suffocating, controlling culture of heteronormativity, Curiosity could only breathe
freely when he was by himself.
The normative pressure for marriage not only makes guanggun unhappy but also
creates more and more unhappy marriages in contemporary China. For example, many
Chinese gay men are forced into heterosexual marriages because of the heteronormative
pressure to get married (Zhu 2018). Most of them would not reveal their sexuality to their
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wives, who suffer from low self-esteem issues due to their husband’s lack of sexual interest
in them. Some of these wives felt great betrayal when they discovered their husband’s
extramarital sex with men. With increasing rates of infidelity (Zurndorfer 2016; S. Xiao
2011; X. Zhang 2008; Y. Zhou 2019), “China, which previously featured universal
marriage and low divorce rates, has been shifting to a society with low marital stability and
high divorce rates” (Mengni Chen, Rizzi, and Yip 2021, 1). The men I talked with also
observed similar trends of unhappy marriage in their life experiences. Bo (31, Shandong)
has an uncle who was married and divorced four times, and another uncle struggling with
an unhappy marriage. There were so many instances of extramarital affairs and betrayal in
both uncles’ marriages. These observations make Bo believe that marriage is not reliable.
In contrast to a lack of happiness, marriage is full of violence and inequalities, as
revealed by feminist scholars (Boellstorff 2007a; Alcalde 2010; Basu 2015). Marriages in
a patriarchal heteronormative society privatize men’s violence against women, masking
violent assault by one human being on another with the veil of private family matters.
Curiosity’s family has been shadowed by violence. His father, the man of the family,
imposed physical violence on Curiosity’s mother, Curiosity himself, and his brother at will.
Sadly, domestic violence is not uncommon in contemporary China. According to a survey
by All-China Women Federation, one in four married women in China have suffered from
domestic violence (T. Yang, Poon, and Breckenridge 2019). Considering that there is still
a strong culture of shame around domestic violence, this statistic could be underreported,
and the actual rate of domestic violence could be higher (Y. Song, Zhang, and Zhang 2021).
Violence is a patriarchal tool to sustain gender inequality. For instance, women who violate
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patriarchal gender hierarchy, such as women who earn equal or more income than their
husbands, are more likely to suffer from domestic violence (Xiangmei Li and Wang 2021).
Rather than a total lack of happiness, marriage does make some people happy at
the expense of others. For example, a study on marriage and happiness in East Asia finds
that marital status is a strong indicator of happiness for men but not necessarily for women
(Hori and Kamo 2018). In contemporary China, one’s happiness in marriage depends on
their proximity to patriarchal gender norms. Compared to more successful women, women
are reported to be happier in marriage if they are less successful than their husbands, and
they are less happy if they make a greater share of the household income (Meng Chen 2018;
Y. Chen and Hu 2021). In Meng Chen’s (2018) words, women receive a “positive
psychological outcome” when they endorse “the traditional female role in marriage and
family life” (266). Wu’s (2021) study also finds the universal existence of “the happiness
penalty of wives” when they have a higher income than their husbands.
Ha, happiness penalty, what a clever term! Here, happiness is the penalty for
deviating from the patriarchal gender norm of female hypergamy. The social norms define
the least resistant path to happiness, and those who go sideways receive a happiness
penalty. More blatantly, a study identifies “an identity-based happiness gain from marriage
for traditionalist individuals” (Bessey 2015, 21), who endorse and abide by existing social
norms. For instance, Harmony, a 28-year-old construction worker in Henan, recognized
that there are issues with the existing norms of marriage, but he still chose to play by the
rules: “I think there is something wrong with this society, but I have no way to change it.
All I can do is to try my best to abide by it.” In this logic, happiness is available to those
who go with the status quo, and those who are at odds deserve to be unhappy. Not only are
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they unhappy, but they also kill the joy of those around them as well (Ahmed 2010a). In
the marriage happiness studies in China mentioned above, successful wives make their
husbands unhappy in addition to suffering from the happiness penalty themselves.
Curiosity’s relationship ended because his lack of a bachelor’s degree made the arranged
relationship no longer female hypergamous. Despite the genuine connection Curiosity
recognized between him and this woman, she eventually cut off this connection to avoid
further unhappiness from a marriage that violates the patriarchal rule of female
subordination and male dominance.
The happiness penalty sometimes spreads beyond wives and husbands. In
Curiosity’s case, his parents were unhappy because he was not married. This is a common
cultural phenomenon in contemporary China: Unmarried sons make unhappy parents. For
example, a study finds that sons’ overage singlehood contributes to their parents’
depression (D. Chen and Tong 2021). Almost all the men I interviewed experienced some
form of parental pressure for marriage. Nice’s (Fujian, 37) father threatened to disown him
when he refused to go on an arranged date for marriage, and his mother always managed
to find a way to talk about marriage during their weekly phone calls. Their pressure makes
Nice feel guilty: “It is so cruel for my parents that I am still single at my age.” Unmarried
sons’ parents are unhappy from a fear of potential loss—the cessation of the patrilineal
family line, a patriarchal kinship practice to expand social networks and lengthen lineage
for men and fragment those for women.
Why would one want to marry if marriage is full of unhappiness, violence, and
inequality? Starting from Curiosity’s story, I develop a critique of heteronormative
marriage by decoupling happiness and marriage, revealing the violence and inequality
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inside patriarchal heteronormativity, and demonstrating how happiness functions as a
disciplinary tool for those who threaten the gender hierarchy and patriarchal kinship
practices in contemporary China. What could one do when their rejection of unhappiness
makes other people, such as their parents, unhappy? In the next section, I showcase a form
of affective resistance by some guanggun who insist on love and meaningful connections.

4.2

Insist on Love
Jade was 39 years old, a no longer appropriate age to crave love according to the

people around him: “They think love is for the young and passionate. A mature adult would
be pragmatic.” However, Jade rarely felt that way, and he still labeled himself as a xiaozhen
qingnian (small-town youth), a term popularized by idol writer Han Han to describe
himself and young men who live in a small-town, claim to have a deep inner world, and
consume high-end books, movies, music, and other cultural products. “I read a lot, and my
brain wanders around in random directions all the time,” Jade told me, “I know this is not
life. It’s just my spiritual life, but I will feel so lonely if the other person across the table
does not care about my spiritual life. I just want someone I love, someone to have good
conservation with.”
Jade did indoor renovation work and only made lower-class level income, but he
owned a house and a car as gifts from his parents, who hoped that the house and the car
would increase Jade’s chances of finding a wife. Because Jade was an only child, lived in
the same small town as his parents, and was still single at 39 years old, his parents had been
stressed out over his singlehood. Jade reassured them again and again: “I swear that there
is nothing wrong with me, and I am not gay.” He frequently went on blind dates arranged
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by his family and friends, none of which worked out: “I think people like me are doomed
to be lonely. On some arranged dates, I would tell myself to give it a try, but I cannot. I can
see what life would be like if I married that person. I can immediately see what the end of
my life would be like, and I do not want that.” However, Jade’s search for a soul mate was
not free from the pressures of social norms; He struggled between social acceptance and
his personal desires. When I asked him why he refused to go on dates with divorced
women, he admitted, “maybe a weirdo like me should just find another weirdo, but I am
still worried about the appearance of my life in other people’s eyes. I am worried that
people will think I am not a real man if I find someone with previous marriage
experiences.”
Despite the pressure from his parents and friends, Jade still insisted on love. His
stubborn desire created a space to resist heteronormativity. Yet, this resistance is
ambiguous as Jade moves between personal desire and social norms. His quest for love is
tangled in a complicated web of power structures that governs the intimate life of Chinese
individuals. There is so much to unfold in Jade’s story, but love is the undeniable keyword.
What is love? I use Lauren Berlant’s (2011) definition of love here: “love allows one to
want something, to want a world, amid the noise of the ambivalence and anxieties about
having and losing that merely wanting an object generates” (687). For Berlant, love is a
desire to “want,” an object— “something” or “a world,” and a condition that allows such
desire or object. Moreover, love also provides courage and motion to insist on one’s desire,
regardless of all the ambivalence generated from an assemblage of complicated forces.
Jade’s story centers on this stubborn, indelible insistence on love.

134

The social condition that allows the emergence of desiring subjects like Jade is a
mix of increasing individualization, patriarchal gender norms, and neoliberal
governmentality. Xiaozhen qingnian (small-town youth), the label Jade used on himself,
emerges from such condition. It is a term popularized in the 1980s, the era that marks the
end of socialism and the increasing privatization as well as individualization in almost
every aspect of China. As a literary genre, xiaozhen qingnian depicts the inner world of
small-town young men—their dream, desire, pain, and frustration, and their consumption
of pretty women and western cultural products (H. F. Xiao 2019; HKT 2022b). As one
form of desire, romantic love in contemporary China refers to the freedom to choose one’s
romantic partner based on personal desires (Pettier 2022). Romantic love is a crucial
mechanism for

producing individualist and

neoliberal-consumerist subjectivity

(Henningsen 2011). An autonomous, modern subject emerges in the process of consuming
commodities, services, and cultural products that are labeled as romantic.
Meanwhile, romantic love and individualism are also harvested by the Chinese
government to improve cultural confidence and nationalism. For example, “Chinese-style
romance” was frequently used by Chinese state media when they reported the 2020 Beijing
Winter Olympics (Liu P. 2022). The term “Chinese-style romance” is a perfect mixture of
personal desire and nationalism by styling deeply individual feelings like romance with
Chinese characteristics in an international event like the Winter Olympics. Resonating with
the trend of individualization in contemporary China (Y. Yan 2010), this term went viral
among state-owned media and Chinese netizens.
However, romantic love was not always celebrated in China. Love was more about
responsibilities towards the family and the nation in traditional Chinese philosophy (W.
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Sun and Yang 2019). In socialist China, romantic love was viewed as a sign of bourgeois,
capitalist erosion at the level of the individual psyche (W. Sun and Yang 2019; Pettier
2022). In contemporary China, there are significant generational differences in love, with
the older generation continuously adhering to the responsibility dimension of love while
the younger generation dives into romantic love. For example, Panda, whom I introduce in
more detail in the fourth section, told me, “I cannot sense much love from the marriage
between my parents; they treat each other more like family rather than loved ones.”
In a fast-changing society like China, the condition for romantic love is marked by
the coexistence of conflicting forces, such as traditional familial ideology, class inequality,
and biopolitical governmentality (Pettier 2022). As a result, the desire for love is
confronted by a reality where love is not easily accessible. Almost all interviewees longed
for a meaningful relationship filled with love and understanding, but not all of them
believed that love was available to them. One interviewee gave up on a relationship because
he could not see any hope as a poor migrant worker. One was rejected by his ex because
he came from a poor family. One was worried that he, and especially his grandson-longing
parents, might be too old to wait for his true love.
It is in this muddy context that Jade’s insistence on love stands out as a form of
resistance against heteronormativity. “Although so many boys are taught to behave as
though love does not matter, in their hearts they yearn for it. That yearning does not go
away simply because they become men” (hooks 2018, 39). Affect theory rejects the notion
that human bodies and psyche are blank slates at the will of cultural norms. Rather, Affect
theory identifies embodied protests via the intransigence of bodies and emotions/affects
(Tapias 2015): “Emotions have their own architectures, their own interests and profiles,
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their own shaping influences on the lived worlds of the bodies through which they move”
(Schaefer 2015, 51). Human bodies release affective oxytocin in the presence of love and
emotional connections, and guanggun’s longing for connections is an embodied,
irreducible affect, affect that not only persists but also resists: “embodied affects are not
only intransigent, but recalcitrant: the way that affects kick back” (Schaefer 2015, 102).
Because Jade could not sense mutual connections on the arranged date, he refused the path
designed by his parents. In contemporary China, the language of romantic love has been
used to reinforce heteronormativity and social inequalities (Pettier 2022), but it also creates
a condition that “allows” non-normative (or non-productive in Jade’s case) desires (Y.
Zhou 2019). Although heteronormativity seeks to harness affects, it could not compeletly
control affects without encountering resistance.
I can immediately see what the end of my life would be like. This is a powerful
critique of heteronormativity from Jade. Here, Jade sat down in a nice restaurant on a date
with a woman arranged by his and the woman’s families, who believed that Jade and this
woman were a good match in every aspect that matters per the Chinese social norms—age,
wealth, appearance, education, and occupation. This practice of arranged dates is called
xiangqin, an effort made by both families to create a good match that would ensure a secure,
happy life, a life that Jade can immediately see its future and the end of his life in this future
(Pettier 2016; 2022). However, for Jade, a good match is not love; love for him needs
random thoughts and spontaneous conversations. “If love is force, though, it is a messmaking force, as its aim is to dissolve toxic sureties” (Berlant 2011, 685). Like all affects,
love is propulsive but not teleological (Schaefer 2015). In other words, one’s longing for
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love sends them on a quest for love in this vast world, a quest full of possibilities rather
than a set destination.
Jade’s critique of heteronormativity resonates with queer theory’s vision of queer
temporality: “a queer meantime that embraces contamination and imbrication” (Boellstorff
2007, 228), i.e., a queer timeline that has multiple possibilities co-existing nonhierarchically rather than one set destination that is deemed the only legitimate path. In the
linear temporality of heteronormative marriage, Jade can see his future at one glance, but
love and desires are all about possibilities and happenstance. In Ahmed’s (2010b) analysis
of happiness, she also emphasizes possibilities as a condition for happiness: “We could say
that happiness would be a possibility kept open by happenstance, such that the condition
of possibility for happiness includes other possibilities. If we think of happiness as a
possibility that does not exhaust what is possible, if we lighten the load of happiness, then
we can open things up” (219). For Jade, the random weird thoughts in his brain, the
unpragmatic books he read, and the spontaneous happenstances of quotidian lives are
indispensable ingredients of happiness and meaningful connections. However, on the set
path of heteronormativity, any possibility other than the final destination is treated as a
distraction in need of elimination as quickly as possible rather than a condition of happiness
and love.
Similar to Jade, other research participants criticized heteronormativity in
contemporary China by comparing the differences between love and arranged dates, which
revolves around societal standards rather than personal desires (Zavoretti 2016; T. Liu
2019). For instance, Nice argued, “arranged dates are more like market exchange: each
party lays out their resources and demands, and a deal will be made when it is a fair trade.”
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In most cases, arranged date functions as a socioeconomic class filter set up by the family
of the prospective bachelor or bachelorette (Pettier 2022). Per the logic of arranged dates,
love/happiness is already thought of in terms of marriage, and marriage is already thought
of as the only legitimate way of social connections. Moreover, the chance of happiness/love
is imagined to be depending on how closely the match approximates social norms.
Arranged dates demonstrate how social norms discipline love, but it is not the only force
that governs love or affects.
The state power is also invested in the governance of love: “Kinship, procreation,
cohabitation, family, sexual relations, love—indeed all forms of close affective
encounter—are as much matters of state as they are matters of the heart” (Oswin and Olund
2010, 62). In contemporary China, the government seeks to regulate love via a combination
of cultural influences and legal restrictions. For example, in order to increase the stability
of marriage, the Chinese government enforced a law called the “cooling-off period” that
requires couples seeking divorce to wait for a month before getting processed by the
government (Davidson 2021). This policy reinforces the cultural stigma against divorce in
contemporary China (Michelson 2019). In addition, the latest family planning policy is
determined to educate Chinese youth on the right view of love and marriage (The Chinese
Communist Party and The State Council 2021).
It is in this complicated web of social norms and state regulations that Jade found
his desire for love. Even though he craved spiritual connections and romantic love, he still
could not free himself from the social norms around gender, especially the stigma against
divorced women in China. His resistance is not perfect, but it is worth noticing. By insisting
on personal desires, he continued to live at odds with the cultural norms around marriage
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and love. His story demonstrates the power of affective, embodied resistance via craving,
motivating, not compromising, rejecting a path, and being open to possibilities. In the next
section, I attest to another form of affective, embodied resistance manifested in rejecting
the reproductive future.

4.3

No Future, No Reproduction
Snow and I are similar in many ways: we were born in the same year, the same

province, the same rural China, and we both have a younger brother. Yet, we lived vastly
different lives when I interviewed him: I was pursuing a Ph.D. degree in the US, and he
was working in an electronics factory in Shenzhen, China; I was married and pregnant, but
he had never been in a relationship; I just bought a house while Snow struggled to save
money with a monthly wage less than 600 dollars. In our conversation, Snow told me he
had no hope or future, and I felt an obligation to cheer him up. When I tried to remind him
of happiness by asking what he enjoyed in his current life, he answered, “Nothing.” My
optimistic, cheering attitude seemed extra cruel because his despair was rooted in his
struggles with discrimination and social inequalities rather than a deficit of a positive
attitude. When I asked him, “Do you believe in social change?” he answered, “I cannot
change anything. I can’t even change my own fate.”
“The bottom class is treated like trash in this era. We are shoved to dark, nasty
corners,” Snow commented. As a factory worker in one of China’s fastest-developing
cities, he has witnessed firsthand the social inequalities in cities. He saw well-dressed rich
people entering grandiose clubs and leaving with different women on a daily basis, but he
could only afford cheap, low-end sex services every half month. He saw brand new
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residential buildings erected everywhere in Shenzhen, but he slept with five co-workers in
one shabby dorm room where privacy was a luxury. He noticed that the Shenzhen
government would pay someone to settle in Shenzhen if they were educated in prominent
universities, but he could not even get the basic unemployment benefits when he was
between factory jobs. Snow could not find any comfort in nationalism: “China is rich and
strong now, but it does not benefit me at all. It is built at the price of exploiting diceng (the
bottom class). The bottom class laborers are doing the worst job with the lowest pay, but
all they got is discrimination and humiliation.”
Because he could not see any hope for the bottom class, Snow believed that it was
a responsible decision to stop engaging in the heteronormative future of marriage and
reproduction: “This country does not offer any future for the bottom class. I do not believe
there would be a good future for my offspring because I am already treated unfairly by this
society. I personally do not feel any hope, nor do I want to burden anyone else.”
“What hope?” I asked.
“The hope to make enough money to support a family, the hope to live a life with
dignity.”
Snow’s story reveals the other side of China’s speedy economic development in the
past four decades. Using Snow’s words, it is achieved “at the price of exploiting the bottom
class,” who are mainly made of workers who leave their rural hometowns to work in cities
(W. Sun 2014). Unlike the much-respected working class in socialist China (L. Hu 2018;
Lu 2016; Dai 2018), these migrant workers are called “peasant workers” with no access to
the healthcare, education, or housing resources in the cities they work (China Labour
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Bulletin 2022; W. Sun 2014; Keung Wong, Li, and Song 2007). In addition, they are often
labeled as low-quality population/workers to justify underpaying their labor and the lack
of effective labor protection law for this group. As a result, they become a highly profitable
group for the city (Howell 2021; Crothall 2018). On the one hand, they are qualified for
very little, if any, accommodation from the city government (F.-L. Wang 2022; X. Wu
2019). On the other hand, they provide cheap labor that attracts global investments in
“Made in China” factories, generating significant revenues for the local and central Chinese
governments (Dai 2018).
I analyze Snow’s suffering with the theoretical framework of biopolitics. Foucault
(2008) used the concept of biopower to describe how human bodies are regarded as
extractable resources and are arranged for various convenient ends by the dominant powers
in a given society, such as state power, capitalism, and patriarchy. Governing biopower can
take many forms, including but not limited to collecting data and generating knowledge
about different bodies and populations, carrying out laws and policies to impact human
reproduction, labeling and managing abnormal bodies, or using direct state violence to
make alive or kill certain bodies. Sorting is a powerful form of biopolitics. As Clarke and
Haraway (2018) have identified, government policies manifest biopolitics by materially
sorting “lives worth living from lives open to abandonment, injury, and disappearance”
(36). In the sorting algorithm in contemporary China, migrant workers like Snow are sorted
as low-quality, disposable, and unworthy of social benefits or legal protection (Jacka
2009a; X. Wu 2019; Guo 2019).
Yet, this devaluation of migrant workers does not reflect but obscures their crucial
function in contemporary China. One can find its evidence in how hard the Chinese
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government pushes for marriage and reproduction. In its latest population policy, the
Chinese government (The Chinese Communist Party and The State Council 2021) decided
to “implement the Three-Children Policy and its supporting policies, which would release
the reproductive potential of the Chinese population, slow down the aging process, promote
intergenerational harmony, and enhance the vigor of the whole society.” Here, the Chinese
government lays out the benefit of reproduction at different levels, from intergenerational
harmony (because barren children make unhappy parents) to the whole society.
In addition, this reproduce-for-parents sentiment is supported by a widely
circulated proverb by Mencius, an ancient Chinese philosopher: “There are three ways to
be unfilial; the worst is to not produce offspring.” Reproduction is the strongest motivation
behind Chinese parents’ push for their children to get married: “In the case of China,
orthodox Confucian discourses have accorded great importance to the institution of
marriage because marriage is key to the continuance of the patriline” (Sun and Yang 2019,
8). Using survey data from rural China, Attané et al. (2019) found out that “no child” is
perceived among guanggun as one of the most difficult issues for being guanggun. In a
culture where one largely relies on family members to provide care and support, the issue
of “no child” is economical (lack of support in old age) but also affective (pressure from
one’s social circle) and symbolic (fail to continue the patrilineal family line) (Attané et al.
2013, 715).
When I asked my interviewees whether they wanted to have children or not, their
answers reflected how successful the above government propaganda had been. For
example, Nice did not care for children, but he was determined to have one for his parents:
“I’ll probably adopt a child in the future so my parents can have the motivation to live
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another 20 years.” Some of the men I talked to also expressed that it is their responsibility
to reproduce for the Chinese state and society. Bing (Henan, 30) argued, “I would definitely
have children to make a contribution to China. With such low fertility, the state encourages
you to have children. If I only consider my own hobby, then I don’t think marriage or
reproduction is necessary, but I cannot just think about myself.” The expression “just think
about myself” manifests a moral consequence of the pronatalist propaganda in
contemporary China: With so many social contributions associated to reproduction, it is
viewed as selfish if a person chooses not to reproduce.
Moreover, reproduction is framed as not just socially good but also economically
indispensable. Here is another paragraph from the policy mentioned above: “Population is
the key for social development and a key variable for the sustainable development of the
economy. With Three-Children Policy, we will have an effective supply of human capital
and consumers for economic development.” If the policy quote in the previous paragraph
still seems to invoke humanist concerns regarding family harmony and social wellbeing,
this quote here is anti-humanist in its nature. Human bodies are blatantly viewed as
instruments to facilitate capitalist economic development. Chinese people must have
children so the economy can have a sustainable supply of laborers and consumers, and a
person’s reproductive decision becomes an indicator of their patriotism for the state and
responsibility for the Chinese society.
However, not all laborers and consumers are viewed as equals. This broad call for
reproduction from the Chinese government is accompanied by a narrow definition of
successful, worthy lives in contemporary China: go to a high prestige university, find a job
that is both respectable and profitable, marry another successfully scripted individual, and
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breed similarly successful children (Kuan 2015; Jacka 2009b; Kipnis 2007). This definition
is a result of deepening economic inequality in post-socialist China and the sorting
biopolitics by the Chinese government, which publicly categorizes Chinese people into
high-quality and low-quality. For example, suzhi, directly translated to quality, is a
keyword in contemporary China, and it indicates one’s proximity to the ideal “good”
Chinese citizen (Jacka 2009a; Kipnis 2007; Greenhalgh 2010). A person’s quality can be
measured in many ways, including but limited to their education level, physical ability, if
they are a good worker, how much they act according to social norms, and how well they
obey the laws. If a person a categorized as high-quality, they will have access to various
social privileges, such as those enjoyed by the prestigious college graduates in Snow’s
observation (Wahlberg 2018). If a person is deemed low-quality, they will need to improve
themselves or be removed to make space for high-quality people (CMP 2017).
Yet, the cost is high to raise a high-quality child. Kuan (2015) pictures the
tremendous efforts and money middle-class Chinese parents invest to ensure their children
grow into high-quality people and to secure a bright future for their children. Such
investment would be unimaginable for migrant workers whose children could not even
access the educational resources in the city where their parents work. As a result, migrant
workers have two options left: sending their children to poorly resourced illegal schools in
cities, or leaving them behind in rural areas so they can go to a public school, which is still
poorly funded compared to public schools in urban China (Keung Wong, Li, and Song
2007; Qian and Walker 2015; China Labour Bulletin 2022). Many migrant worker mothers
have to leave their children behind when they work in cities (Peng 2018; Y. Liu and Erwin
2015). I chatted with a cafeteria worker in my college once, and she burst into tears when
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thinking about how far away her children were from her. At that time, I could not fully
understand her as a young college student. Now, when I hold my child in my arms, I realize
how deep her pain must have been. Besides the emotional suffering, children of migrant
workers are also locked into the bottom class because education is a crucial mechanism for
social mobility. It is from this reality that Snow believed that there would not be a good
future for his children.
In addition, contemporary China is marked by the withdrawal of the welfare
socialist state. In socialist China, the Chinese government and the collective economy serve
as the “provider of public health, education, housing and other goods and services” (Sun
and Yang 2019, 3). For example, free daycare was widely available for everyone
participating in the collective economy. However, the support from the state has gradually
disappeared since the economic reform in the 1970s. As a result, individuals and families
are asked to bear those responsibilities, i.e., “the collapse of the welfare state with the
substitution of marriage” (Boellstorff 2007, 232). Marriage serves as the ideal unit to
contain/privatize these responsibilities so the government can contribute as little as
possible. In other words, heteronormative marriages facilitate biopolitical exploitation in
the context of neoliberalism. However, the retreat of state support also comes with
increasing individualization in modern society. Familial supports are no longer available
as more and more people live far away from their families. With higher parenting standards
and less institutional as well as familial support, Chinese parents are asked to bear more
than they can handle. Snow’s refusal of reproduction might seem extreme compared to the
mainstream culture in contemporary China, but it is actually one end of the spectrum of
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vulnerability shared among Chinese individuals and parents in the context of neoliberal
biopolitics.
No future, no reproduction. Snow refuses to have children in the face of deepening
social inequality and discrimination against the working class by the Chinese government.
This rejection of the future reminds me of Lee Edelman’s (2004) book, No Future, in which
he argues, “we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all
of these fantasies reproduce the past, the displacement, in the form of the future” (31). For
Edelman, the future should be rejected because “the absolute privilege of
heteronormativity” (2) makes reproductive futurism the only available version of the
future, a future that would only replicate discrimination against queer people: “The future
is just repetition and just as lethal as the past” (31). Snow came from a similar logic because
he saw the future as toxic for working-class children, who would continually be treated
unfairly by this society just like Snow. It is from this forecast that Snow decides to stop the
future right here and right now.
Snow’s despair is a shared feeling among migrant workers. In 2010, 18 Foxconn
workers decided to protest inhumane working conditions with their lives, leaping from the
tall factory dormitories in Shenzhen. All of them are migrant workers aged from 17 to 25
(J. Chan and Pun 2010). They chose suicide because they did not see another way out as
there was no effective legal protection for migrant workers (Gallagher et al. 2015). In
Wanning Sun’s (2014) words, they chose “the most desperate and embodied form of
subaltern speech act: jumping off tall buildings” (21).
Instead of being viewed as a symptom of serious social problems, Snow’s despair
and protest are more likely to be viewed as a lack of zheng nengliang (positive energy), a
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term popularized by the Chinese government as a technique to govern the subjectivity and
emotions of contemporary Chinese (Hizi 2021; Z. Chen and Wang 2019; Hird 2018; P.
Yang and Tang 2018; Charlie Yi Zhang 2022). According to the logic of “positive energy,”
one should be positive and stop thinking about negative things for one’s own mental health;
If you are unhappy with a situation, it is because you lack positive energy. Moreover, it is
an individual’s obligation to increase the positive energy of the whole society by staying
positive and minimizing criticism. Ordinary Chinese are demanded to sacrifice for national
construction and a better future for China. This positive energy is charged by a progressive,
linear assumption that contemporary China is much better than its past and future China
will get even better: All existing social problems will be eliminated on the path to a hopeful
future.
Snow shared the hope defined by zheng nengliang: “The hope to make enough
money to support a family, the hope to live a life with dignity.” However, he did not believe
that this hope was available to him. Like many migrant workers in contemporary China,
Snow’s life demonstrates Charlie Yi Zhang’s (2022) keen observation of the impasse of
migrant workers’ lives: “No matter how hard they try, their love-imbued dreams remain a
mirage that leads them to perform still more self-defeating striving” (30). Snow recognized
that the evidence of progress in contemporary China is achieved at the expense of the
bottom class—migrant workers. This dream of progression is a powerful technique of
governmentality, but it also generates a space of resistance when one recognizes that hope
is not available to them.
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4.4

Attachment beyond Heteronormativity
Panda’s (Anhui, 29) life might sound a bit boring. He worked as a clerk in the local

government in a small town in Central China. During his work hours, he tried his best to
get what was assigned to him done and not to get too involved in office politics. After
work, he would work out a little bit, play half an hour of video games with his friends in
another city, watch a movie, then go to bed. On weekends, he would stay at home, chatting
with friends, watching movies, or playing games. Panda explained to me that he was not
addicted to video games: “For me, playing games is a way to connect with friends because
all my friends live in the city where I went to college.” Panda would love to live closer to
his friends, but he felt obligated to live close to his parents as their only child.
Because he is a 30-year-old single man, his parents were stressed out about it, and
his colleagues frequently made fun of him. He had wanted to buzz his head for a while, but
he was worried about what his colleagues would say. One day, he finally gathered the
courage, buzzed his hair, and went to work with a hat on. One co-worker threatened to take
away his hat so other people could see how funny he was. It was a small incident, but Panda
used it to explain why he preferred to stay at home: “In my hometown, I only feel at home
when I am by myself in my space, where there aren’t shit tons of rules telling me how to
behave.” When I asked him about marriage, he answered, “I don’t think that marriage is
necessary. I don’t think a romantic partner can offer much to my life.”
Panda might sound anti-social, but he dreamed of a type of sociality other than
marriage: “If I can choose freely, I want to be a carpenter and live in a house with several
friends, a cat, and a dog. Except for sex, what is the difference between a romantic partner
and a good friend? Even romantic partners will eventually become life partners and good
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friends.” At the time of our interview, Panda lived with his cat, Stary, who did not care
about Panda’s hairstyle or singlehood as long as he still provided canned fish and belly
rubs.
There are various forms of attachments other than heteronormative marriage in
contemporary China, although most of them are still emerging and largely invisible in
mainstream culture. Panda’s story is one example of such alternative attachments.
However, different forms of attachments are not viewed as equals but hierarchically
ranked, just like Ahmed’s (2010)comment on happiness: “Hierarchies of happiness may
correspond to social hierarchies that are already given” (12). Some forms of relationships
are viewed as substantial, meaningful, and heading towards a hopeful future, while others
“have been characterized as childish and immature notions of possibility” (Halberstam
2011, 23). In Panda’s case, he had to defend his video gaming sessions with friends because
they are viewed as unworthy, immature ways to spend his time. As a 30-year-old single
man, a more responsible way for Panda to spend his time would be actively seeking
marriage opportunities. Moreover, Panda’s attachment to his cat Stary is also viewed as
childish, not serious, and unfulfilling compared to heteronormative marriage. As a result,
Panda is stuck between heteronormativity and his dream of alternative attachments. It is
time to queer this hierarchy of relationality.
Theorists of attachment, relationality, kinship, belonging, and sociality have given
a considerable amount of attention to the condition of human connections using a range of
related concepts. Butler (2002) defines them as practices “that emerge to address
fundamental forms of human dependency, which may include birth, child-rearing, relations
of emotional dependency and support, generational ties, illness, dying, and death” (15). In
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other words, Butler believes that attachment is the answer to the vulnerability of living as
human beings, as bodies that need to be touched, held, soothed, supported, cared for, and
disposed of. Attachment is indispensable for human societies because it provides the interdependency that is essentially needed while living as human beings.
However, not all forms of attachment are equally acknowledged or supported. In
some cases, the legitimacy of one form of relationship is achieved under conditions that
deem other forms of attachments as illegible, illegitimate, or wrenched. The term guanggun
(bare sticks) is rooted in a heteronormative definition of kinship that is exclusively based
on marriage and biological reproduction. Thus, a person is reduced to a lonely, bare stick
without any kinship if they are marriage-less. However, guanggun’s lived experiences, as
I will discuss in the following paragraphs, demonstrate the opposite: They are not kin-less
but live in abundant, atypical attachments with and beyond human beings. Their queer
lifeworlds signify the emergence of alternative relationality in contemporary China. Given
the nature of human dependency and the limitation of heteronormativity, it is crucial to
facilitate diverse, more resilient forms of dependency relations or kinship practices.
In Butler’s discussion on kinship, especially whether traditional kinship like
marriage and biological reproduction should be pursued by the queer community, she
advocates for a more expansive understanding of kinship, “opening kinship to a set of
community ties that are irreducible to family” (Butler 2002, 38). In the section above, I
argued that Edelman’s (Edelman 2004) call for queer negativity is a powerful resistance
against reproductive futurism and biopolitics. From a different angle, José Esteban Muñoz
(2009) argued that queer relationality/belonging could also be a form of resistance because
it rejected the here and now and envisioned a utopian where “multiple forms of belonging
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in difference adhere to a belonging in collectivity” (20). In other words, a relationality that
is based not on exclusion but on inclusion, co-existence, and celebration of the differences
in belonging. As a feminist scholar, Donna Haraway also invites readers to reflect on the
exclusive and/or inclusive power of kinship: “Who lives and who dies, and how, in this
kinship rather than that one? What shape is this kinship, where and whom do its lines
connect and disconnect, and so what?” (Haraway 2016, 2). Moreover, she argues that
“making kin differently is at the heart of feminism” (Haraway 2018, 73). In addition,
Lauren Berlant (2011), in her discussion about love and social transformation, also
advocates for “a genuinely realistic and visionary set of transformations [of human
attachment] that do not overstate the consoling promises that sacrifice the human to an
idealized vision” (690). In other words, Berlant calls for a relationality that does not reduce
human beings to rigid social roles nor promise that all problems in life will find answers in
this relationship. The problem with heteronormativity is that it reduces the complexity of
human desires by posing as a one-size-for-all solution for all problems in life.
Many of the men I talked to expressed the feeling that they did not feel as
comfortable in romantic relationships as they did in friendships. Nice, for example, shared
with me, “Honestly, I do not feel like myself when I am in a romantic relationship. I don’t
know how to be with the other person or establish an intimate relationship. I feel really
comfortable with my friends, and I spend a lot of time with them effortlessly.” Panda would
love to live with his friends, but such a living arrangement is deemed illegitimate,
unproductive kinship in mainstream Chinese culture advocated by the Chinese government
(The Chinese Communist Party and The State Council 2021). As a result, he chose to live
close to his legitimate kin group (his parents) but in his own apartment with Stary the cat.
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Another group of Chinese face a similar yet distinctive problem in their quest for
non-normative kinship: women who seek to reproduce outside of marriage. They have
formed online advocate and resource groups, and their representative slogan is, “I just want
a sperm. Why do I have to marry a man?” (Duan 2022; D. Chen 2017; Cai 2022). In most
parts of China, apart from the Guangdong province, women who could not submit a
marriage certificate on her child’s birth certificate application will be punished with hefty
social support fine, a fine that usually applies to families with more children than the
population policy allows (D. Chen 2017). Moreover, single mothers cannot access maternal
leaves, a right granted by Chinese law to married mothers (Cai 2022). Given the low
fertility and aging crisis in contemporary China and the pronatalist policies of the Chinese
government, it seems counter-productive to restrict single women’s production. If
anything, this restriction demonstrates the partnership between patriarchy and the state
power to preserve and reinforce patrilineality.
In addition to alternative attachments to human beings, some research participants
also shared with me their attachment to non-human beings, such as animals and objects. It
might appear radical to expand kinship/relationality/attachment to non-human beings, but
the interspecies boundaries are fuzzier than they may initially appear. Haraway (2016)
argues that personhood is made via relationality rather than exclusively belonging to a
certain species: “Kin making is making persons, not necessarily as individuals or as
humans” (103). In contemporary China, some women believe that their personhood is
affirmed and preserved by companion animals (Tan, Liu, and Gao 2021; Tan 2021), and
their animals are quasi-persons (Doi and Pettier 2018). Compared to traditional marriages
that require women to give up their careers and pre-marital lives, crucial dimensions of
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their personhood, attachments with companion animals provide women affective support
but do not take away their career and life aspirations. As a result, many educated Chinese
women with successful careers choose a fuzzier version of families with companion
animals instead of one with husbands, children, and in-laws (C. K. K. Tan, Liu, and Gao
2021). In Panda’s case, he was comforted by Stary’s non-judgmental acceptance and
affection while his family and colleagues ridiculed his singlehood, hairstyle, and life in
general. In his words, he felts most like himself in his apartment with Stary. For him, Stary
has personality and emotions as well.
However, such attachment between humans and their companion animals is rarely
acknowledged in contemporary China. With the decreasing birth rate and the increase in
nuclear families, companion animals have become more and more popular in urban China
(Doi and Pettier 2018). With more and more people referring to their companion animals
as family members, this living arrangement is a form of alternative family-making.
However, this inter-species relationality is rarely understood outside of these households.
In contemporary China, there are four competing views on pets: companion animals, meat,
danger, and/or indifference (Pettier 2021; Doi and Pettier 2018; Hurley 2016). While some
regard them as affectionate companion animals, popular pets like dogs are still viewed as
meat animals across vast areas of China. For example, Yulin, China, celebrates the dog
meat festival every year. Some people also view pets as dangerous because they might
bring disease into the house or bite children. It is common to hear grandparents or parents
getting rid of pets to prepare for the birth of children. Lastly, for most people, pets are
simply viewed as insignificant animals who are incapable or unworthy of emotional
attachments.
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Some of my research participants found comfort in living with objects. For
example, Snow enjoyed reading books: “I used to read a lot of books, but now I feel that it
has no meaning no matter how much I know.” Despite his frustration and despair, at the
end of the interview, Snow told me, “I have wanted to read Nietzsche’s book Thus Spoke
Zarathustra for a long time. I’ll probably go find it sometime this weekend.” Snow is not
alone. Curiosity also shared his interest in humanities: “My hobby for humanities is useless
and impractical, but it sustains my spiritual world.” Contrary to the misconception of being
culture-less, migrant workers frequently visit the public libraries of the cities they work.
One migrant worker, Chen Zhi, went viral on the Chinese internet because of his love for
philosophy (Xiaofang Li 2022). Responding to the popular perception that migrant workers
are culture-less, Sun (2014) argues that this stereotype functions to mask migrant workers’
political subjectivity and potential for resistance: “it is only when their cultural practices,
strategies, and expressions are considered alongside the sociology and economics of labor
that a nuanced account of the political subjectification of this marginalized social group
can emerge” (4). In this cruel world, our hobby, no matter how useless, is one of the few
things that keep us sane.
How about the condition of human interdependency that Butler identifies at the
beginning of this section? What should guanggun do when they are sick or old? Who can
they depend on when they need support? Where can they obtain the care they need when
they are vulnerable? For many people who decided to stay single in contemporary China,
they plan to make enough money so they can live in a nursing home at old age (Cai 2022).
In Japan, single people can rent a family or a partner for emotional comfort (Batuman 2018;
Lee and Inuma 2022). Ironically, people tend to feel more liberated and empowered in
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these “purchased” relationships while more suffocated in “real” relationships because the
so-called “realness” demanded constant efforts to fit themselves into rigid social roles. Yet,
these solutions might not be affordable for low-class Chinese like guanggun. I do not have
an answer here, only a possible direction: there need to be non-kinship solutions for human
interdependency for those living with non-human attachments.
If anything, guanggun’s lived experiences showed us the vast possibilities of living
a human life outside of the narrow path defined by heteronormative marriage. Their lives
help us “to look beyond the narrow version of the here and now on which so many around
us who are bent on the normative count” (Muñoz 2009, 189). However, by no means do I
suggest that their resistance is fundamental, permanent, and completely innocent. All acts
of resistance are makeshift assemblages of discourses and resources available to them, and
they could very likely resist one dimension of power structures while reinforcing another.
As queer studies scholar Boellstorff (2007) identifies, “there is no inherently destabilizing
essence to singlehood, promiscuity, sex work, polyamory, even queerness itself; all can
serve to further the capitalist state’s reach” (235). He continues, “the fantasy of liberation,
that one can jump out of an oppressive system, is politically and theoretically problematic.
The term queer itself marks this stance of being always already within, in bed with,
complicit and contaminated by, the normative with which it engages” (241). Guanggun are
far from liberated. Rather, they struggle with the status quo. It is their struggles that queer
the system of heteronormative marriage.
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4.5

Making Queer Lifeworlds
Inspired by Halberstam’s study of the queer art of failure, I demonstrate how

guanggun’s failures to live in harmony with heteronormativity generate profound
resistance against patriarchal heteronormativity as well as capitalist and biopolitical
exploitation in contemporary China. With stories from their lived experience, I showcase
how guanggun offer a sharp critique of heteronormativity that poses heterosexual marriage
as the only path to happiness, enact an affective resistance by insisting on their personal
desires against the norms of hegemonic masculinity, reject a reproductive future that only
facilitates biopolitical exploitation against lower-class Chinese by the neoliberal Chinese
government, and envision alternative forms of attachment and lifeworlds outside of
heteronormativity. Although they are branded as failures, guanggun actually bring forward
revolutionary potential to transform the status quo.
In her book about happiness, the happiness prescription Ahmed (2010b) offers is
“to be happy with where we get to if we go beyond the straight lines of happiness scripts”
(115). It is a heartwarming note, but it also seems to put the burden of happiness on the
individuals as if everything will be fine as long as the individual knows how “to be happy.”
My writing about guanggun shows that one would have complicated feelings other than
happiness, feelings like relief, peace, weirdness, desperation, or being stuck, when they go
sideways off the happiness path. For many of them, happiness is not even at the top of their
concern list. They are looking for an end to the discrimination against them, a dignity that
is rarely enjoyed by lower-class Chinese, and a freedom to live outside of
heteronormativity. More than a shift of individual mindset, guanggun’s stories manifest
the need for diverse social support networks to accommodate different possibilities of life,
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i.e., “to make resources for living available to all objects in their thatness” (Berlant 2011,
690).
There needs to be structural support for queer, non-heteronormative lifeworlds.
Currently, families, especially women within families, are still the main bearers of care
work for the sick, the old, and the child. If social supports are only available to the married,
guanggun are doomed when they experience the vulnerability of living as human beings.
Existing studies find that guanggun struggle with caring for their older parents (Huijun Liu
and Feng 2019), lack effective support network when they are sick, and suffer from
discrimination and low quality of life (S. Wang, Yang, and Eklund 2021; X. Yang, Wang,
and Eklund 2020; S. Wang, Yang, and Attané 2018; Xudong Zhou and Hesketh 2017).
Yet, the need for state support also comes with a caution against state power. When Butler
(2002) comments on same-sex marriage, they argue that “it becomes increasingly
important to keep the tension alive between maintaining a critical perspective and making
a politically legible claim” (20). For guanggun, it is crucial to seek governmental support
without losing their radical critique of and resistance against biopolitical governmentality.
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CHAPTER 5. EPILOG: WHAT NOW?
I find it a bit difficult to write this epilog as I worry that whatever I say here would
not be good enough to end this project, but it is not an ending, right? A dissertation is a
stage of my work, not an end. From what I have read in many scholars’ first books, I will
very likely return to my dissertation again and again in the next few years. As for this
epilog, it is a marker of where I should start the next time.
In the past four chapters, I have introduced who guanggun are and their unique
social positions as the bottom class in contemporary China, criticized the intersectional
structural forces that marginalize guanggun, and shown the complexity of their lived
experiences. On the one hand, they internalize patriarchal, heteronormative gender norms
that offer them a slim sense of power but hinder them from forming mutual, meaningful,
and loving connections. On the other hand, their failures in entering heterosexual marriages
leave them at odds with the status quo, generating a revolutionary space to rebel against
the very structural forces that alienate them. With embodied protests, they live out not only
critiques against heteronormative marriage as well as capitalist and biopolitical
exploitations but also lifeworlds full of queer, alternative attachments with human and
beyond human beings.
My dissertation ended here, but there are so many unanswered questions. What
could be done to foster guanggun’s alternative lifeworlds? Are guanggun extra vulnerable
compared to those sheltered within heteronormative kinship systems? If so, what are the
sources of effective support? State welfare? Or diverse small communities built on consent
and collective belonging? In this epilog, I first reflect on the interactions between this
project and my personal life, especially how happenstances in my life shape the way I think
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and write about guanggun. Then, I will explore these questions from my personal
experiences and intellectual lineage.
I chose guanggun as my dissertation project because it felt safe. When I was 20
years old, I tried to write about the media representation of domestic violence as my college
capstone paper, but I failed because I had too close a relationship with that topic—my
father hit my mother, my brother, and me frequently for 20 years. To collect data on media
representation, I had to read news stories with detailed records of unaccountable violence,
futile resistance, and patriarchal injustice. After reading them, I would cry, want to scream
or punch the wall, and curl up in bed for hours. I knew why I was pulled to that topic, but
I concluded that I should never get near my trauma again in academic writing after
submitting a paper that my then advisor commented as “hollow.” Of course it was hollow—
I was running circles around my pain. With lessons learned from my capstone paper, I
make sure to pick academic project topics that interest me but are not too close to me; I
really do not want to fail again. Guanggun is a safe topic for me. I am a woman, married
to a cis-man, on the journey of becoming a mother, and living a middle-class life—
checking nearly all the boxes of heteronormativity, while guanggun are a group of single
men cast as failures because they could not continue the patrilineal family lines or achieve
financial success—the two most crucial standards of masculine success in contemporary
China. Moreover, it is a fascinating and academically productive topic that ties diverse
strands of scholarship together: masculinity studies, feminism, and queer studies, to name
a few.
Yet, it was still an emotionally strenuous journey to write about them, and rightfully
so—after all, I am writing about gender-based violence and lives trapped in patriarchal
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gender norms. Sometimes, when I stared at my sleeping newborn son—his defenselessly
open mouth, the plumpy draping arms, and the rise and fall of his tiny belly, I would think
about the sections on patriarchy and masculinity that I had just read or written or the
misogynist comments from my interviewees: How would patriarchy transform my son?
Would he one day look down on women? Would he expand that disdain to me, the person
whom he currently trusts and adores the most? I think about this poem, “I Know All
Mothers Say Their Children Are Sweet,” by Raquel Vasquez Gilliland (2017):
Then there’s me at eighteen, walking to
the grocery store in Kansas City for
navel oranges. A man grabbed my
shoulder and waist, pressed his erection
into my hip. My spine became stone and
stayed that way for so long I couldn’t
cry or it would shatter.

Now I wonder if this man was ever sweet.
Did he hug his mother with the same body
he assaulted me with. Did he nurse while
looking at her as though she were all
that’s good and wonderful in this universe?

Sometimes, the violence in my dissertation and the violence in the world-in-themaking would cross their path, and I simply could no longer pretend that they were not that
close to me. In January, all Chinese witnessed how a woman was chained in a shack and
forced to give birth to seven children (A. Cao and Feng 2022); Since the pandemic
lockdown in Shanghai in March, the police have been refusing to respond to domestic
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violence calls because they cannot enter residential buildings due to COVID-19
restrictions, so they demand victims to “just put up with it and wait until Shanghai lifts the
lockdown” (Ti 2022); In April, Xu Xiuhua, a disabled female poet in China announced her
wedding plan, but she received overwhelmingly hate comments as a famous woman
marrying a younger man and violating the rule of female hypergamy (P. Wu 2022); In May,
Chinese parents are shocked by the sexist illustrations—one boy grabs a girl’s breast while
another boy lifts another girl’s skirt—in a math textbook for 4th graders (Davidson 2022);
In June, a group of men slapped, punched, kicked, and dragged several women out a
restaurant because the women had refused to be harassed (W. Zhang 2022).
I read these enraging Chinese news stories online while safely nesting in my home
in the United States, but that safety I felt was more of an illusion than reality. On June 24th,
the US Supreme Court overturned the Roe versus Wade ruling and effectively took away
the right of self-determination for people with a uterus. The same day, I started my
menstruation almost eight-month postpartum—I can become pregnant again, and this time,
I do not have the right to the healthcare that I might need. Abortion is not the key word
here; it is body integrity, personhood, and the right of self-determination. In this
dissertation, I wrote about how women went through sex-selective abortions to comply
with the son preference in patriarchy within the fertility restriction of China’s family
planning policy. Whether it is forced abortion or forced birth, the problem is that women
rarely have a say in their reproductive outcome, and human bodies are regarded as
instruments for patriarchal cultures, religions, and governments.
The instrumentalization of human lives—This is the logic that I have visited and
revisited in this dissertation. Guanggun entered the sight of Chinese mainstream media as
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a malfunction of China’s laborer-and-consumer-supply machine—the Chinese population,
when demographers recognized that the sex ratio at birth in China is unusually high
compared to the average numbers worldwide (Guilmoto 2012; C. Tucker and Van Hook
2013; Poston Jr, Conde, and DeSalvo 2011). This kind of comparison is commonplace for
population structure analysis, where a population is reduced to numerical variables and
analyzed from an engineering perspective. Apart from the sex structure, age, regional, and
education structures are other common axes of analysis. By designing an ideal population
structure with maximum productivity, demographers compare an existing population to
this ideal and problematize the mismatching parts. It is from this mode of thinking that
demographers regard guanggun as a problem. However, this mode of thinking still follows
the logic that instrumentalizes human lives as tools.
As I have discussed in Chapter Four, guanggun and many other social groups in
China are resisting this logic with embodied protests and by living out queer, abundant
lifeworlds. Yet, their resistance is extra precarious in a society where marriage and
biological family are still the main sources of care and social support. Moreover, the
dominant heteronormative culture also actively discriminates against and pathologizes
those who are living in non-normative, alternative lifeworlds. Its dominance is built on
otherizing, devaluing, and destructing the queer lifeworlds. In addition, the Chinese
government also seeks to reinforce this strong heteronormative culture in its latest family
planning policy so it can continue to enjoy a stable supply of laborers and consumers
without investing in state welfare. The government also prefers to frame guanggun as a
poverty issue and believes that capitalist development in rural areas is the answer to all of
guanggun’s problems (L. Yang 2019; D. Peng 2017). This poverty frame obscures the root
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causes of the guanggun crisis—a severely unbalanced sex ratio in a highly heteronormative
society with little state welfare support.
Still, scholars argue that government assistance and protection should be the
solution to guanggun’s struggles because the government is strong enough to protect small,
diverse communities from being consumed or destructed by the dominant culture. As
guanggun are outsiders of a highly heteronormative society, many scholars argue that they
are in need of various forms of protection and support to improve their physical and mental
wellbeing (Attané and Yang 2018; S. Wang, Yang, and Attané 2018; Xudong Zhou and
Hesketh 2017). For example, without partners or children, guanggun are especially
vulnerable when they are sick or old, and government-funded, community-based care
facilities would offer the support much needed in these situations. Therefore, the
government should create supportive policies for people with a non-reproductive future,
such as “more innovative community-oriented social relations beyond one’s family [, …
n]ew policies and living alternatives that extend support to non-biologically related people”
(Huang and Wu 2018, 129). Furthermore, the government should also grant more rights to
people outside of heteronormativity, such as single people’s rights to parenthood, or samesex couples’ rights to marriage.
But here is the question: will the state power protect or support non-normative
communities? It depends on the nature of the state power. If the state power truly represents
a collection of diverse communities, then it will protect smaller communities from being
harmed by the dominant culture. However, if it is controlled by the powerful, then it will
not be motivated to protect the smaller communities. Rather, it will continue
disenfranchising non-normative communities. Therefore, the need for state support also
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comes with a caution against state power. Currently, the Chinese government still refuses
to acknowledge its responsibility in creating the guanggun crisis to avoid any blame for its
family planning policy. It also seeks to reinforce heteronormativity and its biopolitical
exploitation against guanggun. Why would it be motivated to protect or support guanggun?
For guanggun, it is crucial to seek governmental support without losing its radical critique
of biopolitical governmentality.
More importantly, I believe it is even more crucial to find another way to protect
and support alternative lifeworlds. Would diverse communities be able to collaborate and
protect themselves? Would they be able to do so without neglecting their differences or
merging into a big, uniform, and oppressive culture that seeks to dominate others? People
across diverse communities argue quite often. Several days ago, I went to a reproductive
rights rally and saw first-hand how challenging it is to collaborate across different
communities: after a black female college student expressed her opinion that the democrat
party was not doing its best to defend reproductive rights, an elderly white woman walked
up the stage and argued that Democrats were still the best option available. This is only
one small instance of the multiple disagreements I saw that day: some were upset that the
word “women” was not inclusive enough for non-binary and trans people with a uterus;
some believed that socialism was the solution, while others were holding onto the capitalist
promise; at the protest, some white women, because they had never been the target of police
brutality, could not understand why women of color took extra precautions to conceal their
identities. Yet, despite the differences, we were all there for one goal—to take back rights
to our bodies. I believe this kind of division is helpful, but what should the future of queer
politics be? How to work together despite differences? How to work together without
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eliminating differences? How can we live “a meantime that can challenge
heteronormativity’s truth without subscribing to the liberationist fantasy of avoiding all
complicity and imbrication” (Boellstorff 2007, 242)? These are the questions that I want
to answer in my next project. I am so grateful that guanggun lead me here.
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APPENDIX. INFORMED CONSENT
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
KEY INFORMATION For guanggun in contemporary China

I am asking you to choose whether or not to volunteer for a research on guanggun in
contemporary rural China. If you are single male, more than 25 years old, and from rural
China, I am interested in understanding your experience of marriage and reproduction
prospect. This page is to give you key information to help you decide whether to
participate. I have included detailed information after this page. If you have questions later,
you can ask me. My contact information is listed below.
what is the STUDY ABOUT AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
In this study about guanggun, I hope to understand the living situation of guanggun in
contemporary China, especially how guanggun struggle with marriage and the prospect of
reproduction, and how this struggle is complicated by socio-economic class, ability,
population structure, and urban-rural inequalities. Therefore, I need to interview you about
your life experience as guanggun and to observe your daily life in different settings. I will
audio record the interview and take notes of my observation. Your participation in this
research will last about 1-5 hours.
What are KEY reasons you might choose to volunteer for this study?
By participating in this study, you can fill a crucial gap in reproductive scholarship—the
lack of masculinity studies, and help Chinese people, or people all over the world, to better
understand how men and masculinities interact with politics of reproduction. Findings in
this research can promote social changes that alleviate the pressures on disadvantaged
groups about reproduction. You can also help increase the visibility of underrepresented
groups in the English-language academia. For a complete description of benefits and/or
rewards, refer to the Detailed Consent.
What are Key reasons you might choose NOT to volunteer for this study?
To participate in this study, you need to share your personal experiences and beliefs related
to reproduction. This may make you uncomfortable and exposed. But I promise you that
NONE of your identifiable information will be collected or published without your
permission. For a complete description of risks, refer to the Detailed Consent.
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY?
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer.
You will not lose any services, benefits, or rights you would normally have if you choose
not to volunteer.
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WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS OR CONCERNS?
The person in charge of this study is Ruwen Chang of the University of Kentucky, a Ph.D.
candidate in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies. Her advisor is Dr. M.
Cristina Alcalde. If you have questions, suggestions, or concerns regarding this study or
you want to withdraw from the study, you can reach her via email ruwenchang@uky.edu,
or Wechat ID changruwen. You can also contact her advisor, Dr. Alcalde, at
cristina.alcalde@uky.edu.
If you have any questions, suggestions or concerns about your rights as a volunteer in this
research, contact staff in the University of Kentucky (UK) Office of Research Integrity
(ORI) between the business hours of 8am and 5pm EST, Monday-Friday at 1-859-2579428, or visit the website https://www.research.uky.edu/office-research-integrity. The ORI
staff can only communicate or respond in English.
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DETAILED CONSENT:
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU WOULD NOT QUALIFY FOR THIS STUDY?
If you are not a single male who is more than 25 years old and from rural China, you are
not qualified to participated for this study.
WHERE WILL THE STUDY TAKE PLACE AND WHAT IS THE TOTAL
AMOUNT OF TIME INVOLVED?
The research procedures will be conducted at a private place you choose to be interviewed,
whether it is your home or a rental private space. You will be interviewed only one time,
and a follow-up interview may be requested if there is need for clarification on anything
from the original interview. The original interview will last about 1-2 hours, and the
potential follow-up interview will last no longer than the original one. The total amount of
time you will be asked to volunteer for this study is 1-5 hours over the next six months.
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?
During the first visit, I will introduce myself and the study to you by showing you this
informed consent. You can choose whether to participate in this study or not. If you agree
to participate, I will interview you about your life experience as guanggun. The interview
will last about 1 hour and be audio-recorded. I will also observe you while you conduct
daily activities for 1-2 hours. In addition, I will ask you to share some pictures or videos
with me. If it is digital, I will ask you to send it to me; if it is printed, I will take a picture
of it. If you provide visual artifacts, your identifiable information will only be published
with your permission. Meanwhile, I will take notes of our conversation and your activities.
You do not have to answer every question I asked. You can end your participation any time
you want.
If you agree to provide visual artifacts and allow the researcher to publish them, please
choose whether you want to remove the identifiable information in your artifacts.
I will provide the researcher with artifacts that all identifiable information (face, address,
name, etc.) is removed.
I will provide the researcher with artifacts as the way they are.”
This process may repeat if there are more than one visit. The purpose of a follow-up visit
is to gain clarification on the original interview. During both the original visit and the
follow-up visit, I will observe and interview you on your current activities. The number
and frequency of the visits depend on my judgement of the sufficiency of existing data.
The follow-up visit will only happen if you are willing to accept it.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
This study only poses minimal risk on you. During the interview or observation, you may
feel uncomfortable to answer some personal question. You may also feel that your privacy
is intruded. In addition, you may also feel sad or upset. Please remember that you do not
169

have to answer every question I asked, and you can end your participation any time you
want. You can also seek help from the list of free psychological counselling resources I
provided.
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
I do not know if you will get any benefit from taking part in this study. However, you may
feel happy that your participation in this study has contributed to knowledge related to
Chinese people, and people all over the world, especially their experiences related to
reproduction. You may also enjoy the comfort of being heard and seen during the interview
or observation. More importantly, if you take part in this study, information learned may
help others.
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE?
There are no costs associated with taking part in this study.
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE?
When I write about or share the results from the study, I will write about the combined
information and keep your name and other identifying information private unless you give
permission for me to publish your identifiable information. I will make every effort to
prevent anyone from knowing that you gave me information, or what that information is.
All the records will be protected with passwords. However, there is a possibility that I may
use transcription services to transcript the audio recording into text. To protect your
privacy, I will erase all identifiable information in the audio recording before I send it to
transcription services.
You should know that there are some circumstances in which I may have to show your
information to other people when you express tendency to hurt yourself or other people.
For example, the law may require me to share your information with:
authorities, if you report information about a child being abused, or if you pose a danger to
yourself or someone else.
To ensure the study is conducted properly, officials at the University of Kentucky may look
at or copy pertinent portions of records that identify you.
The Chinese law require me to report any criminal activity I learn about during my
interaction with you. Please note that I will have to contact the proper authorities if you
report any illegal activities.
CAN YOU CHOOSE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY EARLY?
You can choose to leave the study at any time. You will not be treated differently if you
decide to stop taking part in the study.
If you choose to leave the study early, data collected until that point will remain in the
study database and may not be removed.
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The investigators conducting the study may need to remove you from the study if:
you are not able to follow the directions,
they find that your participation in the study is more risk than benefit to you.
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study.
WHAT ELSE DO YOU NEED TO KNOW?
If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of about 90 people to do so.
I am being guided in this research by Cristina Alcalde, who is my faculty advisor that
guides me in this research. There may be other people on the research team assisting at
different times during the study.
WILL YOUR INFORMATION BE USED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH?
No, your information will only be used in this study. Your information collected for this
study will NOT be used or shared for future research studies, even if we remove the
identifiable information like your name.
By continuing with the interview, you consent to participate in this study.
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